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This dissertation consists of three chapters examining the important role of
firm and coworker characteristics, as well as the use of social networks, in labor mar-
kets. The first paper investigates the effect of firm owners and coworkers on hiring
patterns and wages. Immigrant-owned firms are more likely to hire immigrant work-
ers. This prevalence is especially strong for Hispanic and Asian workers. We also find
that the probability that a new hire is a Hispanic is higher for immigrant firms. On
wage differentials, the results illustrate that much of the difference between the log
annual wages of immigrants and natives can be explained by immigrants’ propensity
to work in non-native owned firms, which pay the lowest average wages. Interest-
ingly, though, native workers holding a job in immigrant firms are paid less than
immigrant workers. The last section examines the potential mechanisms for these
findings. It explores the importance of job referral and use of networks for migrants
in labor markets. We consider the theoretical implications of social ties between
owners and workers in this context. Firms decide whether to fill their vacancies by
posting their offers or by using their current workers’ connections.
Next, we explore the patterns of immigrant concentration relative to native
workers at the establishment level in a sample of metropolitan areas. Immigrants are
much more likely to have immigrant coworkers than are natives, and are particularly
likely to work with others from the same country of origin, even within local markets.
The concentration of immigrants is higher for recent immigrants and interestingly for
older immigrants. We find large differences associated with establishment size that
cannot be explained solely by statistical aggregation. Exploring the mechanisms
that underlie these patterns, we find that proxies for the role of social networks, as
well as the importance of language skills in the production process, are important
correlates of immigrant concentration in the workplace.
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Over the last several decades, labor markets in many cities in the US have
absorbed large inflows of new immigrants. During the same period, numerous em-
pirical studies have analyzed the effect of immigration in the host economy. In
the early 90s the consensus was that there is only a small effect of immigration on
native economic outcomes (Grossman [1982]). However, since the late 90s, the con-
sensus moved toward a significant effect of foreign-born migration on natives (Borjas
[1994]). Recent surveys on the economics of immigration [Borjas, 2003, 2005], Fried-
berg and Hunt,1995; Card, 2001; Card and Lewis,2005; Card, 2006) conclude that
the impact of immigration on the wages and employment is still unclear.
As of 2007, immigrant workers represented 15% of the U.S. population. The
impact of large inflows of immigrants and their assimilation into the host economy
has been a primary objective of analysis in the labor literature. How such large
flows of workers are incorporated into the labor market and interact with various
businesses and workers is of special interest. An alternative literature has focused on
how firms respond to an inflow of immigrants. The key question is no longer one of
job supply but also one of job distribution. Lewis and Card [2005] and Beaudry et al.
[2006] look at an exogenous local unskilled labor supply change and find that areas
with higher concentration of immigrants have employed higher number of unskilled
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workers and increased productivity at the same time. Their findings also suggest a
small impact of immigration on natives’ relative wages.
In this analysis, the role of business owners in the patterns of hires and earnings
in the labor market is relevant. In particular, some studies have found that the type
of manager recruiting new workers is a determinant in the workforce composition of
the business. In a extensive analysis of race and ethnic segregation across workplaces
in the U.S., Hellerstein and Neumark [2007] find that a large degree of segregation
remains even after accounting for metropolitan area, education and occupation. In a
follow-up paper, they explore the role of residential networks in these patterns, and
found preliminary evidence of its relevance for low-educated and low-English-ability
workers.
On the other hand, many other authors have analyzed the direct effect of the
type of manager on the type of worker in the firm. For instance, Carrington and
Troske [1995] and Giuliano and Ransom [2008] have found that females and blacks
are disproportionately employed by female and black supervisors respectively. Mean-
while, Stoll et al. [2004] found that black businesses receive more applications from
black workers and employ more black workers than other businesses. Giuliano and
Ransom [2008] found a causal relation between the race of managers and workers
using panel data of a retail store. They control for the unobserved characteristics
that can also affect the race of the coworkers and hires in a firm. Although the pri-
mary determinants of the racial composition of new hires are workplace and location
characteristics, manager race also stands as a significant component. Nevertheless,
this second group of analyses have been mainly focused on black versus white issues
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and particular industries.
In the sociology literature, there have been a limited number of studies that
provide some insights on the tendency of immigrants to work for immigrant firms.
For instance, in Los Angeles in 1989, 30 percent of employed Koreans held jobs in
firms owned by fellow Koreans even though Koreans composed only one percent of
the Los Angeles County population.1 According to Cardenas and Hansen [1988],
during the 1980s, Mexican immigrant employers were most likely to hire Mexican,
whether legal or undocumented, and were more likely to evaluate their quality favor-
ably. Porter and Wilson [1980] find two relevant patterns in the Cuban immigration
to Miami during the 1960s. First, Cubans worked with other Cubans. Second,
almost one-third of the Cubans worked for Cuban employers. The phenomenon
of immigrants hiring immigrants is not limited to coethnic relationships between
employees and employers. Other researchers have found that employers from one
immigrant group often hire workers from other ethnic/racial groups.2 Immigrant
entrepreneurs can take advantage of their language, cultural background and affini-
ties to have access to different ethnic groups. Their immigrant status can give them
privileged access to sources of labor less available to native entrepreneurs. Immi-
grant entrepreneurs routinely employ coethnics (including relatives) at rates vastly
above chance levels.3
Making use of unique longitudinal and cross-sectional micro level databases,
this thesis examines the role of owners, coworkers and networks, focusing on the
1Min [1989].
2Light [2006].
3Massey [1999], Massey et al. [1987].
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importance of immigration and race/ethnicity on hiring patters, the scope for seg-
regation and wage differentials. The main contributions of the research presented
in this document are providing new stylized facts on the immigration issue and
evidence on the role of social networks in labor markets4.
The outline of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 analyzes the effect of the
birthplace of firm owners and coworkers on hiring patterns and wages. Using a
unique matched sample from an employer-employee administrative database and a
survey of characteristics of firm owners, this chapter studies the impact of the type
of employers and individual coworkers (native versus immigrant workers, and eth-
nic/racial groups) on firm hiring patterns and workers’ average log wages. We con-
nect owner and firm characteristics (place of birth, size and industry) with workers’
characteristics (wage, age, education, and place of birth) to test different assump-
tions about firm hiring patterns and the wage differentials of workers of different
types. Given the unique features of the matched database, the data allows asking
whether the odds that a worker of a particular group is hired are related to the types
of owners and coworkers, and whether there exist wage premia associated with being
an immigrant and working for or with other immigrants.
Our results suggest that immigrant owners are three percentage points more
likely to hire other immigrants than native owners, even after controlling for indus-
try, firm size, geographic concentration of immigrants in the population, population
density, and the legal form of organization of the firm. Looking at ethnic/race
groups, immigrant owners are 3 to 4 percentage points more likely than native own-
4For an extensive analysis on job information networks see Ioannides and Loury [2004].
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ers to hire Asians and Hispanics versus blacks. Both types of owners, immigrants and
natives, hire white non-Hispanic workers, but native owners have a higher probability
of having white workers as new hires. These results are based on linear probability
models as well as multinomial logit specification that accounts for the simultaneity
of choosing from among different types of workers. Among our strongest findings
are the existence of a persistent pattern of hiring similar types and the effect of the
share of dissimilar coworkers on the likelihood of hiring a particular individual. For
instance, the increase of the share of similar coworkers at the time of recruitment by
100 workers increases the probability of hiring a worker of a type by around 60%.
The probability is smaller if we look at the effect of the fraction of coworkers of other
different types. Additionally, this probability depends on whether the employer is
immigrant versus native. Immigrant businesses show higher chances of hiring a new
immigrant, Hispanic or Asian worker compared to native businesses, even after con-
trolling for whether they have similar workforce distribution at the time of a new
recruitment.
Later, after controlling for owner’s race, our results are similar. Hispanic and
Asian owners are 2.5 percentage points more likely to hire their own type (Hispanic
and Asian workers respectively) than white and black owners. Given the lack of
representation of native Hispanic and Asian owners in the data, we were not able
to control for the cross categories race-birthplace. To the best of our knowledge, no
previous study has analyzed the link between employer and coworkers’ birthplaces
and employees’ employment opportunities and wages. This research provides initial
steps on that branch of analysis.
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Chapter 3 presents descriptive evidence on immigrant segregation at the work-
place and analyzes the mechanisms that drive immigrant concentration. We have
unique matched employer-employee data for a large number of states in the US that
permits quantifying the extent of and covariates of the workplace concentration of
immigrants. A lack of suitable data has limited economists’ ability to address these
questions. The paper has two broad objectives. The first is primarily descriptive.
The descriptive findings show that immigrants are much more likely to have immi-
grant coworkers than are natives. This pattern is driven partly by the geographic
concentration of immigrants, but the patterns hold true even within local labor
markets. At the same time, most immigrants do have native coworkers; only a
small share work in immigrant-only workplaces. The concentration of immigrants
is higher for recent immigrants and, conditional on recent arrival, for older immi-
grants. Part of the assimilation process is a movement towards more interaction
with natives in the workplace over time, and younger immigrants are more likely to
work with natives. We find large differences associated with firm size: concentration
is much higher in smaller firms, but is far from zero even in the largest firms. We
also find substantial variation in the extent of immigrant concentration across in-
dustries even after controlling for a detailed set of location, employer and employee
characteristics.
Second, our finding that the allocation of immigrants across workplaces is
far from random raises the question of what drives this workplace concentration.
Both the existing literature and our descriptive findings suggest that it is important
to consider how businesses hire their employees and the choices that businesses
6
make about the skill mix of their workforce. One relevant issue here is the role
that language skills play in governing interactions among employees and between
employees and customers. A second issue is the role of social networks in the process
that matches workers and firms. A third issue is human capital - the sorting and
concentration of immigrants in the workplace may reflect sorting by skills. In the
second part of the paper, we explore the role of these factors. We find evidence that
immigrants with primarily immigrant coworkers are likely to have coworkers who
live in the same residential tract. This pattern is robust to inclusion of controls for
other closely related factors such as residential segregation. We also find evidence
that immigrant workers with poor English speaking ability and low education are
more likely to work with immigrant coworkers.
Our findings suggest that social connections and social capital may be im-
portant for understanding workplace concentration, employment opportunities and
wage differentials. Continuing this line of thought, Chapter 5 offers the conclusions
and discusses on the main factors that can explain the previous findings. It is in-
tended to focus on the role on networks in the labor markets, and the connection of
our findings with previous empirical and theoretical literature. It also describes the
key issues to be considered to develop in appropriate theory.
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Chapter 2
Does It Matter Who I Work For And Who I Work With?
The Impact Of Owners And Coworkers On Wages And
Hiring
2.1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the effect of the birthplace of firm owners and coworkers
on hiring patterns and wages. As of 2007, immigrant workers represented 15% of the
U.S. population. The impact of large inflows of immigrants and their assimilation
into the host economy has been a primary area of study in the labor literature.
How such large flows of workers are incorporated into the labor market and interact
with various businesses and workers is of special interest. The role of business
owners in the patterns of hires and earnings in the labor market has played an
important role in this literature. In particular, some studies have found that the
type of manager recruiting new workers is a determinant of the firm’s workforce
composition. For instance, Carrington and Troske [1995] and Giuliano and Ransom
[2008] have found that females and blacks are disproportionatly employed by female
and black supervisors respectively. Meanwhile, Stoll et al. [2004] found that black
businesses receive more applications from black workers and employ more black
workers than other businesses.
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Using a unique matched sample from an employer-employee administrative
database and a survey of characteristics of small-firm owners, this study analyzes
the impact of the type of employers and individual coworkers (natives versus immi-
grants, or ethnic groups) on firm hiring patterns and workers’ average log wages.
Firm types are defined by the type of owner (immigrant-owned versus native-owned),
while ‘’coworker” refers to the fraction of same-kind fellow workers holding a job in
the same firm. The share of immigrant coworkers in the firm is called the coworker
index.1 We connect owner and firm characteristics (place of birth, size and industry)
with workers’ characteristics (wage, age, education, and place of birth) to test dif-
ferent assumptions about firm hiring patterns and the wage differentials of workers
of different types. Given the unique features of the matched database, the data
allows asking whether there exist wage premia associated with being an immigrant
and with working for or with other immigrants.
The type of a new hire can be affected by the type of employer in different
ways. First, social networks, segregated by race or similar background, could be
used by job seekers and by employers when looking for new candidates. Ethnic
communities provide a network for immigrant entrepreneurs to find workers, to sell
ethnic goods, and to obtain credit. Second, matching productivity generated by
employer-employee similarity could motivate owners to employ same-kind individ-
uals. In certain industries the use of a common language may be important for
productive efficiency. Third, employer tastes might bias them to employ workers
1In this Chapter, the expressions firm type and owner type are used to explain that firm’s
owners correspond to one of the following groups: native-only, immigrant-only, and mix owned
firms.
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of a similar kind. Employer discrimination could generate scope for segregation.2
However, coworker effects could compensate for the presence of employer discrimi-
nation. In fact, for all types of owners the share of similar coworkers increases the
probability of being hired in the firm. We also control for specific characteristics
in the firm, such as the fraction of English speakers, to identify the possible scope
for matching productivity. This paper focuses on the importance of social ties in
the process of recruitment when firms use current employees’ social connections to
help find and identify new candidates. However, employers may use this mechanism
differently for different worker types, depending on their ability to take advantage
of their workers’ connections. For instance, given their cultural, linguistic, and so-
cial backgrounds, immigrant employers have an advantage, compared to natives, in
exploiting their immigrant workers’ social connections.
Our results suggest that immigrant owners are three percentage points more
likely than native owners to hire other immigrants, even after controlling for indus-
try, firm size, geographic concentration of immigrants in the population, popula-
tion density, and the legal form of organization of the firm. Looking at ethnic/race
groups, immigrant owners (Hispanic/Asian owned firms) are 3 to 4 percentage points
more likely than native owners (white and black owned firms) to hire Asians and
Hispanics versus blacks and whites. Both, native and immigrant owners, hire white
non-Hispanic workers, but native owners have a higher probability of having white
workers as new hires. These results are based on both linear probability models and
a multinomial logit specification that accounts for the simultaneity of choosing from
2Lang [1986]
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different types of workers.
Among our strongest findings are the existence of a persistent pattern of hiring
similar types and the smaller effect of the share of dissimilar coworkers on the like-
lihood of hiring a particular individual. For instance, the share of similar coworkers
at the time of recruitment increases the probability of hiring a worker of a type by
around 60%. The probability is higher when the owner is similar to the new hired.
Additionally, this probability is different whether the employer is immigrant versus
native. Immigrant businesses show higher chances of hiring a new immigrant, His-
panic or Asian compared to native businesses, even after looking whether they have
similar workforce distribution at the time of a new recruitment.
To study the wages of employees, one must understand the role of employers
in wage-setting, which necessitates gathering wage data by employer and having
detailed information about the employer. Immigrant workers tend to have lower av-
erage wages than native workers. Many authors have used a human capital approach
to explain that wage gap and have found that skill accounts for almost two thirds of
the wage difference between Hispanics and white Non-Hispanics.3 Meanwhile, the
residual unexplained wage gap has traditionally been used to claim the existence
of racial/ethnic discrimination in the labor market. Other authors have found that
industry wage-differentials are to a very large extent explained by the characteristics
of workers and the contribution of industry to wage setting is much smaller after
looking at both person and that industry effects.4 However, these studies don’t rule
3Borjas [1994], Trejo [1997], Chiswick [1978], Borjas [2003] among others.
4Abowd et al. [1999]
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out a significant impact of firm-level effects on wage formation.5 The results in this
paper suggest that much of the difference between the log annual wages of immi-
grants and natives comes from immigrants’ propensity to work in non-native owned
firms, which pay the lowest average log annual wages. Interestingly, though, native
workers holding a job in immigrant firms are paid less than immigrant workers. Af-
ter controlling for typical human capital variables, full-time immigrant workers earn
about 8% less than native workers ($3,293 less each year). When working for native
employers this difference increases to 11%. Meanwhile, immigrant workers earn 10%
more than native workers in immigrant owned firms ($4,398 more each year).
Recent work has used the idea of networks in the labor market to explain labor
market inequalities as a function of differential social capital (social resources, net-
work structures, network resources). Minority individuals are generally connected
to other minority-group workers who cannot provide them with the opportunity to
change their employment outcomes. Hispanics and blacks are disadvantaged be-
cause they are likely to match with same-kind job contacts, and end up working in
lower wage workplaces where other Hispanics and blacks work (Elliot [2001]).
To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has analyzed the link between
employer and coworkers’ birthplaces and employees’ employment opportunities and
wages in a large set of industries and geographic locations. This research provides ini-
tial steps on that branch of analysis. These findings suggest that social connections
and social capital may be important for understanding employment opportunities
5These authors obtained that the average of the difference in wages paid to an identical worker
employed at two different firms in France was 20%-30%.
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and wage differentials.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 and section
2.3 review previous work on the relation between workers and types of firms, eth-
nic economies and ’ethnic matching’ between supervisors and employees, the usage
of networks, and network effects on hiring procedures and workers’ wages. It also
discusses the importance of analyzing small businesses when looking at the impact
of immigration. Section 2.4 examines the data and presents basic descriptive statis-
tics on owners’ and workers’ characteristics. Next, section 2.5 presents preliminary
information on workers’ average earnings by worker type and by different levels of
coworker shares. Section 2.6 is divided in two sections. The first part analyzes
whether the type of employer and coworker characteristics affect the composition
of new hires in firms. The second part evaluates the impact of firm owner type on
employees’ log annual earnings controlling for worker human capital. Section 2.7
concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Because no single theory exists to explain the effect of firm owners and cowork-
ers on hiring patterns and wages, we draw on the literature of several related fields
to motivate our hypotheses on the subject. Those literatures include ethnic econ-
omy theories dealing with ethnic/immigrant concentration, theories of firm wage
differentials and hiring procedures, and network theories.
Immigrants tend to work in low-wage/low-productivity firms, low-pay occupa-
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tions, and in firms with a high percentage of immigrant workers.6 Some researchers
have found occupational and ethnic coworker concentration in the United States
(Andersson et al. [2007], Patel and Vella [2007], and Light [2006]) and in other coun-
tries (Barr and Oduro [2000] and Andersson and Wadensjó [2001]). The literature
has attempted to explain workers’ concentration by skill, race, and sex.7 Heller-
stein and Neumark [2007] analyzed ethnic segregation in the United States and
found a substantial degree of segregation in the workplace. They claim that even
though workplace segregation partially results from residential segregation (spatial
mismatch explanation) and from ethnically correlated skills, there seem to be other
mechanisms that suggest the presence of immigrant social connection effects (local
residential networking). In an extensive analysis of racial and ethnic segregation
across U.S. workplaces, they found that a large degree of segregation remains even
after controlling for metropolitan area characteristics, and that very little of this
segregation can be explained by observed differences in education and occupations.
Language, however, seems to be a significant factor for immigrant segregation. Lang
[1986]’s theory provides an explanation for worker segregation by language groups.
When there are transaction costs associated with employees of different language
groups working together, there is scope for segregation. Employers of each language
group have incentives to fully segregate to avoid the cost of needing employees who
can be the bridge between different language groups.
Despite findings on immigrant concentration at different levels, we cannot be
6Borjas [1994], Borjas [2003], Andersson et al. [2007], and Andersson et al. [2008].
7Kremer and Maskin [1996], Hellerstein and Neumark [2003].
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sure that immigrants are more likely to work for immigrant bosses and that such a
pattern would affect individuals’ labor market outcomes. There is no evidence that
immigrant-owned businesses are distributed (or concentrated on) differently across
specific industries, firm sizes, or skills, than native businesses, and that this distri-
bution is correlated with the distribution of immigrant workers across industries,
sizes, and skills.
A recent group of studies analyzes the matching process between managers
and workers by racial group. Giuliano et al. [2006] found a significant effect of race
and ethnicity on hiring procedures. For example, in locations with large Hispanic
populations, Hispanic managers tend to hire more Hispanics and fewer whites than
white non-Hispanic managers. In a more recent analysis, Giuliano and Ransom
[2008] looks at the effect of manager ethnicity on hires, separations and promotions
across different occupations in a U.S. retail firm. Whites were more likely to leave
stores where managers were Hispanics than when they were white. Their work
is very relevant, although they only focus on a very particular retail firm. Their
studies do not consider the coworker effect. That is, they don’t study the effect
of the fraction of similar coworkers holding a job in the firm on the probability a
particular type of worker is hired.
There has not yet been a connection established between owner’s birthplace
and the type of workers employed at a firm or these workers’ earnings. Nevertheless,
the literature discusses motivations for supervisor-employee matching. First, firm
owners could have preferences for employing individuals of their own type or with
the same background. Second, the types of goods offered by immigrant firms may
15
differ from those offered by native firms. If immigrants specialize in producing ethnic
goods, immigrant workers have a comparative advantage over native workers in these
firms. The differences between products can result in different worker composition.8
However, none of these reasons have obvious predictions of workers’ earnings. That
an employer has a preference for a certain group does not necessarily imply higher
wages for that group. The distribution of workers and employers in the market also
affects the labor market equilibrium.
In the sociology literature, there have been a limited number of studies that
provide some insights on the tendency of immigrants to work for immigrant firms.
For instance, in Los Angeles in 1989 30 percent of employed Koreans held jobs in
firms owned by fellow Koreans even though Koreans composed only one percent of
the Los Angeles County population.9 According to Cardenas and Hansen [1988],
during the 1980s, Mexican immigrant employers were most likely to hire Mexicans,
whether legal or undocumented, and to evaluate their quality favorably. Porter and
Wilson [1980] find two relevant patterns in the Cuban immigration to Miami during
the 1960s. First, Cubans worked with other Cubans. Second, almost one-third of
the Cubans worked for Cuban employers. The phenomenon of immigrants hiring im-
migrants is not limited to coethnic relationships between employees and employers.
Other researchers have found that employers from one immigrant group often hire
workers from other ethno/racial groups.10 In Los Angeles, during the nineties, 51%
of the garment factories were owned by Asians with most of their employees being
8Andersson and Wadensjó [2001]
9Min [1989].
10Massey [1999], Massey et al. [1987].
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Hispanics. Ethnic networks alone cannot expand the supply of coethnic-accessible
jobs. Generally, the number of jobs offererd by ethnic-specific owned firms is not
equal to the number of possible candidates from the same ethnic group in the local
community. Business leaders from ethnic groups whose rates of entrepreneurship
are higher than other groups find it difficult to limit hiring to members of their
own groups. Ethnic crossover can expand the economic opportunities provided by
immigrant-owned businesses. Immigrant workers often join networks that cross eth-
nic boundaries. Using the Garment Industry in Los Angeles as an example, Light
[2006] analyzes immigrant ownership economies consisting of immigrant employers
plus their immigrant but not coethnic employees. He finds that this type of economy
explains part of the garment industry’s growth during early 1990s in Los Angeles.
The cited studies have been limited to small samples from particular geo-
graphic areas and specific groups of firms and immigrants. Most of them also focus
on a particular period of time, with a cross-sectional view of the distribution of work-
ers and firms. These analyses tended not to look beyond the segregation aspect to
analyze the possible causes and consequences of those patterns. Unlike previous
studies, this paper uses a representative group of areas, firms, industries and work-
ers, and it analyzes the flow of hiring and the effect of employer-employee type
matches on wages. The underlying hypothesis in the analysis is that workers and
employers make different use of their social connections in the market, given their
specific characteristics, such as race/ethnicity and immigration status, which leads
to a particular hiring pattern by each firm. Immigrant firms, for instance, would
have an advantage over native firms when using their immigrant current workers as
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a channel to find new workers.
On wage effects, previous research has suggested that much of the unexplained
variation in wages among employees is linked to characteristics of their firms, such as
size and industry.11 Not only do individual characteristics explain wage differentials
between immigrants and natives, but potentially so do other characteristics, such as
the birthplace or ethnicity of employers and coworkers. Unfortunately, most wage
databases come from household surveys of individuals (Decennial Census and CPS),
rather than from establishment surveys of wage-paying employers; they provide little
employer-specific information, except for industry and, in some cases, firm size.
2.3 On the use of social networks
Recent work has suggested that supervisor-employee ethnic matching could re-
sult from the use of networks.12 On the one hand, according to several sociological
studies on the ethnic economy, ethnic solidarity serves to provide entrepreneurs with
privileged access to immigrant labor and to legitimize paternalistic work arrange-
ments (Sanders and Nee [1987] and Model [1997]). Different firms have different
recruitment processes, generating an initial sorting of worker types. On the other
hand, networks can also have an impact on wages, providing better matches and
more opportunities to the individual. Ethnic networks can generate informal sources
11[Groshen, 1990, 1991a,b], Abowd et al. [1999], Abowd et al. [2004] among others.
12Networks is not a new concept in the literature. For an extensive analysis on job information
networks see Ioannides and Loury [2004]. Sociologists have investigated the origins and creation of
social networks for more than 40 years. Rees[1966] draws attention to differences among workers
and their use of available information (formal and informal sources). Job referral is also extensively
used in the labor market, as well as family networks (Granovetter [1995]).
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of capital formation and captive markets, making these firms more self-sufficient and
flexible (Volery [2005]). Social capital becomes another form of capital resource.13
Individual’s social networks are likely to have an impact on labor market out-
comes (Simon and Warner [1992]). The differential use of social networks does not
provide the same access to information and opportunities to all individuals, offering
a better relative position to those agents with better social connections or better
use of their social networks. Recent literature has moved away from spatial mis-
match model in explaining inequality across ethnic/race groups towards theories
that include how social networks affect urban inequality [Hellerstein and Neumark,
2007, Hellerstein et al., 2008a]. Life-chances depend not only on individual resources
but also on network characteristics reflecting the resources of network members. In
this context, personal networks are then considered an additional determinant of
inequalities (Light [2006]).
How do these mechanisms affect our groups of analysis? What is different
about particular types of workers and firms such as immigrant/racial groups? Al-
though the comparison between whites and blacks has been long discussed, im-
migrant status can be crucial for understanding group differences in informal job
matching and labor outcomes. Two important characteristics of the immigrant
community are relevant for these implications. First, Borjas [1994] pointed out that
immigrants tend to be less educated, to have poor English language skills, and to
lack domestic experience. Second, immigrants rely heavily on social networks for
13Social capital in its simplest form is a social network of strong and weak social ties (Light and
Gold [2000]).
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finding jobs and geographically reallocate (Massey et al. [1987]).
Previous literature has also discussed racial and ethnic differences in informal
job matching (Elliot [2001], Holzer [1987]). These differences arise because informal
channels permit race and other characteristics in the network to play a more promi-
nent role in the hiring process than it does when formal mechanisms are used. As
noted by Elliot [2001], one of the puzzles during 1980s and 1990s was the worsening
position of less educated blacks in the labor market while the economy was absorb-
ing thousands of new immigrant workers. Surprisingly, these new workers had, on
average, similar characteristics to blacks: low formal education and high geographic
segregation. So the question of job distribution became a first order issue, especially
in the topics of immigration and immigrant assimilation. Research on this puzzle
has focused on the use of social networks by different groups for finding employ-
ment [Waldinger, 1997], while the role of prospective employers in the use of these
mechanisms has been ignored.
Our empirical analyses sheds light on the impact of networks on immigrants.
Considering the tendency of workers to refer their own, the immediate effect of net-
work is the reproduction of the workforce composition across time as shown in this
chapter. Our results in the following chapter support the hypothesis that social
networks play an important role in workplace concentration. The tendency of social
networks to be racially/ethnically homogeneous - exacerbated by individual’s im-
migration status- increases the probability that workers would refer same-type can-
didates and that same-type employers would tend to hire from shame-type groups.
Immigrant employers can take better advantage of their immigrant employees in
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hiring than native employers.
The differential use of job referrals by employers is also evident when we ex-
amine who is hired and how the wages are distributed in the firm. Immigrants will
tend to be hired more by immigrant firms with a high share of immigrant workers
than by native firms with high share of immigrant workers.
Immigrant entrepreneurs can take advantage of their language, cultural back-
ground and affinities to have access to different ethnic groups. Their immigrant
status can give them privileged access to sources of labor less available to native
entrepreneurs. Immigrant entrepreneurs routinely employ coethnics (including rela-
tives) at rates vastly above chance levels. The most important network relationships
are based on kinship, friendship, and paisanaje (the feeling of belonging to a com-
mon community of origin).14 Immigrant economies rely upon networks to locate
jobs. On the one hand, referrals by friends or coworkers remove some of the un-
certainty associated with finding a job with unfamiliar employers and increase the
chance of finding a better job match. On the other hand, immigrant entrepreneurs
tend to rely on their current employees to help fill their vacancies. Workers tend to
refer individuals that are ’similar’ to them, from the same group, or with the same
characteristics. Referral coworkers could also provide informal training, show the
new worker how to perform the job, and have a good interaction with the new hire.
Moreover, referral coworkers indirectly accept responsibility for new hires. Employ-
ers realize that this practice is beneficial for them as well. Little cost or effort need
be expended when new workers are located through employee contacts.
14Massey[1980].
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Previous empirical findings show that Hispanic men report more frequent use
of friends and relatives for job search than non-Hispanic whites, and are also signifi-
cantly more likely to have obtained their most recent job through personal contacts.
Hispanics use informal contacts 32.8 percent more often than white non-Hispanics
and blacks.15 Recent Latino immigrants are more likely than blacks or Latino na-
tives to use personal contacts to find jobs.16 Weak English skills explain much of
this difference. However, this difference comes not only from the use of job networks
by workers, but also from a greater reliance on referrals in small workplaces in com-
bination with a concentration of recent immigrants in small firms. Employers also
have a role in this process given that firms’ hiring procedures will affect individuals’
likelihood of receiving offers from jobs heard about through friends and relatives.
2.3.1 Small firms
Our focus on small/medium firms17 is motivated by two observations. First,
in larger firms, the separation between ownership and management could detach the
firm’s hiring process from owner characteristics. As Haltiwanger [2006] points out,
however, in small firms the decision process is likely dependent on owner ability and
characteristics. When dealing with each worker, small firm owners could project
their tastes and managerial abilities onto the hiring and production processes of the
firm. Since it is usually the business owner who makes such choices, the identification
of the person responsible for hiring decisions is easier and more relevant for small
15Holzer[1987b], Smith [2000].
16(Elliot [2001]).
17We consider small/medium firms those with less than 500 employees.
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firms.
Second, immigrant workers are more likely than natives to work in small firms.
In Chapter 3 we find that there is a significant market segmentation that appears
in any detailed distribution of workers in firms. Immigrants are more likely to be
employed in firms with less than 10 employees 70% of immigrants work for small
firms. Meanwhile, more than 60% of native workers are employed at firms with more
than 100 employees. The labor force changes generated by immigration inflows are
thus borne primarily by smaller, younger firms. These firms are more sensitive to
immigration shocks. If we only look at aggregate numbers (including small and big
firms), immigration effects will be obscured.
2.4 Data and Measures
2.4.1 Sources
In this paper, we use three different databases to match owners’ characteris-
tics to workers’ characteristics. First, we use the Characteristics of Business Owners
Survey (CBO) from 1992, and then match this survey with administrative data from
the IRS (Business Register) for the years 1992 to 1996. To obtain workers charac-
teristics, we use information from the Longitudinal Household-Employer Dynamics
(LEHD) database for the years 1992 to 1996. In this section, we give a brief descrip-
tion of each database and their limitations, and discuss how we construct relevant
variables used in the regressions.
The Characteristics of Business Owners (CBO), later renamed the Small Busi-
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ness Owner (SBO)database, is produced by the Bureau of the Census. The 1992
release of CBO was the final version of this survey, which formerly was conducted
every five years. The survey for the 1992 CBO’s release was conducted in 1996,
along with the economic census. Therefore, the questions in the survey refer to
the business’ and owners’ information for years 1992 and 1994. The CBO is a
supplement to the Survey of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises (SMOBE) and
Survey of Women-Owned Businesses (WOB). The survey universe considered was
‘’any business which files an IRS form 1040, Schedule C (individual proprietors or
self-employed persons); form 1065 (partnership); or form 1120S(Subchapter S cor-
poration) in 1992.”18 It considers as business owners those who filed business tax
forms as owners of the firm, excluding non-S corporations, with at least 500 dollars
in yearly business receipts, and with the largest employment size category equal to
five hundred. Note that non-S corporations generally have investors, not decision-
making owners, and thus this group is not in the CBO survey’s universe. However,
excluding non-S corporations often excludes the largest employers, making compar-
isons of small and large business owners difficult. The CBO provides details about
both business owners and their businesses. The unique firm identifier is the CFN
(Census File Number). At the cross-sectional level this number is unique for each
firm.
According to a CBO publication cited in of the Census [1997], almost 62% of
the 78,147 firms’ surveys 19 and 59% of the 116,589 owners’ surveys were returned.
18Characteristics of Business Owners 1992:CBO092-1. U.S. Bureau of the Census (September
1997) and Headd [1999].
19This is translated into 63% of the 41,297 employer firm surveys.
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One possible reason for this low rate of reply is the difficulty of finding owners of
exiting firms after 3-4 years. Almost 70% of all businesses present in 1992 were still
in operation in 1996. This rate is lower for minority-owned firms (around 66%).
We use employer firms in our sample. When sampling weights are used, the
survey indicates that in 1992, 20% of owners were in firms with employees. Accord-
ing to the minority-firm surveys, women, Asian, Pacific Islander, American Indian,
black, and Hispanic owners were typically underrepresented in the larger employ-
ment size classes. Hispanic-owned firms were 3.68% of all employer firms, but just
2.04% of firms with 100 or more employees. Additionally, 90.6% of business owners
were born in the United States, while 9.4% percent were foreign born. 20 The per-
centage of native-owned firms was higher in the case of larger firms (94.5%). In this
paper we focus only on employer firms.
On average, there exists more than one owner per firm. In the CBO(1992),
more than 52% of firms are employer firms, and almost 41% of this group have only
one owner. Employer firms tend to have more owners than non-employer firms.
Based on previous research using the CBO, 21 we consider the CBO as a sam-
ple of firms even though it is essentially a sample of firm owners. The resulting
complication is that we need to make assumptions to identify the owner charac-
teristics for multiple-owner firms. As a first attempt, we consider three types of
firms: only-native-owned, only-immigrant-owned, and mix-owned. Using this clas-
sification, more than 85% of employer firms have 1 or 2 owners for all types.
20A foreign born is an individual that was born outside the USA. CBO has a particular question
on whether the owner was born in the US or abroad.
21Carrington and Troske [1995].
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In order to identify the characteristics of the owners of a particular firm (par-
ticularly immigration status and race), we follow the work of previous research based
on the CBO (Carrington and Troske [1996]). For single-owner firms, the identifi-
cation is straightforward. Meanwhile, for multi-owner firms the mode is used. The
number of hours per week spent at the business was used to break ties.
This database has some limitations. First, in the 1992 survey the CBO’s sam-
ple universe omits chapter C corporations. This group of corporations corresponds
to bigger businesses; therefore, comparison between small and large businesses in
the CBO must be done with care. Second, even though we have each firm’s average
payroll, we know nothing about the interfirm distribution of payroll between differ-
ent types of workers. Third, this survey has zero information on human capital or
occupational characteristics of workers. We try to overcome some of these limita-
tions by merging CBO with data from Bureau of Labor statistics (UI and ES202)
as described below.
The second database used in this paper is the Census Bureau’s Standard Sta-
tistical Establishment List (SSEL) or Business Register (BR).22 This data has more
complete information on firms given that the source of the SSEL is at the ad-
ministrative level. This database works as a register of active employer business
22Walker [1997] has an extensive discussion on the Census Bureau’s Business Register. The ini-
tial source of information on businesses is the IRS(Parker and Spletzer [2000]). The SSEL receives
three main files from IRS; the Business Master File (BMF), with information on name, addresses
and legal form of organization; the Payroll Tax Return File (Form 941) containing quarterly pay-
roll and first quarter employment (including March 12th employment); and the Annual Business
Income Tax Return Files with information on receipts/revenues, industry classification. For all
three sources, EIN is the primary business’ id.
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establishments23 in the United States and its territories. The unit of information is
an enterprise, which can be associated with one or more establishments and with
one or more EIN entities (Employer Identification Number).24 In this paper we
concentrate on those businesses organizations associated with only one EIN and one
establishment, known as single-establishment enterprises or single-unit firms.25 All
of the small firms in this chapter correspond to single-unit establishments. The
assumption that firm owners are the ones making the main contracting decisions in
a firm is more plausible in firms with only one establishment than otherwise. In the
case of younger and smaller firms, this restriction does not exclude many firms.26
Additionally, businesses have a CFN (Census File Number) as an identifier, which
is unique for single-unit businesses. To follow the firm across time, the longitudinal
identifier for each firm is called alpha, and corresponds to the first 6 digits of firms’
EIN. In the sample, we only follow firms that survived the entire period 1992 to
1996. Because most non-surviving firms did not respond to the CBO survey and
the weights are constructed such that this pattern is considered, the weighted results
are not impacted by this exclusion.27
We take data on industry, legal form of organization and employment from the
SSEL files. See Appendix B for specific description of these variables. Because of
the time difference between the year of information and the year in which the CBO
23Active employer business establishments are those with payroll at anytime during the past
three years, or with an indication that the business expects to hire employees in the future.
24An EIN entity is an administrative unit assigned by IRS for tax purpose. Under the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) every organization with paid employees has to obtain an EIN.
25All the matches between CBO(1992) and SSEL(1992) are in this category.
26Haltiwanger et al. [2005].
27Headd [1999].
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survey was conducted, information on employment and sales are from the SSEL
dataset.28 We use the common unique firm identifier (CFN) to match CBO with
SSEL.29 We then follow the firm across time until 1996.30
The second set of information is associated with the characteristics of work-
ers. This information comes from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics
database. Information on workers comes from the Unemployment Insurance wage
records for a group of states31 and the ES202 data.
Based on availability, we use data from eight states for the years 1992 to 1996.
The sample includes states with high immigrant concentration and low immigrant
concentration areas. These files contain person identifiers that allow researchers
to track a worker’s quarterly earnings within a State across years. We sum over
quarters to obtain each worker’s annual earnings. This database also contains firm
identifiers that allow for an exact link between the UI files and other data sets.
The business level identifiers in UI files are State Employer Identification Numbers
(SEINs). Therefore, one can match the UI data with the ES202 data, using SEIN to
get information on the EIN, and compare it with the data previously matched using
CBO(1992) and Business Register. For single-unit firms, the units of observation at
the firm level used for CBO, SSEL and LEHD are generally similar.
28The CBO is a retrospective survey. The response rate is affected by the survival rate of the
firm and the extent to which owners can accurately recall past information.
29We use businesses’ CFN, which are the Census Bureau’s preferred intra-year, cross-dataset
link. The CFN contains the EIN firm identifier and is unique for single-unit firms.
30To illustrate the groups of firms included in both databases, we include a short discussion on
firms matching rate in the Appendix A.
31More detailed analysis on these records is presented in Abowd et al. [2006], and additional
information on date of birth, place of birth, and gender are obtained for almost all workers in
the sample after linking UI wage records to Census data. 98% of all private, non-agricultural
employment is covered by the employer reports.
28
The UI wage records contain virtually all business employment for the sample
states (for private non-farm firms). Earnings reports from these records are more
accurate than survey-based earnings data, and one can obtain information for each
worker in a specific firm (or establishment).
Using this database, we follow firms across time from 1992 to 1996 using the
unique identifier within the state. We end up using only those firms that survived
the entire period and did not change ownership. This group represents about 67%
of the initial set of firms in 1992.32 Finally, the data set used in this study is unique
in the sense that it contains data from each firm on output and inputs used in the
production process, as well as data on earnings and some demographic characteristics
of each worker in the firm. We use the years 1992 to 1996 for the analysis mainly
because information about owners’ place of birth (i.e. being born in or outside the
US) is only available in the Characteristics of Business Owners Survey in 1992. Our
data tracks the total payroll and workforce composition of each firm from 1992 to
1996.
The drawback of using UI data is its lack of certain demographic information
on workers, such as education and occupation. However, the staff at the LEHD
has overcome this limitation by imputing education using administrative data from
the Census Bureau containing information such as date of birth, place of birth,
geographic area, industry, and sex. In this chapter, we use this imputed information
on education,33 which has been used in previous work on the LEHD. This variable is
32Few firms were dropped because, initially, the survey’s rate of response was highly correlated
with the firms survival rate, so that most of the firms with information in the survey are surviving
businesses.
33See Lengermann et al. [2004] for details on the imputation.
29
a proxy for individuals’ human capital. We are aware that the lack of occupational
information could be a relevant drawback of the data given that prior research has
documented an important role for occupational segregation in creating different
workers’ wage gaps. We might think that immigrants tend to concentrate in low-
skilled occupations relative to natives. However, as Troske [1999] and Carrington
and Troske [1995] point out, occupations and job titles are less likely to be sharply
defined in small firms, and as a result there could be less occupational segregation
in small firms compared to large firms. Despite this limitation, we have to keep in
mind that we can account for other workers’ characteristics, such as age, sex and
imputed education. Given that workers have varying preferences for place of work
depending on the disutility of commuting and amenities of particular areas, the
areas where they would be willing to work are better represented by their actual
place of work than their place of residence. Therefore, we need data on individuals’
place of work. Location of the firm is obtained using the LEHD database.
2.4.2 Construction of ex post weights
A relevant technical issue that arises in the process of using different databases,
especially when a survey is included, is the change of sample frame used by the survey
database. Additionally, for smaller geographic areas, differences in industry and
geographic information along with differences in the scope of industries covered lead
to dissimilarities between the universe considered by the LEHD data and surveys
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based on the Economic Census.34
In the design of the CBO survey, four panels were created in addition to divi-
sions by employer status (employer versus non-employer), 2-digit industry and state.
These panels consider racial categories using the owners’ social security information
and the categories: Asian, Asian-American / Pacific Islander, Hispanic, Black, and
White. These groups were created by the Survey on Minority Businesses. Therefore,
small firms and minority-owned firms are over-represented in the survey.
The difference between the universe and sampling frames used in the CBO
survey implies that our matched analysis sample will not be representative. Specif-
ically, the sample frame used in the CBO will over-represent small, minority-owned
businesses when linked with the UI database. To deal with this issue, we follow
Abowd et al. [2007] and build ex post weights that control for the firms’ size, 2-digit
industry code, legal form of organization, and employer status. We follow previous
research in that we first construct the fractions of firms each the category in the
universe of ES-202. The universe of ES-202 is single-unit firms with more than one
employee (coworker shares can be computed only for these firms), not in Agriculture,
Mining, nor Public Administration, and less than one thousand employees, and are
in Economic Census in-scope industries in 1992. This represents the numerator in
the ex post weight. Then, we compute the same fractions for the final matched data
and use each fraction as the denominator of the ex post weight. This weight has
the property that the distribution of employment by each category reflects the size
34LEHD database covers partially agriculture and public administration industries. Surveys
based on the Economic Census tend to over-represent businesses in areas with high density popu-
lation.
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distribution of the ES-202 considered universe.
The second section of the adjustment procedure involves the construction of
an inverse Mills ratio. We use a probit estimation that considers the probability of
being matched as a function of log employment, legal form of organization, owner’s
place of birth (in or out the US), and log of sales per employee to generate the
propensity scores. This section intends to account for the CBO survey’s sampling
frame and the possible selection bias generated by the effect of unobservables on
firms exiting from the universe considered to design the sample of the CBO survey.
The ex post weights are included in all regressions. For more details and unweighted
summary statistics see appendix D.
Before using our approach the matched sample under-represent small, minority-
owned businesses (see appendix D.1). After the match, and without considering the
re-weighting process, we would be under-representing minority groups in small size
firms. The sample of firms offering unemployment benefits are relatively of bigger
size. After applying our new weight, we try to recover some of the original distribu-
tion in the CBO sample. There is a lower representation of sole proprietorship after
matching the original sample with the UI database without using the new weights.
2.4.3 Firms
To compare the full CBO sample to the final matched sample used in the
analysis, we look at descriptive statistics for a set of variables. The final match
uses LEHD information from 8 states,35 which include high and low immigration
35Those states with available data in 1992 are included.
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states. For these states we obtain workers’ and firms’ information. Firms from the
agriculture, mining and public administration sectors are not included. Additionally,
only single-unit businesses are considered. The original matched sample in the
analysis has 7,200 firms, representing 339,040 workers from 1992 to 1996. All results
are weighted by the adjusted-weight discussed in section 2.4.2.
Table 2.1 shows two blocks of summary statistics. One block (CBO-SSEL)
contains the employer firms matched from the CBO survey and the BR, while the
second block (Sample(CBO-LEHD)) contains the final matched sample, consisting
of the subset of CBO-SSEL data matched to the LEHD. For each block, this table
presents the distribution of firm type across firm size categories and sectors, together
with the average number of owners, average share of immigrant workers, de-meaned
average log sales per employee, average percentage of immigrants in the county in
which the firm is located and in the counties surrounding this location, and the
percentage of each type of owner. Total population and the share of immigrant
workers are constructed from the public 1990 Census, and are based on all Census
counties surrounding the location of the firm. Immigrant firms have a higher pro-
portion of immigrants in the local population than native and mixed firms. Because
immigrants also tend to be geographically segregated, we will use this variable to
control for differences in firms’ local workforce.
In the final matched sample, the average immigrant-owned firm employs 38%
immigrant workers. The distribution of firms across sectors and sizes for each type
of firm by owner birthplace is very similar, except for the tendency of immigrant-
owned firms to be in retail or services, and this distribution is only slightly changed
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after matching the original database with the LEHD database.
From the table we observe that immigrant-owned firms’ log sales per employee
is slightly higher than native-owned firms. Actually, on average, native owned firms
have the lowest log labor productivity. In general, firms are concentrated in size
categories with fewer than 50 employees. Meanwhile, regardless their owner type,
firms are highly concentrated in the sectors Services, Retail, Manufacturing and
Construction. Sole proprietorships represent more than 50% of immigrant and na-
tive firms. Mixed-owned firms tend to be larger in size with respect to the other
groups. These firms are mainly Partnerships and Corporations.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics - CBO(1992) and Sample/Matched Firms
CBO1 Matched Sample(CBO-LEHD)
Distribution/Type of firm Mix Imm Nat Unk ALL Mix Imm Nat Unk ALL
Size (%)
2-4 26.52 49.30 42.51 46.43 44.66 16.67 37.27 33.60 33.29 33.79
5-9 18.06 20.90 21.35 20.91 21.05 18.75 21.53 20.97 20.33 20.79
10-19 23.48 14.68 16.69 15.00 15.90 18.75 18.44 18.02 17.40 17.88
20-49 18.18 10.70 12.10 10.95 11.59 28.13 14.25 16.72 16.89 16.58
50-99 6.94 2.97 4.56 4.26 4.26 9.90 5.67 6.65 6.78 6.59
100+ 6.82 1.46 2.79 2.45 2.54 7.81 2.84 4.03 5.31 4.37
Sector (%)
Construction 6.49 5.07 12.74 10.41 10.58 5.73 4.71 13.49 9.38 10.06
Manufacturing 20.26 10.35 13.89 13.59 13.38 25.00 15.93 17.65 18.36 17.76
Transp. & Utility 5.45 2.83 7.43 6.73 6.43 5.21 2.77 7.58 6.91 6.34
FIRE 19.22 19.73 17.14 19.24 18.36 18.75 22.18 19.03 22.24 20.84
Retail 17.14 29.68 19.73 23.17 22.47 14.58 29.85 16.42 21.34 20.83
Wholesale 6.10 3.19 6.18 5.21 5.36 7.81 3.55 5.30 4.44 4.70
Services 25.32 29.16 22.89 21.65 23.43 22.92 21.02 20.54 17.33 19.49
Legal Form (%)
Sole Proprietorship - 52.40 51.43 29.15 50.48 - 49.12 56.81 37.18 50.64
Partnership 28.51 12.58 12.26 18.69 12.97 25.00 12.26 10.46 13.77 12.99
Corporation 2 71.94 35.10 25.01 52.16 37.36 75.94 38.61 32.72 49.35 36.37
l(sales/employment) 3 11.64 11.60 11.48 11.54 11.54 11.73 11.59 11.57 11.63 11.64
(1.17) (1.17) (1.05) (1.15) (1.11) (1.08) (1.19) (1.05) (1.18) (1.13)
Imm. in the neighborhood4 13.47 22.15 12.43 15.06 12.90 14.03 21.17 11.34 15.07 12.80
In MSA 92.01 96.50 90.07 80.60 92.41 91.30 97.37 93.01 81.71 92.85
Average Number of Owners 3.58 1.57 1.88 1.80 1.84 3.78 1.55 1.95 1.83 1.87
Continued on next page.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics - CBO(1992) and Sample/Matched Firms (continued)
CBO1 Matched Sample(CBO-LEHD)
Distribution/Type of firm Mix Imm Nat Unk ALL Mix Imm Nat Unk ALL
Average Share of imm. Workers . . . . . 33.00 38.05 11.55 28.00 26.00
Unweighted dist. of firms 2.03 14.94 45.87 37.16 100.00 2.84 18.10 42.54 36.53 100.00
Weighted dist. of firms 2.01 13.50 78.60 5.89 100.00 2.84 12.89 77.92 6.40 100.00
RACE/ETHNICITY
Hispanic 10.39 18.56 2.99 4.35 4.69 10.09 19.20 3.41 4.15 5.66
Asian 10.60 35.68 1.34 5.20 5.07 15.50 51.70 2.55 3.02 9.41
Black 0.78 1.56 2.22 2.60 2.16 0.79 0.69 1.48 1.20 1.36
White 78.23 44.20 93.45 87.85 88.08 73.62 28.41 92.56 82.30 83.57
# of Firms unweighted 41,297 7,985
# of Observations unweighted 1,655,750 339,040
Note: Statistics based on weighted outcomes unless the contrary is indicated.
(1) Single-unit firms that matched with SSEL.
(2)Only S- Corporation .
(3)Source SSEL: Sales (total receipts/sales), and employment (Employment March12th). Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.
(4)Using Census 1990, computed percentage of immigrant population in the counties including the firm and surrounding.
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The average number of owners (owner type) is similar in the original and
matched samples. The average number of owners by owner birthplace is similar, ex-
cept, as expected, for mix-owned firms which by definition have two or more owners.
Table 2.1 illustrates that these patterns are similar in the original CBO sample and
the final matched CBO-LEHD sample. In the matched sample, Asian-owned firms
are over-represented, while white immigrant owners are underrepresented. How-
ever, as in the original CBO sample, immigrant-owned firms are mainly owned by
Hispanics and Asians, while most of the native-owned firms have white owners.
In the original matched data there is a percentage of firms with unknown
owners’ place of birth. We decide to exclude this group from further analysis. Given
that, on average, the characteristics of this unknown group are similar to the rest of
the sample (see Appendix(C) for t-tests and a chi-square analysis), we don’t expect
this exclusion to affect our findings.
We drop firms with less than two employees. Given that female labor par-
ticipation is characterize for additional elements different to the ones analyze here
we only consider male workers.36 Workers should have at least one coworker, and
the analysis of earnings is net of other labor supply factors that could affect female
workers differently. After these restrictions, the final sample is reduced to 4,478
firms and 214,398 workers from 1992 to 1996.
36The effect of networks for female immigrants is also a very important analysis. According
to Massey et al. [1987], Mexican female immigrants tended to arrive and go directly to specific
industries such as babysitter and meat packaging. The variation at such detailed level is not enough
in our data, so we cannot disentangle industry effect versus owner effect. Given the particularity
in the way female labor enter the market, there could be additional unobserved elements affecting
the likelihood of hire an immigrant woman that we cannot consider in this aggregate analysis.
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2.4.4 Workers
Among the relevant workers’ characteristics available in our data are age, im-
migration status (place of birth), date of entry in the US (date of SSN applica-
tion), education, quarterly earnings, and race. We sum over quarters to obtain each
worker’s annual earnings, and then compute real earnings based on 1992 dollars.
The data set used for the analysis includes all male workers with positive earnings.
On the distribution of workers, Table (2.2) and Figure (2.1) show the propor-
tions of workers by age, race, sex, education, owner type,size, and sector, as well as,
mean age, education and earnings, for all workers and for immigrants and natives.
Foreign workers represent almost 24% of the sample.
Similar to previous studies, on average, foreign born workers tend to be less ed-
ucated, younger and tend to have lower income than native workers (Borjas [1994]),
although these differences are not large in our sample. The fraction of workers
across age categories, however, is similar for both types of workers in age categories
40 years and more.




Age 34.01 34.14 34.11
(13.33) (12.02) (13.13)
Education 13.04 13.16 13.13
(2.76) (2.94) (2.79)




Continued on next page.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics - Characteristics of Workers (continued)
Individual
IM US ALL
Under 25 18.09 24.43 22.91
25-39 51.64 43.03 45.10
40+ 30.26 32.54 31.99
EDUCATION
High School Dropout 8.89 7.41 7.77
High School Graduate 59.27 59.26 59.26
Some College Education 30.81 32.00 31.71
College Graduate 1.04 1.33 1.26
SECTOR
Construction 7.92 18.37 15.85
Manufacturing 37.08 26.13 28.76
Transportation and Utilities 3.81 7.11 6.31
Wholesale 14.17 14.16 14.16
Retail 19.33 16.63 17.28
FIRE 1.36 1.58 1.52
Services 16.34 16.03 16.10
SIZE
2-4 2.18 1.65 1.78
5-9 4.70 4.23 4.34
10-19 9.27 9.32 9.31
20-49 19.32 21.23 20.77
50-99 18.96 18.91 18.92
100+ 45.57 44.66 44.88
RACE
White 17.36 75.07 61.18
Hispanic 47.21 4.85 15.04
Asian 22.76 0.93 6.18
Black 1.71 11.21 8.92
Other 10.88 4.67 6.16
TYPE OF OWNER
Immigrant 42.70 12.10 19.46
Mixed 8.34 5.67 6.31
Native 48.96 82.23 74.22
RACE OF OWNER
Asian 20.64 4.74 7.15
Black 0.85 0.96 0.95
Hispanic 15.58 4.94 6.24
White 64.92 89.36 85.68
Part-time 43.67 37.39 38.90
Continued on next page.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics - Characteristics of Workers (continued)
Individual
IM US ALL
In MSA 97.23 83.38 86.71
All 24.06 75.94 100
Note: Number of observations equal to 214,398 workers. Statistics based on weighted outcomes.
Standard Deviations in parenthesis. Male workers with positive earnings in a year. Log annual
wage in 1992 dollars.
We can compare our sample of workers with the distribution and characteris-
tics of workers from IPUMS 1990 (see appendix E.1 we find interesting differences.
To build the comparable sample, we only look at male workers, older than 16, and
not working in Agriculture, Mining nor Public Administration sectors. One main
difference is the average year of school between our sample and IPUMS. In IPUMS,
both immigrant and natives have more year of schooling. Our sample has a very
low proportion of college graduate workers (natives and immigrants). This low rep-
resentation of this group could be driven by the over representation of small firms
in our sample versus IPUMS database, and the types of workers that these firms
hire.37 Natives have higher wages, but the wage differential between natives and
immigrants is higher in IPUMS (around 12%) than in our sample (around 1%). In-
terestingly, natives in our sample are younger than the national average. By race,
the distribution of workers is very similar. The proportion of immigrants in our
sample is around 24% versus 13% for the national average. In sum, our sample
contains younger male workers with low educational attaintments.
37Ipums database does not include firm’s size. Therefore, we cannot control for the size of the
firms.
40
The share of workers with a high school diploma or less is over 60% for both im-
migrants and natives. Immigrants are more concentrated in the high school dropout
and high school graduate categories. Looking at sectoral distribution, both foreign
and native workers are concentrated in Construction, Manufacturing, Retail and
Services, with natives more likely to be in Construction and immigrants in Man-
ufacturing.38 Foreigners are more likely to be working for immigrant owners than
native workers. 43% of immigrant workers are employed in immigrant firms and
49% are employed in native firms. Asian and Hispanic-owned firms employ more
immigrant workers than the average firm. More than forty percent of immigrant
employees are hired by immigrant owners (around 43%).
Most of the immigrants are Hispanics or Asians, while natives are mainly either
white or black. Although there is a fraction of native-Hispanic and native-Asian
workers, these proportions are less than 5%. The racial and ethnic categories follow
the SSA codes, which form a set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive
categories. I also include information on whether the worker is full or part time. A
worker is full time if he or she has worked during the full year (worker has positive
earnings all four quarters). Most of the survey corresponds to information from
firms located in MSAs. However, we include a variable that identifies those firms
and workers located outside a MSA. Almost 90% of the workers holds jobs in a firm
located inside a MSA.
Looking at place of birth in detail, Mexican, Salvadorian, Indian, and Chinese
38One explanation for this pattern is that informal and undocumented immigrants workers are
not largely covered by the database.
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workers are the most represented immigrant groups in the data. At the national
level, these are also the largest immigrant groups in the US according to Census
1990. In the data, native owners employ almost 75% of the total workforce.
2.4.5 Measuring coworker share
As described further in 3 below, we calculate the immigrant coworker share by








Where Ik is one when the worker is an immigrant. Therefore, this measure
equals the fraction of immigrant coworkers of an employee in a firm. This measure is
generally used in concentration analysis.39 Here I use it as an indication of workforce
composition in the firm.
2.5 Analysis of New Hires, Earnings of Workers and Skill Distribu-
tion
2.5.1 New Hires
For the analysis of hiring procedures, we look at the type, race and ethnic
composition of new hires by type of owner. During the period of analysis (1992-
39Hellerstein and Neumark [2007]; Aslund and Skans [2005a], Aslund and Skans [2005b].
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1996), there were 147,373 new hires. We identify a new hire in the data by following
a firm and looking at those workers that accessed the sample during the period
of analysis. We track information on each new worker. Table (2.3) shows the
distribution of new hires by type of owner. While new hires include a large share
of natives for every type of owner, the proportions of newly hired immigrants for
immigrant and mixed-owned firms (more than 30%) are almost three times the
proportion of immigrants hired in native-owned firms (almost 12%).
The second section of Table (2.3) displays the composition of new hires by race
and ethnicity. Hispanics and Asians correspond to more than 35% of immigrant-
owned firms’ new hires. Again, this represents almost three times the proportion
hired by native firms. Both immigrant and native firms hired more new workers
later in the sample period as the economy recovered from the 1991-1992 recession
(see Figures 2.1 to 2.4). The main diagonal shows that immigrant-owned firms hire
more immigrants (33.33%) than the average firm (14.80%)), while native-owned
firms hire more natives (88.44%) than the average firm (85.20%).
Table 2.3: Average Race and Ethnic Composition of New Hires by Owner’s Type
Owner Type
Worker type/ race/ethnicity Immigrant Mixed Native All
Immigrant 33.30 37.10 11.56 14.80
Native 66.70 62.90 88.44 85.20
Hispanic 20.14 22.32 10.14 11.50
Asian 16.09 12.78 2.65 4.26
White 48.20 49.80 73.61 70.40
Black 6.49 8.41 8.68 8.46
Note: Number of Observations equal to 147,373. Male workers with positive earnings in a year.
The other race/ethnic groups represent 0.5% of the sample. Results are not shown.
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If we further look at the distribution of new hires across owner’s race, the
findings are stronger. Table 2.4 shows a strong correlation between the race of
the owner and the racial/ethnic composition of the new hires.40 Asian, Black and
Hispanic-owned firms hire their own type more than twice as often as the average
firm. Asian-owned firms also hire Hispanic in a large number.
Table 2.4: Average Race and Ethnic Composition of New Hires by Owner’s Race
Worker / Owner Asian Black Hispanic White All
Asian 23.75 2.50 4.27 2.70 4.25
Black 6.29 38.54 10.33 8.04 8.46
Hispanic 20.10 10.52 35.46 9.10 11.50
White 39.03 44.43 42.24 75.39 70.42
Note: Number of Observations equal to 147,373. Male workers with positive earnings in a year.
The other race/ethnic groups represent 0.5% of the sample. Results are not shown.
2.5.2 Earnings of Workers
In this section, we look at workers’ earnings. On average, immigrant workers
have lower wages than natives. Most of the explanations given by the literature are
based on human capital formation. Immigrants have lower host country abilities
and generally less education than natives. However, even after controlling for some
of these characteristics, immigrants tend to receive lower wages than observationally
similar natives (Borjas [1994]). But do workers receive different wages than their
counterfactual group regardless of who they work for? To answer this question we
undertake two different exercises. First, we look at the average real log annual
40Giuliano et al. [2006] find a similar correlation when they look at the race of the hiring manager
and the racial composition of the new hires in different establishments of a retail store.
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Figure 2.1: Workforce Characteristics of Immigrant, Mix and Native Firms
Note: Weighted share and percentage. Base on years 1992-1996.
earnings of each worker type across owner types. We also look at these statistics for
different groups of firms defined by the fraction of similar coworkers in the firm. This
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Figure 2.2: Workforce Characteristics of Immigrant, Mix and Native Firms Con-
tinuation
Note: Weighted share and percentage. Base on years 1992-1996.
analysis is a first look at the impact of firm owner types on earnings. Second, we
estimate owner type wage effects after controlling for a number of firm and worker
characteristics, and evaluate the sources of wage differentials.
The natural log of real annualized earnings of each worker comes from LEHD-
UI records.41 Table (2.5) shows how average wages change according to the type
41When we take the average log annual earnings for each type of firm, we find that it is slightly
below the log of annual payroll per employee in the SSEL database. According to internal documen-
tation on the ES202/SSEL joint project, annual payroll in SSEL files includes non-wage payments,
such as benefit payments, retirement pension funds, annuity funds, supplemental benefit funds,
etc, which are not included in the UI files.
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Figure 2.3: Workforce Characteristics of Immigrant, Mix and Native Firms Con-
tinuation
Note: Weighted share and percentage. Base on years 1992-1996.
47
Figure 2.4: Workforce Characteristics of Immigrant, Mix and Native Firms Con-
tinuation
Note: Weighted share and percentage. Base on years 1992-1996.
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of owner. The last column of the table shows the t-test computed for worker type
wages for each owner type. A t-test can reject the null hypothesis that the mean of
immigrant worker wages and the mean of native worker wages are the same at the
90% level.
Table 2.5: Mean Earnings by Owner and Worker Type
Variable=log(annual earnings) (%) Mean STD T-test
owner = Immigrant
Immigrant 50.30 8.35 1.47
Native 49.70 8.12 1.67
All 100.00 8.23 1.64 24.20
owner = Mix
Immigrant 35.94 8.52 1.86
Native 64.06 9.04 1.71
All 100.00 8.71 1.82 -16.07
owner = Native
Immigrant 15.87 8.32 1.73
Native 84.13 8.38 1.88
All 100.00 8.37 1.73 -5.83
Note:STD indicates standard deviation. Log annual wage in 1992 dollars. Using workers during
the period 1992-1996.(*)T-tests are computed on the difference between average wages of
immigrant and native workers for each specified owner type.
Looking at Table (2.5) we notice three relevant outcomes for wage differential
analysis. First, immigrants are paid slightly less by native than by immigrant own-
ers. On average, they are paid the lowest when working for native owners. Second,
native workers are paid significantly less in immigrant owned businesses. Third,
on average native owned firms pay more than immigrant owned firms. Fourth,
mix-owned firms significantly pay less to immigrant workers. However, these firms
employ a lower proportion of immigrant workers than immigrant-owned firms.
In sum, immigrant workers end up receiving lower log annual earnings than
native workers. If we combine the first three outcomes, we can see that much
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Table 2.6: By Similar Coworker Share: Mean Earnings by Owner and Worker Type
Coworker Share
Below the median Above the median
Variable=log(annual earnings) (%) Mean STD (%) Mean STD
owner = imm
Native 33.64 7.37 1.71 66.36 7.67 1.53
Immigrant 66.69 7.98 1.68 33.31 8.19 1.34
all 48.09 7.74 1.51 51.91 7.82 1.70
owner = mix
Native 26.42 7.90 1.79 73.58 8.39 2.98
Immigrant 66.36 8.67 1.63 33.64 6.91 1.21
all 39.07 8.32 1.75 60.93 8.13 1.98
owner = usa
Native 6.96 7.74 1.81 93.04 8.38 1.89
Immigrant 91.48 7.80 1.77 8.52 7.68 1.96
all 20.33 7.78 1.79 79.67 8.31 1.92
Note: STD indicates standard deviation. Log annual wage in 1992 dollars. Statistics based on
estimation sample: all male individuals working between 1992 and 1996.
of the difference between the log annual wages of immigrants and natives comes
from immigrants’ propensity to work in immigrant owned firms. These firms pay
the lowest wages, and the difference in immigrant earnings between immigrant and
native firms is small. Additionally, native owned firms pay immigrant workers less
than native workers (see Table(2.5)).
It is important to highlight the relevance of having actual earnings of each
employee at the firm level, so we can exploit these variations to identify the effect
of owner types on individuals’ wages. Therefore, individual level wages are used in
the regressions analyzed in the next sections. Table (2.5) would not be possible if
we didn’t have data on both employers and employees’ characteristics. Our unique
database allows us to compare average earnings between workers of different types
holding a job in the same type of firm, and workers of the same type (native or
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immigrant) working for different types of owners.
We now perform a similar exercise, but separating firms by the share of cowork-
ers similar to the worker called ”similar coworker share” (see Table 2.6). This mea-
sure is different from the measure of immigrant coworker share defined previously,
in that here we define the similar coworker share as the share of workers that are of
a similar type to a particular worker in a specific firm. For instance, the coworker
share of a native worker is the share of native born workers in the firm excluding the
worker. The second column (%) shows the percentage of workers of each type in the
firm accordingly below or above the similar coworker share median. We can see in
the table that the previous findings in Table 2.5 remain valid. Foreign-born employ-
ers pay the lowest wages, on average. However, for businesses with coworker share
below the median, immigrant employees working for immigrant employers are paid
slightly more than immigrant employees working for native employers. Additionally,
workers are paid more when working with similar coworkers. When workers’ similar
coworker share is below the median, employers pay lower annual wages. More than
65% of sample businesses have a mixed workforce, that is, the share of immigrant
coworkers is neither one nor zero (0 < share < 1).
These tables do not control for individuals’ characteristics, so we don’t know
the profiles of native and foreign employees holding jobs in these businesses. Nev-
ertheless, these findings are striking. Immigrant owners pay the lowest on average.
Furthermore, they to pay natives less than the rest of the market. This motivates
the question of what type of native workers work for immigrant employers.
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2.5.3 Sorting by Skill
Sorting by skill is a possible cause of sorting by owner type. The incentive
to combine workers of identical skills within the same firm has been documented
previously (Kremer and Maskin [1996]). Job descriptions and skill requirements
are also a concern as characteristics of employers and employees are correlated.
Additionally, if firms of different types have different skill mix productivity, that is,
they use a combination of workers’ skills and capital differently, then the differences
in the probability of hiring a specific type of worker could be motivated by the
capital/labor firm’s decisions. For instance, immigrant owners could use labor more
intensively than native businesses, or could hire more low-skilled workers than native
firms. Immigrants, Hispanics, and other minority groups have lower skill on average
so they may tend to work in low-skill sectors and low-skill jobs regardless of the
owner type. Immigrant owners, on the other hand, may tend to concentrate in low-
skill sectors because they also have low skill levels. For both group, the mayority of
the firms are in the ’Low-Skill Industries’. Almost 30% of immigrant-owned firms
belong to the ’High-Skill Industries’ group, while more than 45% of native-owned
firms belong to this group.
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Table 2.7: Worker types distribution by owner’s skill requirement
Low-Skill Industries High-Skill Industries
Worker / Owner Immigrant Native Mixed All Immigrant Native Mixed All
Immigrant 38.60 11.60 27.50 15.40 33.70 9.20 41.60 11.50
Native 61.40 88.40 72.50 84.60 66.30 90.80 58.40 88.50
Race/ethnicity
Hispanic* 19.23 10.12 16.78 11.40 17.73 6.44 20.05 7.43
Asian 18.22 2.63 8.23 4.64 17.09 2.97 24.30 4.34
Black 5.38 6.83 7.62 6.68 6.45 10.84 4.45 10.42
White (non-hispanic) 48.71 76.18 61.38 72.47 52.22 75.49 42.07 73.28
All 70.83 54.16 62.24 100.00 29.17 45.84 37.76 100.00
Note: Using Census 1990 information on workers’ education attainment by industry, industries are separated into High Skill and Low Skill. High
skill refers to those industries in which more than 50% of workers have at least a high school diploma. Otherwise we define the industry as low skill.
(*) Hispanic refers to all races with ethnic group Hispanic. The group Other includes Native American and otherwise unclassified racial groups.
Native-American workers represented only 0.5% of the total sample.
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Table (2.7) shows workers’ distribution by owner’s skill requirement. The skill
requirement for a firm is computed using Census 1990 data after compiling the share
of workers by industry at the 2-digit level that have low educational attainment(less
than high school) and high educational attainment(more than high school). High
skill industries are those in which more than 50% of workers have at least a high
school diploma. The remaining industries are low skill. The idea is to illustrate
whether specific owner and worker types are concentrated in a particular skill group.
Not surprisingly, the table shows that firms in low-education industries have
higher fractions of immigrant workers than firms in high-education industries. Im-
migrant firms continue to have a bigger proportion of immigrant workers, except for
mix-owned businesses. Results are similar breaking down by workers’ race. How-
ever, it is worth mentioning that immigrant-owned firms are more than 60% of the
group of low-skill firms.
To account for part of this pattern, in the regressions below we include the
share of workers in the firm in four education categories: high school dropouts, high
school graduate, some college, and college graduate.
2.6 Regression Analysis
The ideal data to analyze the effect of owners, coworkers, and social connec-
tions on individual labor market outcomes requires information on individuals’ labor
market histories, earnings, and, specifically, the employer’s source of ex-ante infor-
mation about the job seekers that apply to its open vacancies. With this information
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we would be able to measure the actual hiring policies that firms use to find new
workers.
Unfortunately, we don’t have detailed data on hiring procedures used by firms.
However, we do have a good deal of valuable information on the firms and workers.
Workers can be divided into different categories by birth place or by race/ethnicity42
to infer workers’ and candidates’ likely social connections. This, together with
information on the type of owner, will help us infer the use of social ties in the
firm’s hiring process and its effect on workers’ earnings. More specifically, network
structure refers to the number of ties an individual has (Smith, 2000).
In this paper, we try to identify the impact of networks by using the proportion
of coworkers who are potentially tied to a newly hired worker. Besides identifying
the type of owner for whom the employee works, I use the proportion of similar
employees in the firm at the time the new worker is hired as a measure of the
network link between coworkers, employers, and the new worker.
Following each firm from 1992 to 1996, we obtain the number of employees
who work for the firm and their earnings. We also have the total number of workers
possessing any given set of demographic characteristics at each period of time. Fol-
lowing the definition of networks used in previous literature, we compute the share
of similar coworkers for each new hire at each firm in each period, assuming that a
similar birthplace or ethnicity implies at least a weak network connection between
individuals.43
42White, Black, Hispanic, and Asian.
43At this point, it is worth to mention that even though immigrants are very diverse and it is
a group that reflects a multiple gamma of ethnic/cultural backgrounds, not necessarily captures
by the denomination of being foreign-born, it is also true that immigrants tend to have similar
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A key challenge in linking owners and employees is that the characteristics of
both owners and employees may be correlated with other characteristics of a work-
place and its location. Section 2.5.3 above gives preliminary evidence on sorting
by skill. The correlation between owner and employee types could also be a result
of residential segregation of workers and owners (spatial mismatch). Job descrip-
tions and skill requirements are also a concern, as characteristics of employers and
employees are correlated. Immigrants, and in particular Hispanics, tend to be low
skilled and therefore are likely to work in low-skilled sectors and low-skilled jobs
regardless of the owner type. However, at the same time, immigrant owners could
tend to concentrate in low-skill sectors, perhaps because they also have low skill
levels.
Because the proportions of immigrants are unequally distributed across sectors
and regions, we control for the 2-digit industry and geographic location of each firm.
There exist sectors such as Retail, Services and Construction where immigrants rep-
resent a significant proportion of the workforce 44. We also see this pattern in the
geographic distribution of the immigrant population. For instance, according to
Census 2000, Los Angeles and New York represent more than 30% of the total im-
migrant population in the country. To account for these concerns we need to control
for fixed attributes of the workplace and the local labor market, and also for local
trends in labor pool demographics. Therefore, we estimate the model controlling for
strategies to enter into the labor market regardless of their cultural background. Using migrant
networks is one common factor among foreign-born workers, especially for new immigrants (Porter
and Wilson [1980], Light [2006]).
44This can be also related to the fact that these sectors are also highly represented by relatively
smaller firms than in Manufacturing, for instance.
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characteristics of the firm (Fj) and local community (Zj). These controls include
the immigrant workforce population and population density in the local community,
2-digit industry code dummies, firm size (log of reported employment), and legal
form of organization. We also include the share of the firm’s workers in the four
education categories discussed previously.
Previous research has noted the impact of English language ability in the use
of networks and the level of wages for immigrant workers.45 We capture this feature
by interacting the 2-digit industry dummy with an English speaker dummy 46 This
interaction is a proxy that intends to capture whether language is used differently
in different industries.
In the wage regressions, we also control for individual characteristics (Xj),
including worker’s age, education and a dummy for working full time.47 The com-
position of the labor pool might also be affected by changes over time in labor supply
and demand. For example, white natives may be more likely to work in low-wage
retail jobs when labor markets are weak. Therefore, we also include a dummy vari-
able for each of the years in the sample (Mt) to control for national fluctuations in
the labor market.
The identification strategy exploits variation across owner types for otherwise
similar firms. By controlling for a rich set of firm characteristics we can narrow the
possible alternative explanations for any residual correlation between owner type
45Hellerstein and Neumark [2007] and Hellerstein et al. [2008a]. For additional analysis, see 3
below.
46We identify a group of countries where English is the main language, and use this information
to identify the worker as English speaker or otherwise.




2.6.1 Analysis of firms hiring patterns
This section starts by looking at the hiring patterns of the firm, estimating a
model that predicts the probability that a newly hired employee is an immigrant.
Firm hiring decisions indirectly reflect the way owners use current employees to help
fill their job vacancies. We use a linear probability model to estimate the likelihood
that a newly hired worker is of a particular type (immigrant or from a specific
race/ethnic group).48
Pr(new hire:groupi)kjt=
c+B1 ∗Oj + δ ∗Wjt−1 +B2 ∗Oj ∗Wjt−1 + Φ ∗ Fj + Z ∗ Zkj + T ∗Mt + εkjt (2.2)
Where k, j and t designate the worker, firm type, and time respectively. Oj is a
vector of dummy variables for owner type (defined by immigration status or race). If
i refers to the group of immigrant workers, we use as the reference group firms owned
by immigrants. B1 represents the vector of coefficients associated with the impact of
owner type on hiring. The elements of this vector are expected to be negative when
the omitted group is the same type as the new hire. For instance, the coefficient on
native owners would be negative if immigrant-owned firms are more likely to hire new
immigrant workers. Wjt−1 corresponds to the vector of the proportion of workers of
48We use a linear probability model over a Probit (Logit) model because we don’t need to
restrict the sample to firms that hire at least one new worker of each type. This restriction could
introduce sample selection bias because firms with zero hiring could have a completely different
policy than those with a least one new hire.
58
type each type i at the firm in the previous period. An interaction between owner
type and Wjt−1 is included to asses differences in use of current employees’ networks
across owner types. I also control for firm characteristics Fj (a vector of variables
measured at the firm level), year dummies Mt, and local community information
and state dummies Zkj.
In a regression with both owner type and coworker share included, the esti-
mated coefficient on owner type will capture only the direct impact of owner type on
hiring, not the total effect, which will include both the direct effect and the indirect
effect coming through owner type’s effect on coworker share. The use of employee
referrals can be correlated with the type of owner and can affect hiring patterns if
owners have the tendency to hire same-group individuals. When employees tend to
refer same-group workers, the owner type’s effect may be amplified. If we believe
that the share of similar coworkers is a good proxy for social connections, these
exercises illustrate the combined result of owner effects and hiring patterns.
We assume that the error (εkjt) in equation 2.2 is independent and identi-
cally distributed across firms, but not within firms. To correct for non spherical
disturbances, we estimate Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm.
This procedure is used in all subsequent estimations. We cluster the errors by firm
since firms in the sample may have hired more than one worker and thus may have
repeated observations.
For purposes of analysis, we estimate different versions of equation (2.2) and
look at the impact of the addition of controls on the estimates of B1 and B2. The
first regression includes only year dummies; subsequent specifications add controls
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one by one. Most of the literature on hiring networks argues that current workers’
referrals are more important to firm hiring patterns than owners’ personal networks.
Owners are likely to hire individuals from their residential area. However, current
workers have a larger and more diverse set of connections that can be exploited by the
firm. We are not able to disentangle these effects directly. Nevertheless, by allowing
owners of different groups to make use of their workers’ social ties differently, the
estimated interaction effects can measure the ability of owners to use social ties.
Table (2.8) shows the probability of a new hire being an immigrant given the
characteristics of the firm, its community and the share of immigrant coworkers
in the firm. Controlling only for year dummies, native owners are 25 percentage
points less likely to hire a new immigrant worker than immigrant firms (column 1).
This difference is significantly reduced, to 3.5 percentage points, when we include
the share of immigrant coworkers (column 2). Controlling for year and industry
dummies, the share of immigrant coworker positively affects the likelihood of an im-
migrant being hired. The inclusion of the share of English speaker and its interaction
with industry dummies decreases the impart of the share of immigrant coworkers on
the probability of being hired. This covariates controls for whether language is used
differently in different industries (column 3). For instance, a Mexican restaurant
would probably hire Mexicans or Spanish speaker because of the type of service
they offer and type of frequent consumers. The use of language can be different in
a industry where workers don’t need to communicate with each other, so language
differences are not obstacle in the production process. Given the results, it seems
that firms use language in different ways, affecting the likelihood of an immigrant
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Table 2.8: Linear Estimates of the Effect of Owner Type on the Probability that
a New Hire is an Immigrant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (FE)
Owner Mix -0.0519*** -0.041*** -.0034** -0.0037** -0.00313**
0.0057 0.0065 0.001 0.001 0.001
Owner Native -0.2358*** -0.0351*** -0.0342*** -0.033*** -0.0254***
0.0032 0.0031 0.0009 0.0004 0.0014
% Imm. Coworkers 0.9961*** 0.782*** 0.7724*** 0.7132*** 0.6715***
0.0056 0.002 0.0101 0.0234 0.0435
% Imn. Coworkers -0.0125** -0.0094**
* Owner Mix 0.005 0.005
% Imm. Coworkers -0.0711*** -0.0378***







Share of workers 0.0021**
with HSD (firm) 0.0004
Share of workers -0.0012
with HSG (firm) 0.001
Share of workers 0.005
with SCG (firm) 0.006






Constant 0.4081*** 0.0211*** 0.0989*** 0.0969*** 0.0285** 0.1575*
0.099 0.0039 0.002 0.0016 0.0069 0.781
Dummies
year yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes -
Indus*English Spkr - - yes yes yes -
R-Square 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.41
Note: Reference group is immigrant firms.Reference Sector is Services. The number of
observations is 147,373. Standard Errors are Huber-White robust standard errors, corrected for
firm clustering. (+) Neighborhood is defined counties adjacent to the county where the firm is
located. Population in 100,000’s. FE represents the firm fixed-effect model. ***significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
being hired and reducing the impact of immigrant coworkers in the firm.
There is a positive and significant impact on the probability of the new hire
61
being an immigrant when the proportion of workers in the firm with low education
(high school dropout) increases. The owner effect diminishes and the difference in
the probability of hiring a Hispanic between immigrant and native owners is 2.5
percentage points (column 4). The coworker effect is smaller too, although it is still
significant. The interaction effects between owner type and coworker share decrease
slightly when others controls are included, although the results are similar. The
effect of immigrant coworker share is smaller in mix and native owned firms than in
immigrant owned firms. Immigrant employers can take advantage more efficiently
of their current immigrant workers than other types of employers. The increment of
immigrant coworker share by 1 percentage point increases this likelihood by 0.71-
0.67. The inclusion of other characteristics of the firm and the local community has
a smaller impact on the relative likelihood of native versus immigrant owners hiring
a new immigrant worker.
We should be cautious when analyzing these results. We include a vast series of
covariates to control for all possible observables that can be correlated with employer
and employee effects. However, the presence of unobservables correlated with firm
and worker interactions could bias the results. As another exercise, we compute the
firm fixed-effect version of the model by including firm dummies. The last column
of Table (2.8) shows the results. The impact of share of immigrant coworkers in the
firm at the time of the new hire remains positive, high, and significant.
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2.6.2 Hiring Process by Race/Ethnicity
We next consider the determinants of the probability that a new hire comes
from a particular race/ethnic group: white, black, Hispanic and Asian. That is,
we estimate equation (2.2), setting i equal to a particular racial category. Tables
2.9 and F.1 show the effects of owner types and shares of type i coworker, and
other types of coworker, at the time of hiring on the probability that a new hire is
Hispanic, Asian, white, or black respectively.
2.6.2.1 Worker Race
The likelihood of a new worker being Hispanic or Asian significantly decreases
when the employer is native. This result holds even after including a exhaustive
list of controls(Tables 2.9 and 2.10). The direct impact of owner type is reduced,
however, once we control for the share of Hispanic coworkers. For instance, having
a one percentage point increment of Hispanics as current employees in the firm
increases the probability that a new hire is Hispanic (by up to 0.88 in immigrant
owned firms). The impact of Hispanic coworkers is smaller for native owned firms.
Table 2.9: Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Owner Type on the Prob-
ability that a New Hire is Hispanic
Hispanic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) FE
Owner Mix 0.0214*** 0.012 0.0077 0.014 -0.0694
0.0041 0.01 0.005 0.0357 0.054
Owner Native -0.0903*** -0.0872*** -0.0412*** -0.0245** -0.0172**
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001
Hispanic Cowkrs 0.9441***
0.0054
Asian Cowkrs -0.628*** -0.526*** -0.504***
0.013 0.023 0.029
Continued on next page.
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Table 2.9: Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Owner Type on the Prob-
ability that a New Hire is Hispanic (continued)
Hispanic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) FE
White Cowkrs -0.703*** -0.681*** -0.596***
0.0095 0.0075 0.0197




Asian Cow* 0.1060** 0.093**
Owner Mix 0.0483 0.034
White Cow* 0.0185 0.0175
Owner Mix 0.0384 0.0434
Black Cow* 0.137 0.105
Owner Mix 0.0845 0.0945
Hispanic Cow* -0.0869***
Owner Native 0.043
Asian Cow* -0.113*** -0.102***
Owner Native 0.0295 0.0243
White Cow* -0.148** -0.124**
Owner Native 0.062 0.056
Black Cow* -0.094* -0.097*
Owner Native 0.04 0.04
log(employment) 0.0013**
0.00
Share of workers 0.0012***
with HSD (firm) 0.0005
Share of workers 0.0025***
with HSG (firm) 0.0003
Share of workers 0.0030***





Constant 0.1920*** 0.1243*** 0.9702*** 0.8454*** 0.9511*** 0.8411***
0.0032 0.009 0.08 0.1616 0.171 0.201
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies - yes yes yes yes -
State dummies - - yes yes yes -
Other controls(+) - - - - yes -
p-value 0.0001 0.002 0.0001 0.003 0.003 0.01
R-Square 0.22 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.42 0.35
Note: Reference group is native firms.Reference Sector is Services. The number of observations is 147,373.
Standard Errors are Huber-White robust standard errors, corrected for firm clustering. (+) Other controls
include: location in a MSA dummy, legal form of organization, population in thousands in the neighborhood,
interaction between 2-digit industry dummy and English speaker dummy. Neighborhood is defined as the adjacent
counties to the county where the firm is located. Population in 100,000’s. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at
5%, * significant at 10%.
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The effect of the share of Hispanic coworkers is positive regardless the type of
the owner. However, the effect is smaller than the baseline effect on the Hispanic-
owned firms (column 3). Columns 4 includes the effect of all races coworker share
on the likelihood of being hired. Other races coworker shares affect negatively the
probability of a new hire is Hispanic. Interestinly though, Asian coworker share is
less negative when the firm is mix-owned. Column 5 includes other firm and local
community characteristics. Their inclusion decreases the average effects, but do not
change the directions of the results.
In section (2.5.3) we discussed the distribution of workers by average industry-
level skill requirement. As a proxy to control for this effect, we include the firm’s
share of workers in four education categories and the fraction of workers of similar
type in the local community. The results show that a higher share of low-educated
workers in the firm increases the probability that the new worker is Hispanic. We
also include the share of workers of each racial group in the local labor force. The
inclusion of these shares decreases the impact of the coworker shares.
Looking at Asian new hires (Table 2.10), we again find that native employers
are less likely to hire Asian workers. The inclusion of additional controls reduces the
difference in probability of hiring an Asian between immigrant and native owned
firms. Another interesting result is that Asians are less likely to be hired in firms
with bigger proportion of workers with education attainment below the high school
level.
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Table 2.10: Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Owner Type on the Prob-
ability that a New Hire is Asian
Asian
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) FE
Owner Mix -0.029*** -0.0280*** 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.1948
0.0032 0.0032 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.254
Owner Native -0.1245*** -0.1114*** -0.054** -0.052** -0.06**
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.014




White Cowkrs -0.7876*** -0.741*** -0.6715***
0.0071 0.0072 0.0074
Black Cowkrs -0.8795*** -0.8214*** -0.7631***
0.0083 0.0081 0.0083
Hispanic Cow* -0.0197 -0.0556
Owner Mix 0.0303 0.041
Asian Cow* 0.007
Owner Mix 0.002
White Cow* -0.0746*** -0.076***
Owner Mix 0.0022 0.0022
Black Cow* 0.032 0.0404
Owner Mix 0.0446 0.0536
Hispanic Cow* -0.0064 -0.0064
Owner Native 0.0185 0.0185
Asian Cow* -0.152***
Owner Native 0.013
White Cow* -0.0158 -0.031
Owner Native 0.0154 0.0221
Black Cow* -0.0076 -0.0095
Owner Native 0.02 0.02
log(employment) 0.0014**
0.00
Share of workers -0.0012**
with HSD (firm) 0.0001
Share of workers -0.000
with HSG (firm) 0.00
Share of workers -0.0013**






% Asian 1 0.01
Constant 0.1495*** 0.112** 0.065** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.097
0.0018 0.0562 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.081
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies - yes yes yes yes -
State dummies - - yes yes yes -
Continued on next page.
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Table 2.10: Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Owner Type on the Prob-
ability that a New Hire is Asian (continued)
Asian
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) FE
Other controls(+) - - - - yes -
p-value 0.0001 0.002 0.0001 0.003 0.003 0.01
R-Square 0.26 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.38
Note: Reference group is native firms.Reference Sector is Services. The number of observations is 147,373.
Standard Errors are Huber-White robust standard errors, corrected for firm clustering. (+) Other controls
include: location in a MSA dummy, legal form of organization, population in thousands in the neighborhood,
interaction between 2-digit industry dummy and English speaker dummy. Neighborhood is defined as the adjacent
counties to the county where the firm is located. Population in 100,000’s. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at
5%, * significant at 10%.
Whites and blacks are more likely to be hired by native firms (See Tables (F.1)
and (F.2)). However, the probability that a new hire is black or white depends on
the share of blacks or whites in the firm at the time of the recruitment process. The
significance of the immigrant owner effect on black hiring vanishes when I include
the black coworker share in the regression. The column FE shows the results of
the regression after including firm fixed effects. The impact of similar coworkers
decreases slightly but is still high and significant. The largest change in coefficients
caused by the inclusion of fixed effects is the drop in the impact of white coworkers
on the probability of that a new hire is black.
We also experiment with estimating a multinomial logit model to account for
the posibility that employers may simultaneously choose among different types of
workers. The estimation sample is then restricted to firms that hire at least one
worker of each race group during the period 1992-1996. This restriction eliminates
more homogeneous firms. The new sample contains 2,662 firms out of the original
sample of 4,478 firms. We investigate how the owner type and shares of different
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types of workers at the time of hiring affect the type/race of the new hire. We es-
timate a model49 that aims to reveal whether the birthplace of the employer affects
the likelihood that a new worker is of the same type as opposed to other types, con-
ditional on having accessed to the firm during the period of analysis and controlling
for the characteristics of the worker and the firm.
Pr(new hire is worker type: i)kjt =
exp(ci +Bi1 ∗Oj + δi ∗Wjt−1 + Φi ∗ Fj + Zi ∗ Zkj + T i ∗Mt + εikjt)∑5
s=1 exp(c
s +Bs1 ∗Oj + δs ∗Wjt−1 + Φs ∗ Fj + Zs ∗ Zkj + T s ∗Mt + εskjt)
(2.3)
with i = 1, ..., 4 for the four race groups: white, black, Asian, and Hispanic.
This procedure makes very strong assumptions with respect to the relevance of other
alternatives. The odds ratio of any two options is assumed independent of the other
alternatives. This feature is important to consider when more than two alternatives
are included. To test the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption, we
conduct a Hausman test by excluding each outcome category in turn. The test
indicates that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the odds of one outcome
happening are independent of other alternatives. Additionally, we perform Wald
tests for combination of categories. The tests reject the null hypotheses that all
coefficients associated with a given pair of outcomes are zero (except intercepts).
We cluster the errors by firm since observations within firms are not independent.
The results for this regression are shown in Tables (2.11) and (2.12).
49I specifically estimate a mixed logit model that incorporates both characteristics of the indi-
vidual and the alternatives.
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Table (2.11) shows the change in log odds comparing two alternatives. The
share of white coworkers significantly increases in the log odds of a white being
hired. We also show the predicted hiring probabilities for each owner type (Table
2.12) computed at the means of all firms and dummy variables. The change in log
odds between hiring a white worker versus hiring a Hispanic or an Asian decreases
when the firm is immigrant-owned. Immigrant owners are 3 percentage points more
likely to hire Asians and Hispanics than native firms. These results support the
analysis in the previous section.
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Table 2.11: Multinomial Logit Model: Effects of Owner Type and Coworkers on Type of New Hires
Change in log odds comparing alternative 1 to alternative 2
Cow. Share White to Black White to Asian White to Hispanic Black to Hispanic Black to Asian Asian to Hispanic
White 1.97*** 2.32*** 3.53*** 1.44* 0.53 0.92
0.646 0.761 0.421 0.71 0.723 1.017
Black -5.352*** 1.186 2.145*** 7.456*** 5.456*** 1.014
0.892 1.086 0.661 0.957 0.968 1.131
Asian -1.391 -7.243*** 0.041 1.433 -5.682*** 7.126***
0.951 1.001 0.591 1.108 0.946 1.143
Hispanic -0.236 -0.086 -3.675*** -3.127*** 0.15 -3.654***
1.03 1.102 0.527 1.09 0.952 1.361
Note: Other controls include log of employment, percentage of immigrant workers in the surrounding counties, population in the county, legal form of organization, Msa
location, 2-digit industry, interaction 2-digit industry and English speaker dummy, state and year dummies. Results from race/ethnicity ’others’ are not shown. Number of
observation 135,583 workers, and 2,662 firms. Robust standard errors in italic allow for arbitrary correlation within the same firm.
* significant at 10%,** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 2.12: Multinomial Logit Model: Predicted Probability of Covariates
Workers
Owner White Black Asian Hispanic
Native 0.740 0.120 0.031 0.100
Immigrant 0.710 0.102 0.060 0.126
Mix 0.690 0.119 0.052 0.134
Note: Based on multinomial logit predictions of the race of new hires from previous table.
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2.6.2.2 Worker and Owner Races
After looking at the effect of owner birthplace on the probability of being hired
for each particular worker’s race, the natural question is whether we can detect
similar effects when we separate owner types by race. As explained in Section
2.4.1, owner’s race is obtained from the Small Minority Owner Business Employers
Survey(SMOBE). For multiple-owned firms, the median race is used; in the case of
ties, the hours worked in the firm are also considered to determine the predominant
race of the firm. The race categories are: white, black, Asian and Hispanic.
The likelihood of a new worker being Hispanic or Asian significantly decreases
when the employer is White. This result holds even after including a exhaustive
list of controls(Tables 2.13 and 2.14). The direct impact of owner type is reduced,
however, once we control for the share of Hispanic coworkers. For instance, an
increment of one percentage point in the share of Hispanics as current employees in
the firm increases the probability that a new worker is Hispanic (by up to 0.95 in
Hispanic owned firms).
Table 2.13: Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Owner Race on the Prob-
ability that a New Hire is Hispanic
Hispanic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Owner Black -0.2215*** -0.1514*** -0.024** -0.0284** -0.0165**
0.0271 0.0085 0.0112 0.015 0.0013
Owner Asian -0.135*** -0.1264*** -0.0257*** 0.0868 0.1429
0.0229 0.0043 0.0076 0.7279 0.1309
Owner White -0.2358*** -0.176*** -0.0318*** -0.0231*** -0.0158***
0.0154 0.0034 0.0064 0.0015 0.0045
Hispanic Cowkrs 0.9512***
0.0176
Asian Cowkrs -0.918* -0.9114***
0.0669 0.0707
Continued on next page.
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Table 2.13: Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Owner Race on the Prob-
ability that a New Hire is Hispanic (continued)
Hispanic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
White Cowkrs -0.9086*** -0.6494***
0.0231 0.0269
Black Cowkrs -0.8322*** -0.6335***
0.0317 0.0349




Owner Black* 0.0367 0.0922
Asian Cowkrs 0.2128 0.2218
Owner Black* 0.0132 0.0024
White Cowkrs 0.0678 0.0748
Owner Black* -0.0382** 0.0063
Black Cowkrs 0.0109 0.0783
Owner Black* 0.0048 0.092
Other Cowkrs 0.1592 0.1826
Owner Asian* -0.0427*
Hispanic Cowkrs 0.0252
Owner Asian* -0.0531 -0.1636**
Asian Cowkrs 0.0711 0.0756
Owner Asian* -0.0869** -0.1622***
White Cowkrs 0.0326 0.037
Owner Asian* -0.1764*** -0.144***
Black Cowkrs 0.0493 0.0533
Owner Asian* -0.2705*** -0.33***
Other Cowkrs 0.0627 0.0676
Owner White* -0.09***
Hispanic Cowkrs 0.0194
Owner White* -0.2077*** -0.1057*
Asian Cowkrs 0.0703 0.0748
Owner White* -0.1218*** -0.0811**
White Cowkrs 0.0254 0.0296
Owner White* -0.2015*** -0.1071***
Black Cowkrs 0.0342 0.0385
Owner White* -0.2358*** -0.184***
Other Cowkrs 0.0486 0.054
Share of workers 0.0016***
with HSD (firm) 0.0005
Share of workers 0.0022***
with HSG 0.0003







Continued on next page.
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Table 2.13: Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Owner Race on the Prob-
ability that a New Hire is Hispanic (continued)
Hispanic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% Hisp. 0
Constant 0.3286*** 0.0436* 0.0211 0.8779 0.6446
0.0136 0.0175 0.0828 0.0864 0.1755
Year dumies yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies - yes yes yes yes
State dummies - yes yes yes yes
Other Controls - - - yes yes
p-value 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
R-Square 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.45
Note: Reference group is native firms.Reference Sector is Services. The number of observations is 147,373.
Standard Errors are Huber-White robust standard errors, corrected for firm clustering. (+) Other controls
include: location in a MSA dummy, legal form of organization, population in thousands in the neighborhood,
interaction between 2-digit industry dummy and English speaker dummy. Neighborhood is defined as the adjacent
counties to the county where the firm is located. Population in 100,000’s. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at
5%, * significant at 10%.
The impact of Hispanic coworkers is smaller for other types of firms. The
results for other characteristics of the firm and its location are similar to previous
sections. The results show that a higher share of low-educated workers in the firm
increases the probability that the new worker is Hispanic. I also include the shares of
coworkers in each racial group. Black and White owned firms are 2 to 3 percentage
points less likely to hire a Hispanic worker compared to Hispanic and Asian owned
firms, holding constant the worker race distribution.
Looking at Asian new hires (Table 2.14), we find that white employers are less
likely to hire Asian workers. White owners are mostly natives. The inclusion of
additional controls reduces the difference in probability of hiring an Asian between
Asian and white owned firms. Another interesting result is that Asians are less likely
to be hired in firms with bigger proportion of workers with educational attainment
below the high school level.
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Table 2.14: Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Owner Race on the Prob-
ability that a New Hire is Asian
Asian
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Owner Black -0.181*** -0.1771*** -0.06*** -0.2035* -0.1628***
0.0067 0.0054 0.006 0.1164 0.0268
Owner Hispanic -0.1977** -0.1842*** -0.013 -0.0333*** 0.0503
0.0215 0.0027 0.0034 0.00419 0.0462
Owner White -0.187*** -0.1775*** -0.049*** -0.1257*** -0.1749***
0.0049 0.0021 0.0026 0.0149 0.0163
Asian Cowkrs 0.98***
0.0074
Hispanic Cowkrs -0.987*** -0.8883***
0.0149 0.017
White Cowkrs -0.920*** -0.7414***
0.0101 0.0118
Black Cowkrs -0.978*** -0.7986***
0.0202 0.022




Owner Black* 0.1801 0.1481
Hispanic Cowkrs 0.1258 0.1367
Owner Black* 0.1915 0.1471
White Cowkrs 0.1186 0.1305
Owner Black* 0.2172 0.2031
Black Cowkrs 0.1184 0.1299
Owner Black* 0.3027 0.2474
Other Cowkrs 0.1514 0.17
Owner Hispanic* -0.0374
Asian Cowkrs 0.0339
Owner Hispanic* 0.0019 -0.0373
Hispanic Cowkrs 0.044 0.0488
Owner Hispanic* -0.0421** -0.0302**
White Cowkrs 0.0235 0.0129
Owner Hispanic* -0.0032 -0.0009
Black Cowkrs 0.0506 0.0559
Owner Hispanic* -0.0684 -0.0754
Other Cowkrs 0.0552 0.0608
Owner White* -0.2475***
Asian Cowkrs 0.0131
Owner White* 0.1633*** 0.2095
Hispanic Cowkrs 0.0203 0.0229
Owner White* -0.1158*** -0.1092***
White Cowkrs 0.0158 0.0177
Owner White* -0.144*** -0.1205***
Black Cowkrs 0.0242 0.0263
Owner White* -0.1223*** -0.108***
Other Cowkrs 0.0287 0.0316
Share of workers -0.0017***
Continued on next page.
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Table 2.14: Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Owner Race on the Prob-
ability that a New Hire is Asian (continued)
Asian
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
with HSD (firm) 0.0004
Share of workers -0.0001
with HSG 0.0002








Constant 0.2431*** 0.2131*** 0.0373 0.0275 0.1242
0.0052 0.0557 0.0519 0.0528 0.1129
Year dumies yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies - yes yes yes yes
State dummies - yes yes yes yes
Other Controls - - - yes yes
p-value 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
R-Square 0.28 0.29 0.35 0.38 0.43
Note: Reference group is native firms.Reference Sector is Services. The number of observations is 147,373.
Standard Errors are Huber-White robust standard errors, corrected for firm clustering. (+) Other controls
include: location in a MSA dummy, legal form of organization, population in thousands in the neighborhood,
interaction between 2-digit industry dummy and English speaker dummy. Neighborhood is defined as the adjacent
counties to the county where the firm is located. Population in 100,000’s. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at
5%, * significant at 10%.
Whites are more likely to be hired by white owned firms (see Table F.4).
However, the probability that a new hire is white depends postively on the share of
whites in the firm at the time of the recruitment process. The owner’s race effect is
lower for those owners from a different racial group.
Multinomial analysis is also applied to the combination of worker and owner
races. The results for this regression are shown in Tables (2.15) and (2.16). Table
(2.15) shows the change in log odds comparing two alternatives. The change in log
odds between hiring a white worker versus hiring a Hispanic or an Asian decreases
when firms are Hispanic or Asian owned. A higher share of white coworkers sig-
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nificantly increases the log odds of a white being hired, and a similar result holds
for other races. We also show the predicted hiring probabilities for each owner race
(Table 2.12) computed at the means of all firms and dummy variables. Hispanic
owners are 3 percentage points more likely to hire Asians and Hispanics than White
and Black owners. These results support the analysis in previous sections.
In sum, Hispanic and Asian workers are generally more likely to be hired by
Hispanic or Asian owned firms. In this detailed presentation, it seems that Asian
owned firms tend to employ Asian and Hispanic workers more readily than black and
white workers. Almost 70% of Asian and Hispanic owners are immigrants. We would
also like to analyse the impact of immigrant/native oner effects after controllinf
for owner race, including owner birthpalce and race simultaneously. However, the
variation across the sample is not enough to identify whether birthplace or owner
race is more important. Most of the native owners are either white or black, with a
large proportion of them being white. While, our sample has a small representation
of black immigrant owners.
Given the structure of our sample, white and black owners are mainly natives,
while Asian and Hispanic owners are immigrants, and after looking at our by racial
groups results, we can see that our previous result. Immigrant owners tend to hire
immigrant workers, while native owners tend to hire native workers.
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Table 2.15: Multinomial Logit Model: Effects of Owner’s Race and Coworkers on Type of New Hires
Covariates Change in log odds comparing alternative 1 to alternative 2
White White White Black Black Asian
to Black to Asian to Hispanic to Hispanic to Asian to Hispanic
Owner Black -0.379*** -0.313* -0.234 0.145*** 0.067 -0.079
0.03 0.15 0.2 0.04 0.1 0.1
Owner Hispanic -0.09* -0.186*** -0.052** -0.039** -0.096*** -0.134***
0.06 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
Owner Asian 0.11 -0.229*** -0.113 -0.340** -0.223** 0.116***
0.09 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02
Cow. Share white 2.522*** 1.7560** 6.631*** 4.111*** 0.766 1.875
0.892 0.413 1.121 1.153 0.651 1.034
Cow. Share black -7.130*** -0.823 -0.385 6.745*** 6.308*** 0.438
1.203 0.723 0.241 1.412 1.324 0.56
Cow. Share Asian -3.532*** -7.742*** -1.832* 1.700 -4.210*** 5.910***
0.731 1.202 0.891 1.342 1.154 1.265
Cow. Share Hispanic -1.522* -1.756*** -6.632*** -4.210** 0.667 -4.875***
0.641 0.952 1.678 1.023 0.801 1.123
Note: Other controls include log of employment, percentage of immigrant workers in the surrounding counties, population in the county, legal form of organization, Msa
location, 2-digit industry, interaction 2-digit industry and English speaker dummy, state and year dummies. Results from race/ethnicity ’others’ are not shown. Number of
observation 135,583 workers, and 2,662 firms. Robust standard errors in italic allow for arbitrary correlation within the same firm.
* significant at 10%,** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.16: Multinomial Logit Model: Predicted Probability of Covariates Owner
and Worker Races (%)
Workers
Owner White Black Asian Hispanic
White 74.11 11.99 3.05 10.64
Black 65.66 15.33 3.90 11.97
Asian 60.92 10.91 6.84 12.50
Hispanic 61.00 12.75 6.71 13.87
Note: Based on multinomial logit predictions of the race of new hires from previous table.
2.6.3 Workers’ earnings and analysis of results
We estimate the effects of owner type and coworker shares on workers’ com-
pensation using a human capital approach. The dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of workers’ real annual wages.50 The regression includes dummy variables
for owner type, the share of similar coworkers, worker type, and other firm charac-
teristics. Using wage estimates at the individual level, we can evaluate the impact
of owners’ characteristics on wage differentials by using equation (2.4).





















j ∗ Φ + Z ′kj ∗ Z + T ∗Mt + µkjt
(2.4)
50In order to approximate the individual’s full-year annual wage rate and thus reduce the
importance of within-year labor supply decision, we include the additional information of whether
the worker is a full quarter employee. That is, full quarter worker is an individual with positive
earnings during all the quarters of the year. Controlling for full quarter workers allows us to
make UI’s annual earnings comparable to CPS salary and wages. Abowd et al. [2002] have a
discussion on the comparison between LEHD and CPS annualized wages. After controlling for
dominant employer and full-time status, CPS and LEHD earnings data are more comparable.
LEHD annualized wages are slightly higher than CPS’ annualized wages. However, when looking
at our analysis we should keep in mind that an individual’s labor supply depends on both the
duration and the average number of hours worked at the job.
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where k identifies information on the worker and j refers to information on
the firm. wkj stands for worker k’s log real annual earnings at firm j. Ik is a dummy
variable for whether the worker is an immigrant. In an effort to establish how much
the immigrant earnings differential is due to differences in predetermined personal
characteristics, we add a vector Xk of employee characteristics including age, age
squared, education, sex, and race. Oj is a vector of dummy variables for owner
type (birthplace). COWkj stands for the proportion of immigrant coworkers in the
firm (explained in section 2.4.5). The expected sign for β1 is negative, assuming
that immigrants earn lower wages, and its significance would indicates whether
there is substantial wage variation across the different worker types. With the
inclusion of owner type dummies, the estimate of β1 will represent the difference
in wages between immigrants and natives in native owned firms. The sum of β1
and the B3 and B4 coefficients corresponding to an immigrant owned firm will be
positive if immigrant workers earn higher wages when working for immigrant-owned
businesses than native workers in an immigrant firm. The coworker share accounts
for the potential impact on wages of having better connections to similar types of
workers in the firm. The interaction between COWkj and the vector of owner types
is included to assess whether the effect of coworkers differs according to the type
of employer that is hiring the employee. We explore a 3-way interaction among
owner type, worker type, and the immigrant coworker share. In equation (2.4),
B2Xk absorbs the effects of variations in personal characteristics. We would expect
estimates of β1 and the vector B3 to change after including workers’ characteristics.
We should be aware of the potential presence of omitted variable bias. Unob-
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servable characteristics could bias estimated coefficients in equation (2.4). Ignoring
these unobservables could causes us to overestimate the impact of owner type and
immigrant coworkers on individual earnings. High ability workers of type k should
look for firms that pay higher earnings. If native-owned firms offer higher wages
and employ these high ability workers, the estimated model would not be capturing
the effect of owner type on workers’ earnings; rather it would be capturing individu-
als’ ability to find better jobs. Also, worker preferences and comparative advantage
can influence the results. Variations in preferences for particular job characteristics
across different workers could provide an alternative explanation for both earnings
differentials and sorting. To account for some of this variation, we include the frac-
tion of workers in the firm with education lower than high school, equal to high
school, higher than high school with some college, and equal to college or higher.
The omitted category is college graduate.
Characteristics of firms (Fj) and of the local community (Zj) are also included.
These controls include the population share of each group in the local community,
population density, firm’s size (log of reported employment), and legal form of or-
ganization. Mt are year dummies.
The first column of Table (2.17) shows results from a baseline model including
immigrant status, individual age, education, and part-time status, but excluding
other variables of interest. The table reports the betas estimated by equation (2.4).
To make the analysis easier to interpret, we transform these unstandardized β coef-
ficients with the usual formula [(eβ−1)∗100], so that we can analyze the percentage
change in wages associated with a 1-unit change in a continuous independent pre-
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dictor variable. In the case of a dichotomous independent variable, we interpret
the percentage wage difference in the target category compared to the reference
category. After controlling for typical human capital variables, full-time immigrant
workers earn about 8% less than native workers (3,293 dollars less each year). In the
Table (2.17), we progressively include covariates that control for firms and coworker
shares. Column 1 shows the typical human capital analysis. Column 2 includes
owner dummies and their interaction with worker type. Then, in column 3, immi-
grant coworker share is included and its interaction with worker type to see whether
the effect of immigrant coworker share differs across worker types. Then, the in-
teraction of immigrant coworker share and owner types are added to the regression
(column 5). Finally, we include a 3-way interaction among immigrant coworker
share, worker type, and owner type.
Evaluating the variables at their means and sample distribution, we find that,
when working for native employers, the difference between native and immigrant
wages increases to 11%. Meanwhile, immigrant workers earn 10% more than native
workers in immigrant owned firms (4,398 dollar more each year).
The human capital results in Table (2.17) are consistent with the literature.
Age positively affects wages but at a decreasing rate. Education is significant and
positive. Part-time workers earn less than full-time workers. The inclusion of addi-
tional independent variables does not modify these patterns. After controlling for
individual characteristics, immigrant workers are paid less than native workers in
native firms, but they receive a significantly higher wage than native workers when
working for immigrant firms. The inclusion of the share of immigrant coworkers
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Table 2.17: OLS Results: Effect of Owner Type and Coworker Share on Log Real
Annual Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Immigrant -0.08*** -0.1503*** -0.1205*** -0.1171*** -0.1017***
0.007 0.0069 0.0073 0.0025 0.0008
Age 0.0806*** 0.080*** 0.0803*** 0.0802*** 0.0749***
0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0008
Age square (’) -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.080***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Education 0.506*** 0.506*** 0.511*** 0.504*** 0.484***
0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
Partime -2.1847*** -2.1805*** -2.1792*** -2.1783*** -2.1240***
0.0044 0.0044 0.0044 0.0036 0.0049
Owner Mix 0.1808*** 0.1615*** 0.1407*** 0.0936
0.0128 0.013 0.0481 0.0155
Owner Immigrant -0.1191*** -0.1443*** -0.1495*** -0.1087***
0.0097 0.0101 0.017 0.012
Owner Mix*Immigrant 0.0054 -0.0007 0.1866 0.1368
0.0224 0.02 0.251 0.243
Owner Immigrant*Immigrant 0.3205*** 0.3030*** 0.3174*** 0.3131***
0.0251 0.0153 0.017 0.0252
Imm.Coworker -0.1398*** -0.2457*** -0.3797***
0.0163 0.0203 0.0276










Constant 10.665*** 10.7015*** 10.686*** 10.653*** 10.615***
0.26 0.262 0.263 0.241 0.235
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
2-digit industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Other controls no no no no yes
R-Square Adjusted 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.35
Note: The number of observations includes 214,398 workers. Standard Errors are Huber-White robust standard
errors, corrected by firm clustering. Reference group are full time native workers in native firms. (+)
Neighborhood is defined as the contiguous counties to the county where the firm is located. Population in
100,000’s. (’) Age ∗ 102.
***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
produces interesting results. Immigrants earn more when working for immigrant
employers and when the immigrant coworker share increases. The opposite is true
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for native workers. In general, a native worker receives higher wages if he or she
works for a native firm with a low share of immigrant workers.
These results are striking in two senses. One, the ability to look at individual
wages and identify the types of firm owners is only possible with this database.
We have individual earnings for each firm. Although immigrants are paid less on
average, they find themselves in a better position when working for immigrant firms.
Second, we can look at the entire workforce and identify each individuals’ types of
coworkers in the firm. This allows us to make inference on the impact of social ties
on worker wages.
2.7 Conclusions
This paper takes advantage of unique employee and employer matched micro-
data from the U.S. Census Bureau to examine the effect of owner types and coworker
types on firms’ hiring patterns and workers’ earnings. Particular attention was paid
to the birthplace of employers and to the share of similar coworkers (by birthplace
and ethnicity) at firms when new workers are hired. We examined the effect of
those variables on hiring rates and on the wage differential between immigrants and
natives.
In general, employees’ wages are affected by the type of owner of the firm. For
native employees working for immigrant owners the effect is very interesting. Natives
are paid lower when working for immigrant employers, and in these firms natives
have lower average earnings than immigrants. One explanation for these findings
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is that immigrant bosses have a better understanding of and networking with the
immigrant community, and therefore can find and contract immigrant workers more
easily than native-owned firms. Why can’t native-owned firms quickly adjust and
find this cheaper labor? Lack of language knowledge and lack of networking make
it harder for native bosses to find immigrant workers. These findings justify further
analysis of differences in contracting ability across employers. The evidence that the
type of owner matters for wage differentials among workers also implies an important
role for owner type on personnel policy.
In addition to examining the effect of owners and coworkers on differences
between immigrants and natives, we evaluate the effect of owner and coworker types
on ethnically(racially) different groups. An individual’s race is an important source
of variation across workers and owners. The evidence suggests that employers tend
to hire workers from the same ethnic group. A significant impact of similar coworkers
in the hiring process is observed across all types of owners, even after controlling for
firm fixed effects. Immigrant owners tend to hire more Hispanics and Asians, while
native owners hire more blacks and whites.
By shedding light on the ways workers and employers interact in the labor
market to affect job and wage outcomes, this research makes a contribution to the
sociology, labor economics, and demography literatures. It also opens up numerous
avenues for future research. On the microeconomic side, we can further evaluate
job flows and wage profiles of workers inside different types of firms. The analysis
of assimilation can also take advantage of the results presented here, to further our
understanding of the adjustment process of new immigrant workers. The empir-
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ical analysis in this paper makes some progress toward mitigating biases of skill
sorting. This paper controls for a broad number of observable characteristics that
try to capture other explanations for segregation. However, if owner unobservable
characteristics are correlated with worker characteristics, the results of the analysis
would be biased. Different empirical approaches such as instrumental variables or
owner fixed-effects could be good options in future research, although this would
demand a more exhaustive matched database that follows workers after leaving the
firm and firms after ownership changes. Narrowing the scope of the analysis by
looking at one industry could also provide information on the costs and benefits of
firm recruitment processes. For instance, we could examine with more detail the
effect of worker type concentration on firms’ labor productivity. On an aggregate
view, we can evaluate the effect of large flows of immigrants on the economy with
the combined analysis of push and pull factors. Immigrant firms and immigrant
workers seem to match quickly in the labor market. The analysis of the impact of
immigration on unemployment and aggregate vacancies in the labor market can be
extended to incorporate the findings in this paper.
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Chapter 3
Workplace Concentration of Immigrants
3.1 Introduction1
Over the last several decades, labor markets in many U.S. cities have absorbed
large inflows of new immigrants. The size of these flows has generated intense inter-
est in their effects on the employment and wages of natives, as well as in the extent
to which new immigrants have assimilated into the U.S. economy. New immigrants
find employment and accumulate location-specific skills and work experience, grad-
ually becoming integrated into local economies and potentially changing them in
substantial ways. While outcomes of this process have been the subject of much
research, less is known about the process itself. Which businesses hire immigrants?
To what extent do immigrants work with natives? How does these patterns change
as immigrants accumulate U.S. specific skills? Do the characteristics of different
immigrant groups and different geographic labor markets affect the way in which
assimilation plays out?
A lack of suitable data has limited economists’ ability to address these ques-
tions. Our contribution is to bring to bear a rich set of matched employer-employee
data that allows us to identify immigrants, their coworkers, and their employers.
Our unique data permit quantifying the extent of and covariates of the workplace
1This chapter draws heavily on a joint paper with John Haltiwanger, Kristin McCue, Seth
Sanders and Fredrik Andersson with the same title.
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concentration of immigrants. The paper has two broad objectives. The first is pri-
marily descriptive. The descriptive findings show that immigrants are much more
likely to have immigrant coworkers than are natives. This pattern is driven partly by
the geographic concentration of immigrants, but the patterns hold true even within
local labor markets. At the same time, most immigrants do have native coworkers:
only a small share work in immigrant-only workplaces. The concentration of immi-
grants is higher for recent immigrants and, conditional on recent arrival, for older
immigrants: part of the assimilation process is a movement towards more interac-
tion with natives in the workplace, and younger immigrants are more likely to work
with natives. We find large differences associated with firm size: concentration is
much higher in smaller firms, but is far from zero even in the largest firms. We
also find substantial variation in the extent of immigrant concentration across in-
dustries even after controlling for a detailed set of location, employer and employee
characteristics.
Second, our finding that the allocation of immigrants across workplaces is far
from random raises the question: what does drive this workplace concentration?
Both the existing literature and our descriptive findings suggest that it is important
to consider how businesses hire their employees and the choices that businesses
make about the skill mix of their workforce. One relevant issue here is the role
that language skills play in governing interactions among employees and between
employees and customers. A second issue is the role of social networks in the process
that matches workers and firms. A third issue is human capital - the sorting and
concentration of immigrants in the workplace may reflect sorting by skills. In the
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second part of the paper, we explore the role of these factors. We find evidence
that immigrants with primarily immigrant coworkers are likely to have coworkers
who live in the same residential tract. This pattern is robust to the inclusion of
controls for other closely related factors such as residential segregation. We also
find evidence that immigrant workers with poor English speaking ability and low
education are more likely to work with immigrant coworkers.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of the rel-
evant theoretical and empirical literature that helps guide our empirical analysis.
Section 3.3 describes the measurement of immigrant concentration, the matched
employer-employee data we use in our analysis and the methods we use to explore
the correlates of immigrant concentration. In section 3.4 we present our main results
quantifying the extent and nature of immigrant concentration across workers and
businesses. Section 3.5 analyzes the impact of factors such as social networks, lan-
guage skills and human capital on the patterns of immigrant concentration. Most of
the analysis focuses on native born, recent immigrants and established immigrants
without specific reference to country of origin. Section 3.6 extends the analysis
in terms of the basic patterns of concentration by country of origin. Concluding
remarks are provided in section 3.7.
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3.2 Background
3.2.1 Literature on earnings differences
Work examining earnings differences between whites and other groups in the
U.S. has largely focused on netting out differences in skill (often captured by edu-
cation and labor market experience) and geography (often using place of residence
and urban residence) to assess the potential role of discrimination in labor market
outcomes. This assumes that earnings differences are generated either by differing
worker characteristics or differing returns to those characteristics. By extension,
closing gaps in earnings requires equalizing worker characteristics and their return
across groups. Differences in returns to characteristics are assumed to reflect unob-
served ways in which the wage generating process differs and is typically viewed as
an upper bound on the potential for discrimination to play a role in explaining wage
disparities. A huge number of papers use this approach; some classic examples that
examine earnings differences relative to white men are Smith and Welch [1977] for
African American men, Borjas [1982] for Hispanic men, Chiswick [1983] for Asian
men, and Corcoran et al. [1983] for women.
There is also a large literature assessing the sources of earnings differences
between immigrants and native born workers (for example, Chiswick [1978], or
Butcher and DiNardo [2002]). These papers generally augment the basic human
capital framework used in the studies above by allowing for skill differences that are
specifically relevant to immigrants. These include potential differences in the value
of education and work experience accumulated outside the U.S., and the importance
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of differences in English language skills. Immigrant assimilation into the U.S. labor
market is viewed as occurring through a narrowing of the earnings gap, resulting
largely from increased U.S.-specific skills with time spent in the U.S. While there
is debate over the speed at which the earnings gap between immigrant and native
born workers closes, most studies find a substantial narrowing with time spent in
the U.S. (see Chiswick [1978] and Borjas [1985]).
An older literature in sociology and economics stresses that earnings differences
between groups may be driven by the characteristics of the firms that employ the
majority and minority groups, rather than solely by human capital characteristics.
Usually termed ’dual labor market theory,’ this idea gained considerable attention in
the late 1960s and early 1970s (see for example Averitt [1968] or Galbraith [1971]).
According to this theory, many firms (especially industrial firms) are not governed
by competitive processes. Instead, these firms enjoy market power. They insulate
themselves and stabilize their workforce through job training and promotional lad-
ders (Edwards [1972]). Firms that are constrained by competition do not invest in
work skills and are characterized by low wages and high turnover, with low returns
to human capital including job tenure.
The existence of ’good jobs’ and ’bad jobs’ by itself would not imply an earn-
ings disadvantage to minority workers. Sociologists typically rely on a form of
employer discrimination to explain why dual labor markets lead to minority disad-
vantage. Queuing theory suggests that good jobs always have an excess supply of
applicants and firms then order workers by preferences and hire down the queue
until vacancies are filled. If race or ethnicity plays a role in this ordering, a higher
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fraction of minority workers will be employed in the secondary market and have
relatively low wages and wage growth.
While dual labor market theory per se has largely fallen out of the mainstream
literature in economics and sociology, a newer literature that similarly argues that
firm characteristics may be partially responsible for the level and growth in earn-
ings of workers has gained growing acceptance. Wages appear to be positively
correlated with firm productivity and firm size (Abowd et al. [2005]). While more
controversial, there is some evidence that firm-level technological adoption also af-
fects workers’ wages (Dunne et al. [2004]). Lengermann [2002] finds that coworker
characteristics, in addition to firm characteristics, may affect wages. Specifically,
he finds that having more skilled coworkers independently raises a worker’s wages.
If firm characteristics play a major role in wage setting, then understanding how
race and ethnicity affect the matching of workers to firms becomes important for
understanding wage disparities across groups. Lengermann et al. [2004] explore the
issues of sorting of immigrants across firms and find that sorting matters for wage
differences between native born and immigrant workers.2 We now turn to theories
of worker segregation with special attention to how immigrants sort into firms.
3.2.2 Literature on segregation
Four broad overlapping theories explain segregation of workers into firms.
These theories focus on sorting based on (a) productive characteristics, (b) pref-
2Some of our basic findings on immigrant concentration are also found in Lengermann et al.
[2004]. Using the same data infrastructure that we use in this paper, they find for example
differences in immigrant concentration by industry and employer size.
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erences of workers or employers, (c) information available to workers or employers,
or (d) cost of commuting to jobs. Some, but not all, of these theories imply that
segregation results in a disadvantage for one group of workers relative to another.
There is substantial evidence of segregation by skill. For example, Kremer
and Maskin [1996] look at the sorting of high and low skilled workers into firms
over time and across three countries, the U.S., Britain and France. They find a
high and rising correlation between worker skill levels in firms over the 1970s and
1980s. This may occur either because a firm demands a particular type of worker (for
example skilled workers) or because coordination within a firm demands that workers
share a common characteristic such as a common language. Cabrales et al. [2008]
emphasize a different skill-based mechanism: if a worker’s utility is a function of both
absolute wages and their wages relative to those of coworkers, and if movement of
workers across firms is costless, complete segregation of workers by skill is optimal.
A mixed-skill workforce generates wage inequality within a firm, reducing worker
utility. All workers are made better off by grouping workers with similar skills and
avoiding these reference group costs. Regardless of the mechanism, segregation by
skill will cause immigrant-native differences in the distribution of skill to contribute
to segregation. For example, immigrants are both much more likely than natives to
have an 8th grade education or less (23% vs. 5.2% for natives in the 2000 census),
and also more likely to have an advanced degree (10.3% vs. 8.6% for natives).
Therefore, firms that specialize in hiring exclusively low-skilled or exclusively high-
skilled workers will tend to have a workforce that has a higher fraction of immigrants
than the fraction in the population.
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Language differences provide another productivity-based motivation for segre-
gation. If working with someone who does not speak the same language generates
transaction costs, employers may increase productivity by hiring only workers who
share a common language. In this case, immigrants from non-English speaking coun-
tries may be particularly likely to be segregated, and may also be particularly likely
to work with their compatriots rather than other immigrants. Lang [1986] develops
a formal model of wage differences arising because of the costs to firms of having
to pay a premium for bilingual workers who can bridge the language barrier. One
of the results of this model is that complete segregation would occur if both capital
and labor were owned by each language group. Hellerstein and Neumark [2003] find
evidence that Hispanics with poor English-language skills are particularly likely to
work with other Hispanics. Their data do not allow them to examine how much
of this is due to Hispanic workers working for Hispanic-owned firms as in the Lang
model.
Becker [1957] is the classic model of preference-based segregation. In this
model, segregation of workers by race occurs as the result of discriminatory pref-
erences on the part of co-workers. White workers would demand a premium to
work with black workers. In response, firms segregate workers into separate facil-
ities, avoiding the need to pay a wage premium to discriminating white workers.
Depending on conditions including the relative size of the minority and majority
group, the number of firms, and returns to scale in production, segregation may
be extreme but with limited disadvantage in wages to the minority group. Dual
labor market theory, described above, also generates wage differences across groups
93
if discriminating employers put minority job candidates lower down the queue. In
this case, higher wages in the primary sector ensure that a higher fraction of the
majority group works in the primary sector and hence gives a wage advantage to
the majority group.
Information-based theories concentrate on the mechanisms that workers use
to find jobs. For example, firm use of employee referrals to fill jobs may contribute
to workplace segregation. For workers, use of personal contacts to search for jobs is
inexpensive and has relatively high rates of success (Holzer [1988]). For employers,
employee referrals provide both a low cost recruitment strategy and, on average,
new hires with higher productivity and lower turnover rates (Holzer [1987]; Mont-
gomery [1991]). If workers tend to refer others who have similar characteristics, use
of referrals can increase rates of segregation. Elliot [2001] finds that recent Latino
immigrants are more likely than blacks or Latino natives to use personal contacts
to find jobs. Weak English skills explain much of this difference. A greater re-
liance on referrals in small workplaces in combination with a concentration of recent
immigrants in small firms also contributes to the difference.
Information flows may combine with residential segregation to contribute to
workplace segregation. Neighborhoods play an important role in who you know
and hence may provide important job contacts and references. Several papers have
established that workers in the same firm are disproportionately from the same
neighborhoods. Using data from Boston, Bayer et al. [2008] find that a worker is
about one-third more likely to work with someone who lives in the same census block
as to work with someone who lives in other blocks in their block group (typically
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eight or so contiguous blocks). This comparison of blocks to block groups provides
important evidence that having coworkers who are neighbors does not stem from
unobserved factors such as transportation routes or distance that make a place of
employment a natural place to work for those living in a particular location. Many of
these unobserved factors would be similar for a block group and block of residence,
and so should have similar effects on the likelihood of working with more or less
immediate neighbors. This paper is limited in that the exact establishment can not
be observed, while sample sizes as well as the ethnic make-up of Boston restrict the
authors’ investigation to black-white differences.
Hellerstein et al. [2008a] also present evidence of neighborhood network effects.
Using matched employer-employee data, they compare how likely an individual is to
work in the same establishment as his neighbor, relative to the likelihood that this
would result if their employer hired workers randomly from the geographic areas of
residence of all individuals who work in the employer’s census tract. Their dataset
is large enough to disaggregate the analysis for whites, blacks and Hispanics. They
find that another worker living in the same census tract has twice the probability of
working in your firm than what one would expect from randomness. They do not
investigate the importance of other mechanisms for sorting workers into firms.
A final theory of the sorting of workers into firms also works through resi-
dential segregation but focuses on the fact that not all jobs are equally accessible
from different places of residence. Kain [1968] investigated employment patterns of
blacks and whites in Chicago and Detroit. He found that blacks were unlikely to
be employed in areas that were predominantly white, that blacks would have higher
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employment rates if housing segregation was lower, and that the movement of jobs
from central cities to suburban areas depressed the employment prospects of blacks.
A number of other studies followed that compared employment differences between
central city and suburban residents within an urban area. These tests often found
employment prospects lower for central city residents, but controlling for unmea-
sured skill differences between residents of different locations remained an issue in
inference. A recent study by Hellerstein et al. [2008b] questions the interpretation
that a lack of jobs near where blacks live is a major source of racial employment
differences. They find that the employment prospects of black residents are posi-
tively correlated with the number of nearby jobs in which blacks work, but not with
the number of nearby jobs in which whites work. This indicates that even within
close geographic proximity, job markets are racially segregated. They conclude that
spatial mismatch has little effect on employment prospects of blacks but that what
they term racial mismatch—few nearby jobs that employ blacks—has a large effect.
Clearly, residential segregation could contribute to workplace segregation of
immigrants. There is ample evidence that immigrants’ places of residence are spa-
tially concentrated. Iceland [2009] describes the high level of residential segregation
in the U.S. among immigrant groups but also shows that immigrants migrate to
neighborhoods that are more ethnically integrated as they spend more time in the
U.S. However, Porter and Wilson [1980] argue that, unlike for black Americans,
residential segregation may aid immigrants—especially new immigrants–while also
leading to segregation of workers in firms. Studying the post-Castro immigration
from Cuba to Miami, Portes and Wilson show that not only do Cubans in the U.S.
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work together, many work in firms owned by other Cubans. Moreover, Cuban em-
ployees of Cuban-owned firms tended to display the same patterns of wage growth
and returns to human capital as workers in firms classified as in the ’primary sec-
tor,’defined as firms with a promotion ladder, over 1000 workers, and high average
wages. While an impressive source of employment, it is not clear that the example
of Cubans generalizes to other foreign-born groups. Capital owners specifically were
forced to leave Cuba, which may have led to higher levels of capital with which
to start businesses and more experience with small businesses among Cubans than
among other foreign born groups. Having said this, Wilson and Portes report that
much of the capital used to start these businesses was accumulated in the U.S. and
not transferred from Cuban concerns.
3.3 Methodology and Data
3.3.1 Measuring immigrant concentration
We follow several recent papers that study workplace segregation (Heller-
stein and Neumark [2007]; Aslund and Skans [2005a], Aslund and Skans [2005b]—
henceforth HN and AS) by using the share of coworkers in a particular group as a
measure of exposure. That is, we exclude the worker himself when measuring the
concentration of immigrants in the business he works in. For worker i, employed by








where Ik is an indicator for whether or not worker k is an immigrant. For the
sake of brevity, we will refer to this simply as the coworker share. As pointed out by
these authors, excluding the worker’s own characteristic in calculating concentration
ensures that in large samples the coworker share for both immigrants and natives
should on average equal the share of immigrants in the workforce in the absence of
any systematic concentration. Based on this, we use the difference between the mean
coworker share for immigrants and natives as a measure of immigrant concentration.
A positive value indicates that immigrants are more concentrated than would be
expected based on random allocation. At the extreme, if immigrants worked only
with immigrants and natives with natives, the difference in coworker means would
equal one. A negative value for this difference would indicate that immigrants
were more likely to work with natives than would be expected based on random
allocation—a pattern that could arise where the two groups provide different but
complementary skills.
We depart from the approach of these authors in two ways: in the way in which
we condition on observable characteristics, and in choice of a normalization to gauge
whether the concentration we find is large relative to some alternative. There are
two types of questions that can be addressed by conditioning on observable char-
acteristics in studying segregation: to what extent can segregation be explained by
differences in the characteristics of the two groups, and which characteristics are
most associated with segregation. HN and AS both focus more on the first issue,
while we explore some aspects of both questions. As an example to provide some
context, the immigrant and native education distributions differ, and particular em-
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ployers may hire primarily from one part of the education distribution, leading to
concentration of immigrants because of differences in skill. HN and AS both use the
difference between measured concentration and the amount of concentration that
would be generated solely by the way in which education is distributed across em-
ployers as their conditional measure of concentration. In contrast, we condition on
a worker’s own characteristics and on the characteristics of his or her employer (e.g.
employer size and industry), but do not directly condition on coworker characteris-
tics. Our measure of concentration is the mean difference between immigrants and
natives with the same characteristics.
We take a different approach in part because the worker characteristics in our
data that vary within employer (age, gender) do not differ dramatically between
immigrants and natives, and they also turn out not to have a strong correlation
with immigrant concentration. Controlling for a worker’s own characteristics should
remove the effects of age and gender from the measured difference in coworker mean,
and the estimated coefficients allow us to examine the characteristics of immigrants
and natives who work in heavily immigrant workplaces.
Both HN and AS normalize their measures of concentration, though they
choose different references for the normalization. While both of their normalizations
have intuitive appeal, we take a different approach. We use the immigrant-native
difference in coworker shares as our measure of concentration, but in most cases
also present information on the coworker share for natives as a point of reference.
Our regression approach makes doing so straightforward, and also allows us to more
directly illustrate patterns of concentration. For example, using the regressions to
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predict means for a given set of covariates allows us to illustrate the strong positive
relationship between immigrant concentration and immigrant share of the workforce,
when looking across groups defined by characteristics such as area of residence and
employer size. In addition, the regression approach using our coworker index at
the person level as the dependent variable permits us to normalize our measure of
concentration effectively along a number of dimensions. For example, HN normalize
to control for between MSA differences in various groups (e.g., differences in the
distribution of blacks and whites across MSAs). We control for such differences
directly in our regression approach by, for example, including controls for MSAs.
3.3.2 Data
We use the data from the Longitudinal Employer - Household Dynamics
(LEHD) database, which draws much of its data from complete sets of unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) earnings records for a subset of U.S. states. The database
includes records for 1990 to 2004, though some states only have data for a subset of
those years. The workers’ earnings records have also been matched to characteristics
of their employer gathered in quarterly administrative reports and through Census
Bureau business censuses and surveys. Basic demographic data are also available
for workers, including place of birth. For those born outside the U.S. (and its terri-
tories), we treat the year in which they first applied for a Social Security Number
(SSN) as the date of their arrival. While this may not precisely date arrival, prelim-
inary results based on a sample of immigrants for whom both LEHD and decennial
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population census data are available suggest that the year the individual first ap-
plied for a social security number proxies the reported year of arrival fairly well.3
In the current analysis, we use data from selected metropolitan areas in 11 states.
While we do not use a large number of states, our sample does include five of the
six states that had immigrant populations of 1 million or more.
These data give us two unique advantages. First, we have earnings for a group
large enough to include millions of immigrants. Second, we can observe the firms in
which workers are employed, allowing us to measure both employer characteristics
and the characteristics of coworkers. These data have other advantages that we do
not exploit here but plan to in future work: for example, the data can be used to
generate a panle on both employers and employees that would allow us to track
earnings of immigrants over time in the U.S. as well as to observe contemporaneous
changes for native-born workers. The main disadvantage of these data for studying
immigration is that they include only on-the-books employees and so do not cover
the self-employed or those working in the informal sector. Thus they likely have poor
coverage of undocumented immigrants. Coverage of employment in agriculture is
incomplete in the LEHD data, so we exclude employers in that sector.
Calculating the share of coworkers who are immigrants requires at least one
3Here we use year of arrival only to split immigrants between those arriving very recently
(within the last 5 years) and other immigrants. Comparing our classification based on date of
SSN application to one based on responses in the 2000 census, 92% of immigrants are classified
in the same way according to both sources. Among those for whom the classification differs,
the most common pattern is that 4% of Mexicans are considered new immigrants in Decennial
Census versus 10% in LEHD. The lag in the registration process by immigrants, specially in the
case of Mexicans, explains these differences. The patterns by age are very similar between LEHD
and Decennial Census, however younger immigrant workers are also reporting a small lag in their
application for social security.
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coworker, so we restrict our sample to businesses with at least two employees.4 We
measure concentration using a cross-section of data based primarily on the second
quarter of 2000, but we use LEHD data for the 1995-2000 period to define business
age. In computing the coworker share, we use all coworkers, whether or not they
hold other jobs. However, the set of observations used in our regressions includes
only one job for each individual: the job where they received their highest earnings
in that quarter.
We draw data from employers in 31 MSAs. We include all MSAs that have
substantial foreign-born populations and are in states for which we have the required
data, but we also included several smaller MSAs that experienced very rapid growth
in foreign-born residents between 1990 and 2000.5 Even in the smallest of our MSAs
we have data on more than 30,000 immigrant workers, so small sample sizes are never
an issue.
Table 3.1 summarizes the across-MSA variation in immigrant shares for our
sample of MSAs. In the average MSA in our dataset, 18.9% of workers are immi-
grants. In what follows, we are interested in deviations in workplace shares from the
overall-average. Clearly the substantial variation in immigrant share across MSAs
will contribute to finding immigrant concentration. The shares of both recent and
4Immigrants account for 27% of employment in single-employee businesses, and 16% of em-
ployment in businesses with more than one employee.
5More precisely, we started from the list of MSAs used in Singer [2004], which included all
MSAs with at least 1 million residents in 2000, and meeting at least one of the following criterion:
(i) at least 200,000 foreign-born residents, (ii) a foreign-born share higher than the 2000 national
average (11.1%), (iii) 1990-2000 growth rate of the foreign-born population above the national
growth rate (57.4%), or (iv) above national average percentage foreign-born in 1900-1930 (‘’former
gateways”). We drop 14 of Singer’s 45 MSAs because we do not currently have access to all of the
data we need from the relevant states.
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Table 3.1: Variation in Immigrant Share of Workforce across Sample MSAs
Percent Immigrant
Total Recent Established
Mean 18.86 3.40 15.46
Standard Deviation 10.27 1.85 8.57
P25 10.57 1.94 8.52
Median 16.26 2.92 13.54
P75 26.60 4.37 22.82
P90 32.58 6.03 27.23
Source: Authors calculations based on LEHD UI-ES202 database.
Note: Unit of observation is an MSA. Immigrant shares are measured as of the second quarter of
2000, and recent immigrants are those arriving between 1995 and 2000. The table presents fuzzed
percentile values.
established immigrants vary substantially across MSAs as well.
For roughly 10% of workers in our sample, we match in additional information
on educational attainment and English language skills from the long form of the
2000 population census. Using propensity score models, we develop weights for the
matched sample that allow us to closely replicate our results based on the overall
sample.6 We then use weighted estimation with the matched sample to examine the
relationship between these measures of skill and immigrant concentration.
3.3.3 Regression specifications
Our primary empirical approach is to run a series of regressions with the
coworker share as the dependent variable, and individual workers on their primary
job as the unit of analysis. As a rough way to capture the way in which immigrant
6The variables used in the propensity score procedure were: worker age, sex, country of ori-
gin (11 groups=Mexico, China, Cuba, El Salvador, India, Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Phillipines,
other country of origin groups, and natives), log earnings, worker status, industry (4 digits), Msa
indicator variables and population density, plant age and size, and firm’s # of establishments.
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concentration changes with time spent in the U.S., we include indicators for whether
an individual is a recent immigrant (RI, defined as arriving in the last 5 years), or
a more established immigrant (EI, arriving more than 5 years ago). Since we use
a cross-section of data, the differences between recent and more established immi-
grants confound the effects of time spent in the U.S. with changes in labor markets
and in immigrant and native characteristics over time. We would need to exploit
the panel aspect of our database to seriously address the affects of assimilation, but
believe this is useful as a starting point that provides suggestive evidence on whether
assimilation effects on concentration are likely to be important.
Our initial regression specification is:
Cij = γN + γEIEIi + γRIRIi + βxij + εij (3.2)
where (again) i denotes an individual and j denotes a workplace. Here, the constant
term (γN) represents the mean coworker share for the omitted category, which in
our simplest specification consists simply of natives.
Coefficients γEI and γRI give us estimates of the differences between immi-
grants and natives in how likely they are to have immigrant coworkers. We use
controls for MSA and for various worker and employer characteristics to examine
the extent to which immigrant concentration can be accounted for by differences
between natives and immigrants in their geographic distribution and in worker and
job characteristics. In section 3.6, we define coworker shares for specific countries
of origin and look at which immigrants are most likely to work together.
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Specification (3.2) assumes that the effects of covariates are the same for im-
migrants and natives. To examine whether this in fact holds, we use an alternative
specification that includes interactions between our immigrant dummy variables and
other covariates:
Cij = γN + γEIEIi + γRIRIi + βxij + φEIEIi ∗ xij + φRIRIi ∗ xij + ε (3.3)
Once we add interaction terms, the intercept rarely identifies effects for a group
of particular interest. To illustrate the effects of a particular covariate in speci-
fications of form 3.3, we present predicted means for immigrants and natives, by
which we evaluate differences between immigrants and natives based on the pooled
distribution of the variables in x.
To ease computations with our 36 million records, we use linear regression
models rather than adopting an approach that accounts for the limited range of
the dependent variable. In this draft, we also ignore the effect of clustering within
employer in estimating the standard errors. For most of our specifications, the
dependent variable mean is not close to either 0 or 1, which mitigates some of
the problems inherent in the linear model. The strong positive correlation in the
coworker share among employees of the same business will lead to a downward bias
in our estimated standard errors in all worker-level regressions. Given the huge size
of our sample, the results we present would generally remain significant at standard
levels even if the corrected standard errors were 100 times larger. The few exceptions
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(in Table 3.6) are estimates that are too small to be meaningfully different from zero
anyway. 7
3.3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for immigrant and native workers in
our full sample. The first row gives coworker shares for the three groups. For the
average native, about 15% of coworkers are immigrants, while 42% of the coworkers
of recent immigrants are fellow immigrants, and 36% of the coworkers of estab-
lished immigrants are immigrants. The immigrant-native difference in coworker
means—our measure of concentration—is .272 for recent immigrants and .214 for
more established immigrants, indicating substantial concentration.
Table 3.2: Characteristics of Immigrant and Native Workers, Full Sample
Immigrants
Recent Established Natives
Coworker share 42.1 36.3 14.9
Age
Age<30 43.6 19.7 29.3
30<Age<40 35.6 33.2 30.0
Age>40 20.8 47.0 40.7
Male 56.8 56.4 51.7
Age at arrival (*)
<12 1.1 14.7 .
12-25 36.2 49.6 .
26-35 37.0 24.8 .
35+ 25.7 10.9 .
Establishment size
2-9 8.5 9.0 8.0
10-49 23.6 22.6 23.5
Continued on next page.
7So far, using statistical software to handle clustering does not seem feasible. However, we
could put an upper bound on the standard errors by summarizing data at the establishment
level for immigrants and natives, and then running our regressions weighted by employment and
clustering on establishment. This reduces the number of records to less than two times our number
of establishments and cluster size to at most 2.
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50-99 14.4 13.3 13.6
100-499 31.4 30.9 29.6
500 or more 22.2 24.2 25.3
Firm has multiple establishments 31.6 34.3 41.4
Establishment age
0-1 12.3 10.7 10.8
2-4 25.6 22.0 23.6
Age 5 or more 62.2 67.3 65.7
Sector
Construction 4.7 5.5 5.9
Manufacturing 18.9 21.3 12.8
Transportation & utilities 3.7 5.2 6.5
Wholesale 6.8 7.0 6.5
Retail 22.7 18.3 21.4
FIRE 3.2 5.6 7.2
Services 40.0 37.1 39.7
Log quarterly earnings 8.20 8.52 8.39
Consecutive quarters on 2000-Q2 job
Quarter before AND after 58.7 70.9 65.6
Quarter before OR after (not both) 32.9 23.4 26.6
Neither quarter before NOR after 8.5 5.7 7.8
Immig. share of wkrs in residence tract 36.5 35.2 15.2
Neighborhood network index 2.10 1.78 1.70
Shared commute index:
Immigrant co-commuters 0.14 0.11 0.05
Native co-commuters 0.24 0.23 0.48
Source: LEHD database and author calculations.
(*) Year of application for a SSN is used as a proxy for time of arrival in the U.S.
Note: The unit of observation is a worker. Employer characteristics and earnings are for the first quarter 2000 job
with the highest earnings. All figures except for log earnings represent percentages. There are 35,966,450 workers
in total for our 31 MSAs.
The following rows give demographic information for each group. Recent im-
migrants are substantially younger than natives while earlier immigrants are older.
Combining the two, immigrants are slightly older than natives in our sample. Men
substantially outnumber women among both recent and established immigrants,
while among natives men are more narrowly in the majority. Differences between
immigrant and native women in rates of labor force participation likely contribute
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to these gaps. Overall, more established immigrants are also more likely to have
entered the country before reaching prime working age. This is in part by definition,
as immigrants who are old enough to work and arrived in the country within the
last five years could not have arrived when they were young children.
Comparing information on employer characteristics, immigrants are more con-
centrated in manufacturing than are natives, but generally the differences by sector
are not particularly large.8 The size distributions look surprisingly similar. Im-
migrants are more likely to work in the smallest firms, and less likely to work in
the largest, but overall the differences are small. Our restriction to employers and
on-the-books employment may affect these statistics as well. Similarly, differences
in distribution of employment by plant age are also small. However, immigrants are
less likely than natives to work for multi-unit firms.
The statistics on earnings show rather large differences, with recent immigrants
having lower earnings than natives, while established immigrants have higher earn-
ings. Differences in job tenure likely explain some of this pattern, as established
immigrants are least likely to be in a job that lasts only one quarter, and recent
immigrants are most likely to be in such a transitory job.
We construct three additional measures from our data base using information
on worker tract of employment and tract of residence, which we use in section 3.5 to
8Comparing our estimates to published 2000 population census estimates is inexact for several
reasons: our analysis includes only a subset of MSAs; our sectors are defined based on SIC codes
while the 2000 industry codes are NAICS based; and we exclude the self-employed and those
working off the books, both of which may be included in household estimates of employment. But
for reference purposes, in the 2000 decennial census 17% of immigrants and 14% of natives worked
in manufacturing, while 8% of immigrants worked in construction compared to 7% of natives
Bureau [2005].
108
explore the relationship between workplace concentration and social networks. The
first of these is simply the share of immigrants among people in a worker’s tract of
residence which we use to capture the degree of residential segregation.9 Because we
only have data on those who work, we use the share of immigrants among resident
workers in a particular tract rather than the share among all residents. As can be
seen in Table 3.2, immigrants are more likely to live with other immigrants than
are natives, but there is little difference in residential segregation between recent
and earlier immigrants. On average, both groups live in tracts that are majority
non-immigrant.
As a proxy for social networks, we calculate for each worker the fraction of their
coworkers who also reside in the worker’s tract of residence. This proxy, which we
refer to as a neighborhood network index, may reflect many factors. For example, as
discussed in Section 3.2, referrals by current employees may be an important recruit-
ment source, and many referrals may come about through contacts with neighbors.
If neighborhood referrals are important we would expect to find people who work
together also living close together. Our network variable will, in principle, capture
such effects but should more generally be viewed as capturing the extent to which
residential location and employment location are correlated. It is for this reason
that when we explore the role of this variable in the regression analysis that follows,
we include both the residential segregation variable above and the shared commute
9Census tracts are small geographical areas with a population between 1,500 and 8,000 indi-
viduals. They are designed to be relatively homogeneous with respect to socio-economic charac-
teristics. As such, they are arguably well-suited to serve as a proxy for the geographical reach
of a social network, i.e. the limited distance between residents of a census tract, both in terms
of geography and socio-economic factors, suggests that the within-area likelihood of interactions
between members is high relative to the between areas.
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variable described below as controls. Not surprisingly the mean of the network index
is small: for the average worker the fraction of coworkers who live in the same tract
is about 1.7 percent. This fraction is substantially higher for small businesses, and
it falls systematically with employer size. It is also instructive to observe that while
the average is small there is considerable variation across workers and it is the latter
variation we exploit in our analysis.
A related but distinct relationship between workplace and residence is that
proximity or transportation infrastructure may mean that employees working at a
particular location are likely to live in a particular set of neighborhoods. To dis-
tinguish this effect from the network measure, we construct an additional variable
for each worker, namely the share of employees at other businesses located close
to his employer (defined as other employers in the same tract) who also live in the
worker’s residential tract (as in Hellerstein et al. [2008a]). This is a rich measure
of the propensity for workplace and residence to be connected that will control for
factors such as commuting patterns and even the extent to which the connection
between workplace and residence might reflect sorting across workplace and resi-
dence locations by skill. We refer to this as a shared commute index, which we split
between immigrant co-commuters and native co-commuters. That is, the denomi-
nator for both components of the shared-commute index is the number of employees
working for other employers in a worker’s tract of employment.10 The numerator
for the immigrant co-commuter variable is the number among that group who are
10In our sample, there are on average 49.19 employers per tract (excluding tracts that are
strictly residential). 7% of tracts with employment have only one employer, and for those tracts,
the shared commute variables are zero. Only 9% of workers in our sample work in single-employer
tracts.
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Figure 3.1: Cumulative Distribution of Coworker Share by Worker Type
immigrants and who live in the worker’s residential tract. These shares are quite
small, but differ between immigrants and natives.
Figure 3.1 provides some basic information on the distribution of our depen-
dent variable. The three lines plot the cumulative distribution of immigrant coworker
share for natives and for recent and more established immigrants. About 13% of
natives work in native-only workplaces (having coworker immigrant share=0) in
our sample of immigrant-rich MSAs, but the share of immigrant employment in
immigrant-only businesses is surprisingly small (2.8% of immigrants). In this set of
MSAs, about 10% of the median native’s coworkers are immigrants, while for estab-
lished immigrants the share at the median is about 34%, and for recent immigrants,
the share is about 41%.
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3.4 Accounting for immigrant concentration
We carry out two sets of exercises to examine the degree and nature of immi-
grant concentration. First, we address the extent to which observable factors can
account for immigrant concentration using a series of regressions with the coworker
share as the dependent variable based on specification (3.2). Second we apply speci-
fication (3.3) in which we add interactions between the immigrant dummy variables
and our explanatory variables. In doing so, we let the difference between coworker
shares for immigrants and natives vary with observable characteristics, which allows
us to determine in what sort of workplaces and for which kinds of workers we see
the most concentration.
Table 3.3 presents estimates of the key parameters from the first set of re-
gressions. The first two columns present estimates of the coefficients on the dummy
variables identifying our two immigrant groups—recent immigrants, defined as those
who arrived between 1995 and 2000, and more established immigrants who entered
before 1995.
In the first row of Table 3.3, we report results from the base specification
without any controls. This simply reproduces the differences in means one finds
from the first row of 3.2. The subsequent rows of Table 3.3 show the effects of adding
each of the sets of controls. We include MSA dummies in all but the first row, but
add the other controls one set at a time. Note that in doing this we are allowing the
immigrant share of employment to vary with the controls, but assuming that within-
cell immigrant concentration is the same for all control categories. Our intent here
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Table 3.3: Contribution of Covariates to Immigrant Concentration (Full Sample)
Recent Established
Covariates immigrant immigrant R-squared
Full sample
No covariates 0.272 0.214 0.198
MSA dummies 0.224 0.156 0.379
MSA+:
Worker age 0.225 0.155 0.379
Worker sex 0.224 0.156 0.379
Employer size 0.224 0.156 0.380
Employer age 0.225 0.156 0.379
Employer age * Multi-unit 0.221 0.154 0.387
Industry detail 0.195 0.133 0.460
Size and industry 0.195 0.135 0.461
Log earnings and full-quarter controls 0.223 0.115 0.379
Neighborhood network index 0.221 0.155 0.381
Shared commute index variables 0.222 0.156 0.379
Immigrant share in residential tract 0.181 0.132 0.471
All of the above 0.143 0.089 0.495
Notes: Figures in the first two columns give the predicted difference in mean coworker share
between the immigrant group and natives. As a point of reference, the mean coworker share for
natives in the first line is .149 (as in Table 3.2). It is also .149 for all other specifications if
evaluated at the native mean for all included covariates, but somewhat higher if evaluated at the
pooled sample mean. The unit of observation is a worker. N=35,966,450 for the full sample. The
variables are as described in Table 3.2, except that we use 185 detailed industry categories in
place of sector. All standard errors are less than 0.0001.
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is to determine whether any of the employer or worker characteristics available to
us identify cells with a large share of immigrant employment, but within which the
immigrant-native differences are significantly smaller than the overall difference. For
example, if immigrants were mostly employed in a few industries, but were randomly
distributed across workplaces within industry, industry controls would reduce the
concentration coefficients to zero because there is no concentration within industry.
If that were the case, then explaining immigrant concentration would boil down to
explaining why immigrants worked in different industries than natives.
In broad terms, Table 3.3 shows that our measures of employer and worker
characteristics account for a substantial amount of the observed concentration of im-
migrants in the workplace, but about half of the concentration remains unexplained.
Differences in the immigrant share of employment across MSAs and detailed indus-
tries account for roughly one-third of total concentration. The other control with
substantial explanatory power is the share of immigrants in a worker’s residential
tract. Living in an immigrant-rich residential tract is positively correlated with the
share of coworkers who are immigrants, so the difference between immigrants and
natives in the likelihood of working with immigrants is substantially smaller for
those living in neighborhoods with similar immigrant shares than for immigrants
and natives overall. In the last row, we include all of our controls but still find that,
compared to natives, the difference in the share of coworkers who are immigrant is
14% for recent immigrants and 9% for established immigrants.
In the subsections that follow, we discuss the results of adding particular
controls in Table 3.3 along with results from our second exercise based on (3.3),
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in which we add interactions with the immigrant dummy variables. Because the
patterns identified by the interaction terms are easier to grasp visually, we present
the findings from this exercise through graphs of predicted coworker shares. We do
note that the R-squared for this full model with interactions is 0.567.
3.4.1 Location
Covariates have the greatest potential to account for differences in coworker
means when their distribution differs substantially between immigrants and natives.
Geography is one dimension along which there are substantial differences. In this
section we look only at differences across metropolitan areas, but in section 3.5 we
explore how differences in location within MSAs may also contribute to immigrant
concentration.
Immigrants are much more likely than natives to live in the largest metropoli-
tan areas in the U.S. For example, in 2000 55% of immigrants lived in the 9 metro
areas having a population of at least 5 million, compared to 27% of natives. While
21% of natives lived in nonmetropolitan areas, only 3% of immigrants did (Schmidley
[2001]). Even if immigrants were randomly sorted into jobs within their local labor
markets, the fact that many natives live in areas with few immigrants would lead us
to find substantial concentration in coworker means for the nation as a whole. By
restricting our sample to urban areas that have many immigrants, we increase the
overall share of immigrant coworkers above the national average. At the same time,
we reduce the difference between immigrants and natives by excluding areas where
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natives work with few immigrants. But substantial variation in the immigrant share
of employment remains across our sample MSAs, as illustrated in Table 3.1 above.
In Table 3.3, including MSA dummies almost doubles the R-squared. The
reduction in the recent immigrant coefficient between row (1) and row (2) indicates
that roughly one-fifth of the overall difference between recent immigrants and na-
tives simply reflects differences in their geographic distribution: unsurprisingly, the
metropolitan areas in which immigrants work have higher immigrant shares than
the areas in which the average native works. Similarly, about one-quarter of the na-
tive/immigrant differential for established immigrants is due to differences in which
cities they live in. When we allow immigrant concentration to differ across MSAs
(results not reported), we find that immigrant concentration rises very consistently
with the overall immigrant share in an MSA, and that concentration is consistently
higher for recent immigrants than for more established immigrants.
3.4.2 Worker Demographics
We have limited data on the characteristics of workers—basically age and gen-
der, in addition to knowing the country in which a worker was born. As the third
and fourth rows of Table 3.3 illustrate, adding age and gender to the specification
with MSA dummy variables has essentially no effect. Allowing the effects of these
variables to differ between natives and immigrants shows that age does have a weak
association with immigrant concentration, though gender does not. As Figure 3.2
illustrates, older immigrants are somewhat more likely to work with other immi-
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grants than are younger immigrants, but there is little difference by age for natives.
Note that because recent immigrants have by definition arrived within the preceding
5 years, age and age at arrival are necessarily highly correlated for that group, so
what we observe are the combined effects. We would need to move beyond the cross
section we are using here to disentangle their separate effects for recent immigrants.
We use similar methods for most of the following bar charts, so it is useful to
clarify how the estimates were constructed for the first chart. The coworker shares
here are based on regression estimates from specifications that include all of the
sets of variables listed in Table 3.3. We constructed the estimates presented in the
figures using the pooled mean values of all controls except for those used in defining
the categories for the bars. So for Figure 3.2 the pooled mean values for all variables
except age are used to get predicted values for each age and immigrant status group.
The age dummy values are set according to the labels on each of the three clusters
of bars. The differences between bars for a given age group are determined by the
coefficients on the immigrant group dummy variables and by the product of the
interaction effects for the group with the pooled mean the other controls. The age
interaction terms determine how much the bars vary across age categories for a given
group (i.e. natives, recent, or established immigrants) while the pooled means and
coefficients for other variables determine the average level of the bars for a group.
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Figure 3.2: Coworker share by age of employee
Note: Size, Sector, plant age, sex, units and MSA groups use total population distribution. Using
full two-way interactions with individual status.
3.4.3 Employer characteristics
We have a rich set of employer characteristics in our data. Most of the mea-
sures we use are defined for an establishment (or business location). The measures
include establishment size (measured by employment), detailed industry and de-
tailed location.11
11There are some technical issues in assigning workers to multi-unit establishments in the LEHD
data. The UI wage records at the person-level include state-specific employer identifiers which
identify the firm that a worker is employed by. The UI wage records link to ES-202 records filed by
the firm that provide employment, payroll, industry, and location information for each of the firm’s
establishments in that state. LEHD has developed algorithms for assigning workers to multi-unit
establishments which multiply impute an establishment identifier to affected workers based on the
worker’s place of residence; the locations, sizes, and ages of the employing firm’s establishments;
and the timing of the worker’s employment. Once a worker is assigned to a specific establishment
while working for a given employer, the worker remains with that establishment as long as the
worker remains employed with that employer. We weight each implicate based on the estimated




We classify employer size into the size bins depicted in Figure 3.3. Recall that
we are excluding establishments with only one worker since the coworker index is by
construction not defined for a worker who has no coworkers, so the bins begin with
size 2. When we constrain the size effects to be the same for immigrants and natives,
adjusting for immigrant/native differences in employer size has virtually no effect on
the difference in average coworker share (see Table 3.3). This is unsurprising given
that the distribution of employment across employer size classes (given in Table 3.2)
is similar for immigrants and natives; the immigrant share varies little across these
classes.
Despite this similarity in distributions, when we allow the size effect on coworker
share to differ between immigrants and natives we find large size effects. That is,
while the share of immigrants is relatively constant across size classes, the concen-
tration of immigrants in the workplace falls substantially with size, as illustrated
in Figure 3.3. Natives are slightly more likely to work with immigrants in larger
firms than in smaller firms, while immigrants are much less likely to work with other
immigrants in larger firms. For example, 37 percent of coworkers are immigrants for
recent immigrants who work at establishments with 10-19 workers, while for recent
immigrants at establishments with 500 or more employees, that figure is 26 percent.
It is striking that these large size effects hold even after controlling for many other
factors including detailed industry. We also find that the difference in immigrant
coworker shares between recent and more established immigrants falls with size.
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Figure 3.3: Coworker share by employer size
Notes: Evaluated at pooled mean for other control variables–MSA, sector, immigrant
demographics, establishment age interacted with multi-unit status. Sector, individual’s age, plant
age, sex, units and MSA groups use total population distribution. Using full two-way interactions
with individual status.
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Figure 3.4: Cumulative Distribution of Coworker Share by Worker Type and Em-
ployer Size
Source=LEHD database. Year 2000 second quarter.
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To illustrate more concretely how these differences arise, Figure 3.4 gives cu-
mulative distributions of employment across coworker shares for different employer
size classes. The size of the gap between the native and immigrant cumulative dis-
tributions represents the size of the differences in means, or the amount of concen-
tration. For the smallest firms, much of the concentration comes from segregated
workplaces—those with only immigrant or only native employees. About three-
quarters of natives in this size class work only with other natives, while roughly
half of recent immigrants and two out of five established immigrants work only with
other immigrants. Looking across the different size classes, the share of employment
accounted for by all-immigrant and all-native workplaces falls quickly as firm size
increases.
We think two mechanisms drive this pattern. One is a size effect, which we find
interesting—a greater tendency for immigrants to work with natives in larger firms.
The second is a statistical artifact that arises from the fact that the variance across
employers in the coworker share falls with employer size. For a given size-neutral
tendency to group like workers together, the difference in mean coworker share will
tend to fall as the variance of the mean falls—that is, with employer size.
To see this, consider 2-employee firms. The only possible outcomes are com-
plete segregation (2 natives or 2 immigrants), or integration (1 native, 1 immi-
grant). If workers are randomly allocated to employers, the expected values of
mean coworker shares for immigrants and natives will both equal the overall im-
migrant share of the (employer size=2) workforce—a difference of 0. But given
some tendency to group like workers together, moving some of the weight of the
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distribution towards segregated workplaces has a relatively large effect on the mean
difference because it moves immigrants towards workforces with coworker share=1,
and natives towards coworker shares of 0. As employer size increases, extreme values
become less likely. If we think of some process shifting weight away from integrated
workforces to those with more segregation, with larger firms this has a smaller ef-
fect on the mean difference because less of the weight ends up at extreme values.
Appendix G shows that this is true for a particular statistical model, but we think
this point holds more generally.
This statistical effect is not particularly interesting but we need some way to
gauge how much of the size effect it accounts for. Because the change in variance
with sample size falls off quite quickly as size increases, we think the statistical effect
is unlikely to account for size effects among firms with more than 20 employees. Thus
it might be reasonable to think of size effects based on the portion of our sample with
at least 20 employees as representing the economic size relationship, while in smaller
firms the size effect combines the economic and statistical relationships. Based on
this assumption, we fit a flexible functional form to the size effect for the portion
of our sample with at least 20 employees, and then use the fitted model to predict
the size effect for smaller firms.12 The lower panel of Figure 3.3 superimposes this
estimated/extrapolated relationship on the actual size-specific means.
For each of our three groups, we separately fit the relationship between mean
coworker share and firm size over the range of firm sizes above 20. The points
12We use linear, quadratic and cubic functional forms to predict the size effect for smaller firms.
The quadratic and cubic specifications gave very similar results. We show the quadratic results
here.
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marked on each line represent the mean predicted coworker share for that employer
size grouping. For example, in the lower graph, the 23% marked on the established
immigrant line for the 500+ size group is the mean predicted value for established
immigrants in this size range—a bit lower than the actual 27% share, which is
labeled in the upper graph. For groups 2-4, 5-9, and 10-19, the actual coworker
share does not influence the fit of the model. The model projection fits the native
means closely, which is unsurprising given that the native mean varies little with
size. For immigrants, the projections under-predict the coworker means, with a
particularly large gap for recent immigrants in the smallest firm size classes. If
we take the projection as tracing out the real size effect, the evidence is consistent
with a modest underlying size effect. Given that interpretation, the gap between
the actual and projected mean then represents the purely statistical effect of size.
Consistent with the statistical model in Appendix G, this effect is large for very
small firms, but rapidly decreases with size.
We think that the size effects, especially after controlling for the statistical
aggregation effects, potentially reflect a number of factors that influence concen-
tration as described in section 3.2. One reason that size may matter is that the
production process (even within industrial sectors) varies across establishments of
different sizes. Job tasks and division of labor are likely less formal in small estab-
lishments, with all workers more likely to interact with coworkers and customers.
As such, more concentrated workplaces permit immigrant workers to work along-
side with immigrants,potentially overcoming language and related barriers. Still,
Figure 3.4 shows that except for the smallest workplaces (where concentration is by
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construction high at the individual establishment level) we find that not much mass
is concentrated in completely segregated workplaces. This suggests that even small
businesses can find ways to organize their production activities to permit native and
immigrant workers to work side-by-side.
A related argument is that the hiring process is likely to be more informal for
small businesses. Moreover, the number of open vacancies is likely to much smaller
for a given small business (even if the rate of vacancies is as high or higher than
larger businesses). Both of these effects might make social networks more important
in the hiring process for small businesses. At this point of the analysis we cannot
distinguish between these or alternative channels for our findings on the role of
employer size. For now, we highlight the importance of employer size but we also
explore some of these channels in our analysis below.
3.4.3.2 Industry
Industry differences in immigrant concentration are of particular interest to
us because, given the available data sources, industry provides the best way of
grouping employers that face similar constraints in choosing the skill mix of their
workforce. Significant variation in immigrant concentration by industry would be
consistent with technological differences playing an important role in determining
how employers combine employment of natives and immigrants.
Controlling for detailed industry reduces our measure of concentration by
about 13% for recent immigrants and 15% for established immigrants, while sub-
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Figure 3.5: Coworker share by employer sector
Note: Size, individual’s age, plant age, sex, units and MSA groups use total population
distribution. Using full two-way interactions with individual status.
stantially increasing the explanatory power of the regression (as illustrated in Table
3.3). Whether we control for employer size or not has little effect on this conclusion.
It is impractical to illustrate differences across 185 detailed industries, but Figure
3.5 illustrates differences by broad sector to give a sense of where immigrants are
most concentrated. The figure orders sectors according to coworker shares for re-
cent immigrants. Manufacturing is the most immigrant intensive sector in our data;
even among natives, immigrants account for more than one out of five coworkers.
The concentration of immigrants is also highest in manufacturing: despite the large
coworker share for natives, the share for immigrants is about double the native
share. The other sectors also show substantial levels of immigrant concentration at
least for recent immigrants, with even the least concentrated sector (finance, insur-
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ance, and real estate) having an 18% percentage point higher coworker share for
recent immigrants than for natives. Note that using the coworker share for estab-
lished immigrants (or for natives) to order the sectors would change the ranking of
sectors—there is less consistency across groups in ranks by sector than we found
when looking at variables such as size.
3.5 Exploring social networks, language skills, and human capital as
possible explanations for concentration
Section 3.4 has three main findings. First, there is substantial concentration of
immigrants at the workplace. Second, even after accounting for many employer and
worker characteristics including employer location, industry and size, concentration
remains substantial within employer and worker characteristic groups. Third, the
differences in coworker means between immigrant and native workers vary substan-
tially with employer and worker characteristics. The most interesting interaction
effects we find are by employer size and industry. These effects are especially in-
triguing because they arguably reflect differences in how businesses organize their
workplaces. As discussed above in section 3.2, there are number of potential chan-
nels for immigrant concentration depend on the type of technology (broadly defined),
organizational structure and recruiting methods of a business. In this section, we
present results of analyses that look more directly at possible channels. In par-
ticular, we explore the role of network effects, English language skills and human
capital.
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To explore these issues, we add variables intended to capture the effects of
social networks, language skills and human capital variables to the regression spec-
ifications in section 4. As a proxy for social networks, we use the neighborhood
network variable defined and discussed in section 3.4. As discussed above, this net-
work measure is likely to be correlated with a variety of factors that connect the
workplace to the place of residence. Accordingly, as controls we include both the
residential segregation measure and the shared commute variables. We also include
education variables as well as variables measuring English speaking ability (these
variables are discussed in more detail below). The education and language skill
variables are of interest in their own right since the concentration of immigrants
may reflect sorting by these characteristics. In addition, social network effects are
also likely related to language skills so it is of interest to include both the proxy of
social networks as well as language skills in the specification.
Table 3.4: Characteristics of Matched Sample Workers (Unweighted)
Immigrants
Recent Established Natives
Coworker share 41.3 36.1 13.6
Age
Age<30 43.6 19.0 31.0
30<Age<40 35.8 32.7 26.0
Age>40 20.6 48.3 43.0
Male 55.9 55.2 50.8
Age at arrival (*)
<12 0.8 11.0 .
12-25 35.4 58.4 .
26-35 38.5 21.5 .
35+ 25.3 9.2 .
Establishment Size
2-9 7.8 8.21 9.2
10-49 22.7 24.2 22.3
50-99 13.4 14.2 13.2
Continued on next page.
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100-499 29.5 31.8 30.81
500 or more 26.7 21.6 24.6
Firm has multiple establishments 33.6 44.6 44.8
Establishment age
0-1 12.5 10.0 11.4
2-4 25.9 19.2 14.3
Age 5 or more 61.6 70.8 74.3
Sector
Construction 5.2 4.9 5.9
Manufacturing 17.9 17.7 12.4
Transportation & utilities 2.6 17.8 6.3
Wholesale 6.3 5.7 6.0
Retail 24.5 16.5 22.9
FIRE 2.9 4.3 6.4
Services 40.6 33.1 40.2
Log quarterly earnings 8.21 8.54 8.34
Consecutive quarters on 2000-Q2 job:
Quarter before AND after 56.0 70.1 64.1
Quarter before OR after (not both) 32.9 21.6 27.3
Neither quarter before NOR after 11.1 8.3 8.6
Immig. share of wkrs in residence tract 35.8 34.6 13.5
Neighborhood network index 0.97 0.88 0.95
Shared commute index:
Immigrant co-commuters 0.07 0.06 0.03
Native co-commuters 0.13 0.14 0.32
Source: LEHD database and author calculations.
(*) Year of application for a SSN is used as a proxy for time of arrival in the U.S.
Note: The unit of observation is a worker. Employer characteristics and earnings are for the first quarter 2000 job
with the highest earnings. All figures except for log earnings represent percentages. There are 3,549,111 matched
workers in total for our group of MSAs.
For this analysis, we focus on our matched sample since it is for this sample
that we have education and English language skill measures. Table 3.4 shows un-
weighted summary statistics for our matched sample. Comparing Table 3.4 to Table
3.2 illustrates that most of the differences between the matched and full samples are
modest. Matched natives have a somewhat lower coworker share than in the full
sample, but the shares for immigrants are little changed. There seems to be a gen-
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Table 3.5: Characteristics of Immigrant and Native Workers, Matched Sample
(weighted)
Immigrants
Weighted Recent Established Native
Education categories
High school drop-out 34.90 28.03 17.08
High school graduate 19.38 15.78 25.38
Some college 13.51 15.01 26.02
Bachelor’s degree 20.80 32.98 23.94
Advanced degree 11.46 8.20 7.58
Does not speak English well 31.35 16.89 1.14
Source: LEHD database and author calculations.
(*) Year of application for a SSN is used as a proxy for time of arrival in the U.S.
Note: The unit of observation is a worker. All figures represent percentages. There are 3,549,111
matched workers in total for our group of MSAs.
eral tendency for workers at multi-unit firms to be overrepresented in the matched
sample, but the difference is large only for established immigrants. Workers with
very transitory jobs also tend to be somewhat overrepresented. The most dramatic
differences are in the mean values for the shared commute and neighborhood network
index ,which are much smaller in the matched sample for all three groups. Table
G.1 gives weighted statistics for the matched sample to illustrate that the weights
we construct bring us reasonably close to replicating the observable characteristics
of the full sample.
Table 3.5 presents summary statistics for the additional variables that we can
construct using the matched data (using the propensity score weights to make the
sample representative). Immigrants are much more likely to be high school drop-
outs than are natives, particularly very recent immigrants. But immigrants are also
overrepresented among those with advanced degrees. The English language measure
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we use is based on a sequence of questions asked on the census long form question-
naire. All respondents are asked whether they speak English or another language at
home. Those who report that they speak another language at home are then asked
to categorize how well they speak English–not at all, poorly, well, or very well. We
categorize all those responding either not at all or poorly as not speaking English
well. Note that this includes a small fraction of natives, presumably primarily sec-
ond generation immigrants. Unsurprisingly, recent immigrants are more likely than
others to report not speaking English well.
Our analysis of the contribution of these additional variables is in two steps.
First, we estimate the model without any interactions to examine the direct role of
these variables in accounting for immigrant concentration. Table 3.6 is the extension
of Table 3.3 with these additional variables. The first two rows correspond to the
first two rows in Table 3.3, but estimated on the matched sample using our weights.
The third row corresponds to the “All of the above” row in Table 3.3. While
estimated concentration is somewhat lower for established immigrants using the
matched sample, the estimates using all of the controls from the full sample match
Table 3.3’s results very closely. Adding the additional controls without interactions
modestly increases the explanatory of the model, with the English language measure
having a more substantial effect than the education measure.
In Table 3.7 we show results for the specification that includes a full set of
interactions so that the effects of variables can differ between immigrants and na-
tives. To simplify the model, we categorize all immigrants together rather than
distinguishing between recent and more established immigrants. In Table 3.7 we
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Table 3.6: Contribution of Covariates to Immigrant Concentration (Matched Sam-
ple)
Recent Established
Covariates immigrant immigrant R-squared
Matched sample
No covariates 0.269 0.186 0.175
MSA dummies 0.218 0.139 0.369
Full sample specification 0.148 0.090 0.498
Full sample specification +:
Education controls 0.146 0.087 0.500
English language controls 0.129 0.080 0.504
Education and English controls 0.128 0.078 0.506
Notes: Figures in the first two columns give the predicted difference in mean coworker share
between the immigrant group and natives. As a point of reference, the mean coworker share for
natives in the first line is .145 (as in Table G.1). It is also .145 for all other specifications if
evaluated at the native mean for all included covariates, but somewhat higher if evaluated at the
pooled sample mean. The unit of observation is a worker and N=3,549,111. The categories for
worker age, employer size and employer age are the same as in Table G.1. There are 185 detailed
industry categories. All standard errors are less than 0.0001.
only report the interaction coefficients for added variables of interest but note that
the patterns by employer and employee characteristics discussed in section 4 are still
present. It is also of interest to observe that the fully interacted model now accounts
for a substantially larger share of variation – the R-squared in Table 3.7 is 0.605.
The results in Table 3.7 support the hypothesis that social networks play an
important role in workplace concentration. The network index variable is positively
associated with concentration: natives who work with their neighbors have fewer
immigrant coworkers, while immigrants who work with their neighbors have more.
It is important to emphasize that this pattern holds controlling for a rich set of
employer and employee characteristics and for shared commute patterns, residential
location, education and language skills.
Turning to the other effects of interest, the coefficients on education and the
132
Table 3.7: Network Effects from Coworker Share Regressions
Covariates (1)
Neighborhood network index -0.081
Network index * Immigrant 0.443
Native shared commute index 0.033
Native shared commute * Immigrant -0.754
Immigrant shared commute index -0.774
Immigrant shared commute * Immigrant 0.351
Immigrant share in residential tract 0.075
Immigrant residential share * Immigrant 0.053
High school drop-out 0.016
High school graduate 0.002
College graduate 0.002
Graduate degree 0.004
High school drop-out * Immigrant -0.004
High school graduate * Immigrant 0.009
College graduate * Immigrant 0.009
Graduate school degree * Immigrant 0.009
Does not speak English well 0.216
Does not spreak English well* Immigrant 0.035
R-Squared 0.605
Note: All standard errors are below 0.001. Controls in all columns include MSA, detailed
industry, employer age and size, worker age and sex, along with interactions with immigrant for
each, in addition to the variables listed in the table. Education and English language controls
and their interactions with immigrant are added as well. The reference group is the group natives
who speak English well. The unit of observation is a worker. N=3,549,111. These are the
workers with complete information on their residential location.
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English language variable indicate that high school drop-outs and those with poor
English language skills are more likely to work with immigrants. While significant,
even the largest education effect–the difference between high school drop-outs and
those with some college–is quite small. The effect of having limited ability to speak
English is substantial–immigrants who do not speak English well have about 25%
more immigrant coworkers.
The control variables are also of interest. The residential segregation index
has the expected impact. A higher share of immigrants in the residential tract is
associated with a higher share of coworkers who are immigrants for both natives
and immigrants. The shared commute pattern has a somewhat anomalous effect,
although these coefficients are highly sensitive to the inclusion of the residential
segregation index. Thus, it appears that these two controls are capturing related
effects that may be difficult to identify separately. We note that the main effects
of interest are robust to including only one of these controls (i.e., either residential
segregation or shared commute).
To explore the role of education and English speaking ability further, we also
consider a richer version of the specification presented in Table 3.7. That is, return-
ing to the specifications considered in section 4, we estimate a specification with
the new variables and also distinguishing between new and established immigrants.
The pattern results are quite similar to those reported in Table 3.7 but enriched by
the additional degree of variation.
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3.6 Country of origin differences
In the analysis above, we distinguish between natives, recent immigrants and
established immigrants. Our data also permit exploring how the patterns of immi-
grant concentration vary by country of origin. That is, instead of only asking how
likely it is for immigrants to have co-workers that are immigrants, we can ask how
likely it is for an immigrant from say, Mexico, to have co-workers who are Mexicans.
Examining such patterns could potentially shed further light on the relative merit
of various language- and cultural-based explanations for immigrant workplace con-
centration. In particular, we would expect social networks to have much stronger
effects within country-of-origin groups, while language-based explanations would
imply similar effects for immigrants from different countries that share the same
language. We plan to investigate these issues in the next draft of this paper.
3.7 Concluding remarks
Using matched employer-employee data that extensively cover employment in
our sample of MSAs, we find that immigrants are much more likely to work with
each other—and hence less likely to work with natives—than would be expected
given random allocation of workers. This is in part driven by the distribution of
immigrants across MSAs, but within an MSA, substantial concentration remains.
We find evidence that immigrant assimilation into the U.S. workforce generated
a tendency to have more native coworkers as more time is spent in the U.S. We
also document that immigrant concentration is greatest in small firms, and varies
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substantially across industries.
After presenting descriptive results, we examine possible underlying causes
of this concentration. We find evidence that supports the hypothesis that social
networks, language skills and education are important factors in accounting for
workplace concentration. Our results indicate that natives who live near some of
their coworkers are more likely to work with others who are native born. The effect
for immigrants is similar—they are more likely to work with immigrants if they
live near coworkers—but larger. These findings hold controlling for a variety of
other factors (e.g., residential segregation) that could lead to a correlation between
residential and employment location. We also find that immigrant workers with
poor English speaking skills and less educated workers are more likely to work with
other immigrants. These effects are of interest in their own right, since they suggest
that some of the workplace concentration we observe is associated with sorting by
skill and language, but these effects also act as controls for the other variables of
interest. The results for the full specification indicate that our results on social




This thesis took advantage of unique employee and employer matched micro-
data from the U.S. Census Bureau to examine immigrant segregation at the work-
place, the effect of owner types, and coworker types on firms’ hiring patterns and
workers’ earnings. In Chapter 2 particular attention was paid to the nativity of
employers and to the share of similar coworkers (by nativity and ethnicity) at firms
when new workers are hired. We examined the effect of those variables on hiring
rates and on the wage differential between immigrants and natives. In 3 a detailed
geographic residential location was used to describe networks by links between res-
idential neighbors.
We found that immigrants are much more likely to work with each other,
and hence less likely to work with natives, than would be expected given random
allocation of workers. This is in part driven by the distribution of immigrants
across MSAs, but within an MSA, substantial concentration remains. We found
evidence that suggests that immigrant assimilation into the U.S. workforce includes
a tendency to have more native coworkers with more time in the U.S. We also
documented that immigrant concentration is greatest in small firms, and varies
substantially across industries.
In general, employees’ wages are affected by the type of owner of the firm.
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For native employees the effect on wages is higher when working for immigrant
employers. Natives are paid lower when working for immigrant employers, and in
these firms natives have lower average earnings than immigrants. One explanation
for these findings is that immigrant bosses have a better understanding of and
networking with the immigrant community, and, therefore, can better find and
contract immigrant workers than native-owned firms. Why can’t native-owned firms
quickly adjust and find this cheaper labor? Lack of language knowledge and lack
of networking make it harder for native bosses to find immigrant workers. These
findings justify further analysis of differences in contracting ability across employers.
The evidence that the type of owner matters for wage differentials among workers
also implies an important role for personnel policy.
After presenting descriptive results, we examine possible underlying causes
of this concentration. We find evidence that supports the hypothesis that social
networks, language skills and education are important factors in accounting for
workplace concentration. Our results indicate that natives who live near some of
the coworkers are more likely to work with others who are native born. The effect
for immigrants is similar—they are more likely to work with immigrants if they
live near coworkers—but larger. These findings hold controlling for a variety of
other factors (e.g., residential segregation) that could lead to a correlation between
residential and employment location. We also find that immigrant workers with
poor english speaking skills and low educated workers are more likely to work with
other immigrants. These effects are of interest in their own right since they suggest
some of the workplace concentration we observe is associated with sorting by skill
138
and language but these effects also act as controls for the other variables of interest.
Namely, that the impact of social networks we estimate is robust to inclusion of
language and education controls. These findings are consistent with an important
role for social networks, though there are other mechanisms that could lead to
a correlation between residential and employment location that we have not yet
investigated. We posited that social network effects should be more important in
smaller firms that are less likely to have formal human resources practices. We
also found that poor English language skills and low education levels are highly
correlated to immigrant workplace concentration, though our education measures
are not high in levels in our regressions once the language measure is included.
By shedding light on the ways workers and employers interact in the labor
market to affect job and wage outcomes, this research makes a contribution to the
sociology, labor economics, and demography literatures. It also opens up numerous
avenues for future research. On the microeconomic side, we can further evaluate
job flows and wage profiles of workers inside different types of firms. The analysis
of assimilation can also take advantage of the results presented here, to further our
understanding of the adjustment process of new immigrant workers. The empirical
analysis in this paper makes some progress toward mitigating biases of skill sorting
and controls for a broad number of observable characteristics that try to capture




To have an idea of the groups of firms included in both database, I include a
short discussion on firms matching rate. Mostly, matches between CBO and SSEL
in 1992 are employer firms (See Table(A.1)). However, there is a small portion of
non-employers that match with SSEL1. The matching rate, although very high, is
not 100%. There is a group of industries that are not included in SSEL such as
Private Households (88), and Direct Sellers (5963) that are included in the CBO.
The matching rate increases with the number of owners of the firm. Number of
owners in the firm and size of the firm are also relatively proportional.














Source: Authors calculation based on CBO(1992) and SSEL(1992).





Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL).
• Sales: Following Spletzer [1998], I consider the variable sales as to the sum
over ACSR1, ACSR2, ACSR3. We can include ACSR4 for Corporations and
Partnerships. Spletzer [1998] gives a more detailed information on the sale
data in the SSEL. For single establishment file has sales data. This variable
contains data for the Value of Shipments, Sales, Receipts, or Revenue. It
may include ’‘total revenues, gross income, operating receipts (gross receipts
or sales less returns and allowances), interest income, and gross rents”. In
1992, 80.1 percent of SSEL single establishments have current year sales data.
When matched with CBO we obtain sales data for all firms. Spletzer [1998]
compared the values for Employment, Payroll, and Sales between SSEL and
the Economic Census. He found that, for 1992 and single establishments in
Maryland, the number for the two first match well. However, the numbers for
sales and sales per worker shows a difference above 8%. He speculates that
the difference is coming from distint definitions, specifically for commissions
for wholesalers ‘’that sell as an agent for another company (Type of Operation
code=43 or 46).”




Before continuing with the analysis, it is worthy of attention to mention that
there exists a group of undefined firms for which owners’ nativity is unknown.
Mostly, this group corresponds to firms that did not answer the survey (CBO).
95% of the owners of these firms did not answer the survey. I obtained informa-
tion on their distribution, size, sales and payroll using SSEL and EC in 1992. At
a glance, from Table( 2.1) the distribution of this type of firms across size and sec-
tors is similar to the rest of the group. For further analysis, I compute a t-test
of equality of productivity proxies and earnings per employees means between the
unknown-owned firms and a weighted average value of the productivity proxies and
earnings of the other three groups. A t-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the mean of labor productivity (t-test=-0.89), and logarithm of earnings per em-
ployee (t-test=2.2) of unknown-owned firms and the rest of the groups are the same
at the 90% level. The average number of owners and the average share immigrant
workers at the firm is also similar when we compare unknown-owned firms with the
average of immigrant, mix and native-owned firms.
Additionally, a chi-square test over unknown-owner firms’ and the rest of the
group’s distribution across categories (size and sector) cannot reject the hypothesis
that unknown-owned firms and the total of firms excluding unknowns are similarly
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distributed across the categories size and sector presented in Table( 2.1) at the 90%
level. The Pearson chi-square for the size distribution is 9.02 (Pr=0.11). For the
distribution across sectors, the Pearson chi-square with 6 degree of freedom is equal
to 16.02 (Pr=0.08). Like the other firms types, unknown-owned firms are highly
represented in Wholesale, Manufacturing, Services and Retail. At the same time,
more than 70% of unknown-nativity employers are businesses with less than 20
employees.
It is very relevant for us to know whether the owner (or owners) of the firm was
(were) born in the USA or otherwise. We cannot identify this profile for the group
unknown. Given that the characteristics of the unknown group are very similar,
in average, to rest of the sample, I decide to drop these observations. For the rest
of the paper, we only consider those groups for which nativity is obtained (three
groups of firms: native-owned, mix-owned, and immigrant-owned).
Appendix D
Weights and Selection
According to Heckman(1979), I obtain the probit estimate from the probit
selection equation in order to estimate the inverse mills ratio. The probability of
being a matched firm in the sample is estimated as a function of the characteristics
of the firm: size, industry, legal form of organization, geographic location, owner
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where Φ(.) is the standard normal cfd, φ(.) is the standard normal density and z
is x
′
β/σ. The covariates x are the ones discussed above and the coefficients are
estimates of the probit model.
144
Table D.1: Descriptive Statistics - CBO(1992) and Sample/Matched Firms
Matched Sample(CBO-LEHD) unweighted
Distribution/Type of firm Mix Imm Nat Unk ALL
Size (%)
2-4 28.93 29.50 25.32 20.40 24.53
5-9 14.93 21.40 19.78 28.30 21.35
10-19 15.98 25.56 21.67 17.89 21.40
20-49 19.56 17.15 18.37 19.42 18.79
50-99 10.62 4.01 9.40 9.42 8.89
100+ 9.98 2.38 5.46 4.57 5.04
Sector(%)
Construction 4.35 3.20 13.40 10.20 11.34
Manufacturing 27.50 17.02 20.50 14.50 18.25
Transp. & Utility 6.40 2.48 8.50 6.55 7.20
FIRE 17.89 15.32 16.70 21.50 19.34
Retail 15.40 38.40 18.40 22.35 19.45
Wholesale 10.50 4.01 5.45 4.56 4.79
Services 17.96 19.57 17.05 20.34 19.63
Legal Form(%)
Sole Propietorship - 55.70 53.40 15.43 49.30
Partnership 24.30 17.50 15.30 30.27 25.43
Corporation (*) 75.70 26.80 31.30 54.30 25.27
l(sales/employment) (1) 13.45 13.39 12.49 15.30 13.55
(1.08) (1.19) (1.05) (1.18) (1.13)
Average Number of Owners 4.01 1.60 2.00 1.96 1.94
Race/Ethnicity
Hispanic 10.45 20.45 5.00 4.21 6.40
Continued on next page.
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Table D.1: Descriptive Statistics - CBO(1992) and Sample/Matched Firms (continued)
Matched Sample(CBO-LEHD) unweighted
Distribution/Type of firm Mix Imm Nat Unk ALL
Asian 11.50 45.50 2.43 3.19 9.29
Black 0.95 0.50 2.59 2.30 1.54
White 77.10 33.55 89.98 90.30 82.77
Note: Statistics based on unweighted outcomes.
(1) Single-unit firms that matched with SSEL.
(2)Only S- Corporation .
(3)Source SSEL: Sales (total receipts/sales), and employment (Employment March12th). Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.
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Appendix E
IPUMS 1990: Descriptive Statistics
Table E.1: Descriptive Statistics - Characteristics of Workers
Individual
IM US ALL
Age 36.28 36.74 36.68
(11.49) (11.93) (11.74)
Education 14.45 16.9 16.5
(2.41) (2.53) (2.89)




Under 25 15.68 16.58 16.47
25-39 48.76 45.01 45.49
40+ 35.56 38.40 38.04
EDUCATION
High School Dropout 35.21 14.98 17.54
High School Graduate 18.15 28.55 27.24
Some College Education 15.66 23.48 22.50
College Graduate 30.98 32.98 32.73
SECTOR
Construction 10.55 9.87 9.95
Manufacturing 26.36 25.01 25.18
Transportation and Utilities 7.62 11.72 11.21
Wholesale 5.66 6.81 6.66
Retail 19.01 16.23 16.58
FIRE 5.38 6.08 5.99
Services 25.41 24.27 24.41
RACE
White 28.07 83.51 76.50
Asian 21.74 0.81 3.46
Black 6.69 9.90 9.49
Hispanic 43.08 5.28 10.06
Other 0.42 0.50 0.49
All 12.64 87.36 100.00
Continued on next page.
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Table E.1: Descriptive Statistics - Characteristics of Workers (continued)
Individual
IM US ALL
Note: The sample includes only male workers older than 16 years. Sectors Agriculture, Mining
and Public Administration are not included. Self-employed workers are not considered. Statistics
based on weighted outcomes. Standard Deviations in parenthesis.
Appendix F
Linear Probability Estimates
Table F.1: Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Owner Type on the Prob-
ability that a New Hire is Black
Black
(1) 2) (3) (4) (5) FE
Owner Native 0.0231*** 0.0312*** 0.0235*** 0.0345*** 0.0345***
0.002 0.002 0.003 0.013 0.013
Hispanic Cowkrs -0.8262*** -0.8321*** -0.7143***
0.0299 0.0337 0.034
Asian Cowkrs -0.8516*** -0.8363*** -0.6523***
0.0269 0.0302 0.032




Hispanic Cowkrs * 0.0009 0.0048
Owner Native 0.03 0.03
Asian Cowkrs * 0.0898 0.0707
Owner Native 0.103 0.0384
White Cowkrs * 0.0386 0.0584**





Share of workers 0.0011***
with HSD (firm) 0.0005
Share of workers -0.0001
with HSG (firm) 0.0001
Share of workers 0.0005
with SCG (firm) 0.0008
Working Pop. -0.0362*
% immigrant(+) 0.01
Continued on next page.
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Table F.1: Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Owner Type on the Prob-
ability that a New Hire is Black (continued)
Black




% black (+) 0.01
Constant 0.0689*** 0.0269*** 0.0867*** 0.4116*** 0.4116*** 0.3145
0.0026 0.0077 0.01 0.1612 0.1612 0.201
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies - yes yes yes yes -
State dummies - - yes yes yes -
Other controls (+) - - - - yes -
p-value 0.0001 0.002 0.0001 0.003 0.003 0.01
R-Square 0.21 0.23 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.34
Note: Reference group is native firms.Reference Sector is Services. The number of observations is 147,373.
Standard Errors are Huber-White robust standard errors, corrected for firm clustering. Mix-owned firms outcomes
are not reported in the table but they are used in the regressions. (+) Other controls include: location in a MSA
dummy, legal form of organization, population in thousands in the neighborhood, interaction between 2-digit
industry dummy and English speaker dummy. Neighborhood is defined as the adjacent counties to the county
where the firm is located. Population in 100,000’s. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Table F.2: Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Owner Type on the Prob-
ability that a New Hire is White
White
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) FE
Owner Mix 0.0197*** 0.0518*** 0.0077 -0.0007 -0.012
0.0074 0.0073 0.005 0.02 0.02
Owner Native 0.2633*** 0.2307*** 0.0412*** 0.0391*** 0.0233***
0.004 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.010
Hispanic Cowkrs -0.8325*** -0.8197*** -0.147***
0.0255 0.0257 0.0276




Black Cowkrs -0.8936*** -0.8654*** -0.6634***
0.0375 0.0378 0.465
Hispanic Cowkrs * -0.1247*** -0.1252***
Owner Mix 0.05 0.0566
Asian Cowkrs * -0.2546 -0.2212
Owner Mix 0.0507 0.0518
White Cowkrs* 0.1015***
Owner Mix 0.0454
Black Cowkrs * -0.047 -0.0236
Owner Mix 0.1047 0.1048
Hispanic Cowkrs* 0.0351* 0.0390*
Owner Native 0.017 0.017
Continued on next page.
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Table F.2: Linear Probability: Effect of Owners types on the Probability that a
New Hire is White (continued)
White
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) FE
Asian Cowkrs * 0.0996** 0.1154**
Owner Native 0.0363 0.0364
White Cowkrs * 0.077***
Owner Native 0.0354
Black Cowkrs * 0.0194 0.0257
Owner Native 0.0386 0.0388
log(employment) 0.0061**
0.00
Share of workers -0.0018***
with HSD (firm) 0.0008
Share of workers -0.0024***
with HSG (firm) 0.0005
Share of workers -0.0046***




% white (+) 0.023
Working Pop.
% black (+)
Constant 0.4407*** 0.4112*** 0.9702*** 0.8747*** 0.915*** 0.71*
0.004 0.127 0.08 0.2327 0.237 0.33
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies - yes yes yes yes -
State dummies - - yes yes yes -
Other controls (+) - - - - yes -
p-value 0.0001 0.002 0.0001 0.003 0.003 0.01
R-Square 0.27 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.39 0.41
Note: Reference group is native firms.Reference Sector is Services. The number of observations is 147,373.
Standard Errors are Huber-White robust standard errors, corrected for firm clustering. (+) Other controls
include: location in a MSA dummy, legal form of organization, population in thousands in the neighborhood,
interaction between 2-digit industry dummy and English speaker dummy. Neighborhood is defined as the adjacent
counties to the county where the firm is located. Population in 100,000’s. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at
5%, * significant at 10%.
Table F.3: Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Owner Race on the Prob-
ability that a New Hire is Black
Black
(1) 2) (3) (4) (5)
Owner Asian -0.4114*** -0.3728*** -0.0373** -0.057*** -0.2238
0.0076 0.0074 0.0134 0.0316 0.0369
Owner White -0.3928*** -0.3697*** -0.0407*** -0.1313*** -0.1594
0.0072 0.007 0.013 0.0178 0.0226
Black Cowkrs 0.9512***
0.0249
Continued on next page.
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Table F.3: Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Owner Race on the Prob-
ability that a New Hire is Black (continued)
Black
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Asian Cowkrs -0.6087*** -0.62
0.1743 0.1981
White Cowkrs -0.9677*** -0.956
0.0292 0.037
Hispanic Cowkrs -0.8834*** -0.85
0.0586 0.0701




Owner Asian* -0.2324* -0.0597
Asian Cowkrs 0.1767 0.2008
Owner Asian* -0.1286*** 0.193
White Cowkrs 0.0427 0.0514
Owner Asian* -0.1383*** 0.2152
Hispanic Cowkrs 0.0679 0.0803
Owner Asian* 0.1728 0.157
Other Cowkrs 0.1115 0.138
Owner White* -0.0862***
Black Cowkrs 0.0262
Owner White* -0.135 -0.0504
Asian Cowkrs 0.1749 0.1989
Owner White* -0.0993** 0.1262
White Cowkrs 0.0253 0.0381
Owner White* 0.0493 0.0758
Hispanic Cowkrs 0.0597 0.0712
Owner White* 0.2033** 0.1182
Other Cowkrs 0.1057 0.1323
Share of workers 0.0013
with HSD (firm) 0.0005
Share of workers -0.0003
with HSG 0.0003








Constant 0.4784*** 0.4082*** 0.0869 0.0717 0.2882
0.0072 0.0766 0.0784 0.0787 0.1743
Year dumies yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies - yes yes yes yes
State dummies - yes yes yes yes
Other Controls - - - yes yes
p-value 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Continued on next page.
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Table F.3: Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Owner Race on the Prob-
ability that a New Hire is Black (continued)
Black
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
R-Square 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.31
Note: Reference group is native firms.Reference Sector is Services. The number of observations is 147,373.
Standard Errors are Huber-White robust standard errors, corrected for firm clustering. Outcomes from
Hispanic-owned firms are used in the regression but are not reported because of disclosure revision. (+) Other
controls include: location in a MSA dummy, legal form of organization, population in thousands in the
neighborhood, interaction between 2-digit industry dummy and English speaker dummy. Neighborhood is defined
as the adjacent counties to the county where the firm is located. Population in 100,000’s. ***significant at 1%, **
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Blacks new workers are more likely to be hired by Black owned firms(See
Tables(F.3). The effect of having other black coworkers is stronger for black owned
firms and then white owned firms. As for Hispanic workers, black employees are
more likely to be hired by firms with higher concentration of high school drop outs
compared to college graduates.
Table F.4: Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Owner Race on the Prob-
ability that a New Hire is White
White
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Owner Black -0.3989*** -0.3946*** -0.0909*** -0.0202 -0.0198***
0.0324 0.0114 0.0178 0.0334 0.0085
Owner Asian -0.3681*** -0.3019*** -0.0808*** -0.0393** -0.0219***
0.0366 0.0046 0.0077 0.0134 0.0031
Owner Hispanic -0.3496*** -0.2735*** -0.0608*** -0.0331** -0.0137**
0.0272 0.0048 0.0086 0.0143 0.0071
White Cowkrs 0.8745***
0.0065
Black Cowkrs -0.8774*** -0.5805***
0.0292 0.0789
Asian Cowkrs -0.8707*** -0.804***
0.0168 0.0627
Hispanic Cowkrs -0.7089*** -0.7722***
0.0139 0.1131




Owner Black* -0.0776 -0.1903
Continued on next page.
152
Table F.4: Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Owner Race on the Prob-
ability that a New Hire is White (continued)
White
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Asian Cowkrs 0.2722 0.298
Owner Black* 0.0715 -0.0166
Hispanic Cowkrs 0.0917 0.1139
Owner Black* -0.1588*** -0.1637*
Black Cowkrs 0.0466 0.1012
Owner Black* 0.0173 0.0725
Other Cowkrs 0.1679 0.2905
Owner Asian* -0.0819***
White Cowkrs 0.0157
Owner Asian* -0.1210*** -0.1311**
Asian Cowkrs 0.0362 0.0852
Owner Asian* -0.1219*** -0.0696
Hispanic Cowkrs 0.036 0.0826
Owner Asian* 0.052 -0.0481
Black Cowkrs 0.0498 0.1291
Owner Asian* -0.1573*** -0.1257
Other Cowkrs 0.0506 0.1408
Owner Hispanic* -0.0551***
White Cowkrs 0.0187
Owner Hispanic* 0.105 0.0516
Asian Cowkrs 0.1008 0.1285
Owner Hispanic* -0.184*** -0.1561**
Hispanic Cowkrs 0.0361 0.0795
Owner Hispanic* -0.1482*** -0.2106***
Black Cowkrs 0.0392 0.1209
Owner Hispanic* -0.2512*** -0.192
Other Cowkrs 0.046 0.1294
Share of workers -0.0025***
with HSD (firm) 0.0006
Share of workers -0.0019
with HSG 0.0016








Constant 0.7209*** 0.8591*** 0.0411 0.9194*** 0.1583*
0.0152 0.126 0.1174 0.1195 0.0946
Year dumies yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies - yes yes yes yes
State dummies - yes yes yes yes
Other Controls - - - yes yes
p-value 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
R-Square 0.24 0.25 0.33 0.35 0.40
Note: Reference group is native firms.Reference Sector is Services. The number of observations is 147,373.
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Standard Errors are Huber-White robust standard errors, corrected for firm clustering. (+) Other controls
include: location in a MSA dummy, legal form of organization, population in thousands in the neighborhood,
interaction between 2-digit industry dummy and English speaker dummy. Neighborhood is defined as the adjacent
counties to the county where the firm is located. Population in 100,000’s. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at
5%, * significant at 10%.
Appendix G
Simulations of employer size effects in a statistical model with
segregation
If immigrants and natives are randomly allocated to jobs in proportion to their
presence in the working population, the expected difference between immigrants and
natives in the share of coworkers who are immigrant is zero regardless of employer
size. However, we find that the distribution of immigrants across workplaces is
clearly not consistent with random allocation, and that concentration is particu-
larly high in small businesses. This raises the question of whether we should expect
some general tendency to segregate to have the same effects on measured concen-
tration in small and large businesses. The following sets up a statistical model that
incorporates some segregation, then uses the model to simulate how employer size
might affect differences in coworker immigrant share.
Suppose that an employer of given size s draws its workforce randomly from
the population, but that some fraction of initial draws that involve an integrated
workforce (i.e. some natives and some immigrants) are rejected and replaced with
a new draw.






 piD(1− pD)s−i (G.1)
where i represents the number of immigrants in the workforce draw, s repre-
sents employer size, and pD represents the fraction of workers who are immigrants
in the group being sampled in draw D. For the initial draw, the parameter p0 will
equal the overall share of immigrants in the workforce.
Suppose that employers discard a draw with probability d which depends on
the composition of the workforce, and a parameter θ which indexes the tendency to
segregate (0 ≤ θ ≤ 4).








If an employer draws only immigrants or only natives, then d = 0—the original
draw is kept. If there are some of both types of employees, then the workforce is
redrawn with probability d. This shifts some of the probability mass from more
integrated towards more segregated types of employee mixes. Figure G.1 illustrates
the shape of d() for various values of θ.
For θ = 4, all draws with immigrants making up exactly half the workforce
(i/s = .5) are discarded in the first round. However, even with s = 2, the final
distribution includes some workforces with i/s = .5 because 1 immigrant and 1
native can be drawn in the second round.
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Figure G.1: Shape of function d
If immigrants account for a small share of the population, they are more likely
than natives to be included in integrated workforces in the first draw. Because of
this, the population that the second draw is taken from has a somewhat higher share
of immigrants than the initial population. (e.g. with s = 2, immigrants are always
half of the workers in discarded first round draws.)
Thus the second draw is also binomial, but the immigrant share is given by:
p1 =
∑s
j=1 b(j, s|p0) ∗ d(j; s, θ) ∗ j∑s








b(j, s|p0) ∗ d(j; s, θ)
)
(G.4)
For the simple case s = 2 and θ = 4 (so d = 1 for the only integrated
workforces—those with 1 immigrant, 1 native), p1 = .5, and the probability of ob-
serving a workforce with 1 immigrant and 1 native in the final distribution simplifies
to p0(1 − p0) (half the binomial probability). Figure G.2 illustrates the difference
between the distribution of the coworker mean with segregation and without for
employers of varying size. It uses parameter values θ = 4 and p0 = .25. Smaller
values of θ would reduce the shift in the distribution, while smaller values of p0 shift
the weight of both distributions to the left.





















The difference is then:
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Figure G.2: Immigrant share distribution with and without segregation




Pr(i, s|p0, θ) ∗




Figures G.3 to G.5 plot out the relationship between employer size and coworker
means for various values of the immigrant share of the overall workforce p(different
colored lines in each graph), using segregation parameter θ = 4. Figure G.3 graph
gives the mean by firm size for immigrants, figure G.4 is for natives, and figure G.5
gives the difference between them. Figure G.6 repeats figure G.5, except that it is
parameterized to represent a lower level of segregation (θ = 1).
Examination of these figures makes a couple of patterns clear:
• For very small employers (< 10 employees), the model can generate a large
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Figure G.3: Immigrant coworker mean and employer size (θ = 4)
Figure G.4: Native coworker mean and employer size (θ = 4)
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Figure G.5: Immigrant-native difference in coworker mean and employer size (θ =
4)
Figure G.6: Immigrant-native difference in coworker mean and employer size (θ =
1)
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difference in coworker means, even with a relatively mild tendency to segregate.
• Even for large theta, this model generates essentially no segregation in large
firms.
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Table G.1: Characteristics of Weighted Matched Sample
Immigrants
Weighted Recent Established Native
Coworker Share 42.0 36.1 14.3
Age
Age<30 44.6 19.8 30.9
30<Age<40 35.7 34.3 28.6
Age>40 19.7 45.0 40.0
Male 56.9 62.4 51.9
Age at arrival (*)
<12 0.9 12.3 .
12-25 36.3 51.5 .
26-35 38.4 25.4 .
35+ 24.5 10.8 .
Establishment size
2-9 8.4 9.2 7.8
10-49 23.6 23.2 22.9
50-99 13.4 13.4 13.4
100-499 29.1 30.6 29.1
500 or more 25.0 23.1 26.8
Firm has multiple establishments 34.6 36.3 42.6
Establishment age
0-1 years 13.0 11.3 11.9
2-4 years 26.2 22.2 24.6
Age 5 or more 60.8 66.6 63.6
Sector
Construction 4.85 5.47 5.71
Manufacturing 18.75 21.70 13.43
Transportation & utilities 2.60 3.77 5.26
Wholesale 6.46 6.73 6.18
Retail 23.99 18.86 22.46
FIRE 3.01 5.14 6.71
Services 40.34 38.34 40.26
Log quarterly earnings 8.15 8.54 8.34
Consecutive quarters on 2000-Q2 job:
Quarter before AND after 57.5 70.4 64.2
Quarter before OR after (not both) 34.7 24.0 28.0
Neither quarter before NOR after 7.8 5.6 7.8
Immigrant share of workers in residence tract 36.5 36.3 14.2
Neighborhood network index 2.00 1.50 1.78
Shared commute index:
Immigrant co-commuters 0.13 0.09 0.04
Native co-commuters 0.21 0.17 0.47
Source: LEHD database and author calculations.
(*) Year of application for a SSN is used as a proxy for time of arrival in the U.S.
Note: The unit of observation is a worker. All figures represent percentages. There are 3,549,111
matched workers in total for our group of MSAs.
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Neighborhood network index 0.0410
Immigrant share commute index 1.9923
Native share commute index -0.5932
Log earn 0.0020
Work Quarter 1 and 2 of 2000 0.0036
Work Quarter 2 and 3 of 2000 0.0016
Full quarter worker 0.0016
College Graduate 0.0013
Graduate Schl. 0.0075
High Sch. Drop 0.0188
High Sch. Grad 0.0024
Poor English 0.0759
Immigrant residential tract 0.1859
Plant age 0-1 -0.0023
Plant age 2-4 0.0039




Plant size 2-4 0.0234
Plant size 5-9 0.0054
Plant size 10-19 -0.0035
Plant size 20-49 -0.0068
Plant size 50-99 -0.0032
Plant size 100-499 0.0045
plant age*Number of plants= 0-1 Multi 0.0009
plant age*Number of plants= 2-4 Multi -0.0001
Note: All standard errors are below 0.001. Controls in all columns include MSA, detailed
industry, employer age and size, worker age and sex, in addition to the variables listed in the
table. The reference group is the group who speak English well. The unit of observation is a
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